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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY   THE PLACE OF TROELTSGH AS 
A THEOLOGICAL THINKER
Brnst Troeltsch was born February 17, 1865, in Augsburg, German.. 
His father was a physicians hence the son had the opportunity to familiar 
ise himself with science in his parental home, and enjoyed the cultural 
advantages to which his family background made him heir. The classical 
culture became known to him in the Gymnasium, where he was prepared for 
the university. Following his own desire, he began the study of theo- 
logy in 1885, and pursued his studies at Erlangen and Gottingen, where 
he sat at the feet of Frank, Ritschl, and Paul de Lagarde. All three 
of these great teachers contributed to the theological development of 
the youthful Troeltsch, as he later acknowledged repeqtedlyj but it 
was Ritschl who was most influential in the formation of Troeltsch* s own
theology,   even though the latter was largely a reaction from the
2 Ritschlian School.
At the conclusion of his theological studies in 1888, Troeltsch 
served as assistant minister in a Lutheran Church in Munich, where he 
had a taste of the practical work of the Christian Church, in which he 
was always to retain interest to a degree unusual among German theo- 
logians. ^ In 1891 his academic career began; for it was then that he 
became a lecturer (Privatdoaent), at Go'ttingen. The following year
1 A. von Harnack, "Rede am Sarge Ernst Troeltschs, "Berliner Tageblatt, 
6 Feb., 1923, reprinted in Die ohristliche Welt, 22 Feb., 1923.
n
c Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 1, Vorwort*
* Cf. his essays on church affairs such as Die Trennung von Staat und
Kirehe, Gewissensfreiheit, Die Mission in dter modefnen Welte, etc.
he was made Professor Extraordinarius at Bonn. In 1893 he was appointed 
full professor in systematic theology at Heidelberg, where he remained 
until 1915, when he was called to occupy the chair of philosophy at Berlin, 
which had once been held by Otto Pfleiderer. Troeltsch held this position 
until his untimely death on February 1, 1923.
In addition to his work as a university professor, and a prolific 
writer on theological and philosophic subjects, Troeltsch took an active 
part in the politics of his time. While at Heidelberg, he was a member 
of ihe Upper House of Baden for several years; and later, in Berlin, he 
was in the Prussian Landtag,.besides serving as Under-Secretary of State 
in the Ministry of Public Worship. This practical interest and vital 
contact with the affairs of his time, both clerical and secular, had an 
energising effect upon his theological thinking; and made him aware be- 
yond all others of his theological compatriots, of the acuteness and 
complexity of the problems which modern life presents to theology. 
Some of his most stimulating essays are those which treat of the con- 
flicts between Christianity and the secular trends of modern civilisation, 
(for example, the famous one, Grundprobleme der Ethik), and indeed all of 
his work is permeated with a broad understanding of modern life and its 
divergent cultural tendencies with which the church must battle.
History from time to time presents us with figures which in 
their single persons embody the spirit of the age in which they live,   
Virgil in the Augustan age, Luther in the Reformation, and others too 
numerous to mention. Troeltsch was such an incarnation of the early
 *  Troeltsch, Christian Thought, Introduction by Baron von Hugelj also 
R. S. Sleigh, The SuiTiciency of Christianity, pp. 21-26.
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twentieth century s for in his own person he epitomised both the 
strengths and the weaknesses of that era. As Kaftan well says, he 
is an epoch in himself,   the early twentieth century. Troeltsch f s 
work mirrors his time with all its varied and conflicting trends, its
u.
appreciation of, and the attempt to synthesise the most divergent and 
i^
incompatible influences. It is this feature of his own mind and tem- 
perament, as well as that of the era to which he belongs that made 
Troeltsch so many-sided, so inconsistent. It was the effort to ex- 
press an age which caused him to change his mind so often, and to be 
so dissatisfied with any position he had adopted. In a personality of 
that type, we cannot expect a unified system, nor a large body of 
positive results, but rather a keen analysis of the problems, and a 
suggestive method of approach to them. These are what Troeltsch gives 
us in his theological writings, in which we have in heightened and 
intense form the Christian mind wrestling with the modern world.
To his task as a theologian and a philosopher in the fields 
of religion and history, Troeltsch brought not only the equipment of 
a powerful mind and a temperament which epitomised the modern world in 
their sweep, but also the indispensable qualification of a thoroughly 
religious mind and heart. Baron von Htigel, who was an intimate friend 
Of his ••"••• over a long period of years, tells us how Troeltsch saw 
in all the events of his own life the guidance and the goodness of God
in Whose presence he felt himself to stand, whether in good or ill
o
fortune, but even if we did not have this confirmation from an in-
The odor Kaftan, Ernst Troeltsch, eine kritische Zeitstudie, p. 1
von Httgel, "Er 
29 March, 1923.
Q
Baron nst Troeltsch,'1 in The Times Literary Supplement,"
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tiiaate friend, we could not help inferring the presence of a deep and 
vital Christian experience from the nan's own writings. Behind the 
involved and technical phraseology in which Troeltsch so often ex- 
presses himself is the unmistakeable heart-beat of a warm and vital Christian 
faith,land frequently .,,,.! in the midst of some learned discussion 
comes an almost lyrical gem of religious insight. It was this re- 
ligious spirit which would never allow him to rest content with the 
idea of a culture that was not Christian. Even when he seems to reach 
negative conclusions, Troeltsch is actuated by a sincerely religious 
desire to find the truth, for as Professor Henry N. Wieman reminds us, 
it is religion that craves and cherishes truth even more than science. 
Moreover, no matter how relativistic Troeltsch 1 s theoretical conclusions 
about the Christian religion might become, they never affected his prac- 
tical devotion to it. As Baron von Hugel finely says, apropos of the 
extreme relativism and individualism which characterised Troeltsch 1 s 
final book, "The wonder is that the conclusion does not appear more 
thin than it does in fact appear. But then we have Ifco do with a soul of the 
rarest and finest richness, which in spite of every logical self-entrap- 
ment, does partly have its way; and again this soul retains certain 
grand convictions, alive still, from pre-individualistic days,   its
faith in God and its sense of Christ   convictions assuredly not
2acquired from such a break-neck plunge."
It is not only the comprehensiveness and power of Troeltsch*s
1 Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, p. 233«
^ Troeltsch, Christian Thought, Introduction by Baron won Hflgel, pp.
-5-
niind, and his vast understanding of modern culture, but his religious 
spirit as well that made him an inspiring teacher, whose memory his 
students still reverence; and from whose books many of us who never 
knew the great master in life still derive light upon our problems 
and religious help towards their solution. During his lifetime, 
he enjoyed great respect not only in Germany, but in other countries 
as well, particularly in the English-speaking world, for whose culture 
he had great appreciation. Even the French Protestant, Vermeil, con­ 
sidered his thought of sufficient importance to make it the subject of 
a sympathetic monograph. The international recognition which Troeltsch 
received was due to the fact that he was free from the extreme national­ 
ism which sometimes spoils the German intellectual. Indeed, while en­ 
tertaining a true affection for his country, he preserved an objectivity 
of outlook upon German affairs which made him aware of the dangerous 
trends in the national and religious life of his fatherland, and also 
displayed a truly international and catholic outlook which enabled him 
to appreciate the excellencies of other peoples. His high estimate 
of Calvinism, in his Soziallehren^.J5 a case in point, as is the esteem 
in which he held the activistic temper of the churches of the Anglo-
n
Jtooerioan world. He visited America in 1904, and wrote appreciatively
2 of much he had seen of church life there; . His last book, Christian
Thought, was a volume of lectures prepared for delivery in England,
Georg Wunsch, "Zum Gedachtnis an Ernst Troeltsch," in Die Christ- 
liche Welt, 22 Feb., 1923, and Albert Dieterich, "Ernst Troeltsch,"
in .Archiv ftir Politik und Geschichte, Marz 1923.. ————— _ ——— • - - . —— — - ————
Cf. his essay, "Die Mission in der modernen Welt," Gesammelte Schriften, 
Bd. II, pp. 783 ff., in which he commends the missionary activity 
of the churches in English-speaking lands, as opposed to the indif­ 
ference of the German churches on the whole question of missions.
' Troeltsch, '"Die Religion im deutschen Staat," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 
II, pp. 69-71. '
although he was prevented from making this projected visit by his death. 
All through his life, he was a keen student of the culture and thought 
of the Anglo-American world, and his books testify abundantly to his 
knowledge and comprehension of our life, both religious and secular,
Although the radicalism which tinged his thinking along theo­ 
logical lines caused him to be viewed with suspicion by the more con­ 
servative and orthodox both in Germany and in other countries, his in­ 
fluence was apparent in the more liberal theological groups, and also 
in some very unexpected quarters. He enjoyed the high respect of the 
philosophers with whom he was associated, and influenced the thinking 
of some of them at a time when by no means all of philosophy was 
friendly towards theology and theologians.?1 Although thoroughly 
Protestant in his own thinking, Troeltsch also achieved the unusual 
distinction of having friends and partial adherents among Roman Cath­ 
olic theologians. Besides his close friendship with Baron von Htigel, 
Troeltsch was admired by other Catholics, among whom is Emil Spiess, -a 
priest. In a recent book entitled Die Heligionstheorie von Ernst
Troeltsch, Spiess ranks him as the greatest theologian of German
o
Protestantism,
Whether one agrees with Troeltsch or not, one must admire the 
breadth of his intellect, the wide range of his knowledge, and the 
diversity of his intellectual interest. He was almost equally at home 
in the three fields, theology, philosophy, and history, and in his work 
as a scholar, Prof. Troeltsch synthesised them all to an amazing degree,
. Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 
1921 edition, p. 559, in which Rickert speaks gratefully of some 
of Troeltsch 1 s criticisms of the first edition of his book. Also Josiah
SJRoy^e, The Problem of Christianity, Vol I pp. 196 ff.
. Spiess, Die Religions the or ie von Ernst Troeltsch, 1927, Vorwort,
viii. Cf. also Erich Przywara's "Ernst Troeltsch" in Stimmender Zeit 
1923, Heft 105, pp. 75 ff . for a favorable estimate of Troeltsch from 
the Catholic standpoint.
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His voluminous writings cover all three provinces, though he began 
with theology as the main interest* Most of his theological works 
were written before 1913, after which time the philosophy of history, 
which had always exercised a fascination over him, became his chief 
occupation. The transition was a natural one, for his theological studies 
had all beendominated by the historical and philosophic bents which were 
so strong in his mind. His very first book, Vernunft und Qffenbarung 
bei Gerhard und Melanchthon, (1891), though a theological treatise, 
reveals the interaction of that interest with the historical and 
philosophic, which was to characterise all his scholarly activity. 
In fact the chief problem to which he devoted himself as a theologian 
and a philosopher of religion was the very pressing one of the relation 
between religion, particularly Christianity, and history.
Though Troeltscl^s earliest work was primarily in the realm 
of theology, his philosophic and historic interests were always so 
strong that it is necessary to understand his philosophic background in 
order to comprehend his theological constructions, for although he always 
maintained religion1^ independence of philosophy, he considered that the 
goal of the two was the same, — that is, the philosophic Absolute is 
identical in the last analysis with God* However, of the two, it is 
philosophy that is subordinate rather than religion. Philosophically, 
Troeltsch was not entirely consistent, either during his entire life, 
or even during any one particular period. In general, he stood in the 
Kantian tradition; for he believed that Kantian idealism
^•Troeltsch, Per Historismus und seine Probleme, p. 210. For the indepen­ 
dence of religion, of. the article, "Die SelbstSndigkeit der Religion/1 
in Die Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirohe, 1895-1896. Although the 
metaphysic underlying this article was not Troeltsch 1 s final position, 
he maintained the independence of religion to the end.
provided the best metaphysical structure into which to fit the
Weltanschaung of the Christian faith as an independent force? but he 
was never a pure Kantian, and the modifications of Kantianism to which 
he gave his allegiance were not the same for all periods.
Troeltsoh himself tells us that he had no real system of phil-
A
osophy. TOiat he did have was an eclecticism which varied from period 
to period, and was not altogether consistent with itself at any one time. 
He started out under the influence of Lotze and Leibniz, as he tells us 
in the biographical sketch to which reference has just been made. In 
this early period, represented by the Selbstandigkeit der Religion, his 
metaphysical structure was a transcendent realism. He believed that 
knowledge dealt with real, and objective perceptions both in the sensuous 
and the transcendent realms. This position, was a compound of Lotze, 
Dilthey and Paulsen, with a strong flavor of Kant and Hegel. The object 
of this construction was a distinctly theological one; to provide a 
basis for the historical demonstration of the superiority of the Christian
religion, yet without the metaphysical agnosticism of Ritschl in theology,
3 
or of Dilthey in philosophy.
^Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p. 479.
2Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. IV, "Meine Bucher," p. 3.
3R. S. Sleigh, The Sufficiency of Christianity, pp. 40-44, and Johannes
Wendland, "Philosophic und Christentum bei Ernst Troeltsch "Zeitschrift 
fur Theologie und Kirohe, 1914, give a very complete account "of 
Troeltsch's metaphysical structure, upon which the present account 
is closely dependent.
Troeltsoh had in his own temperament a combination of a strong 
rational bent and a vital appreciation of the fact that not all of 
life can be reduced to reason and logic; hence this early Hegelian 
position failed to satisfy him completely. In 1903 he changed his 
philosophical position to the Neo-Kantianism of Rickert and Windelband, 
whom he had formerly opposed because of the subjectivity which seemed to 
him inherent in their theories. For his religious interest this shift 
meant a change from concern with the religious Object to the religious 
subject j?;but he believed that he escaped from the dangers of subjectivity 
by basing the validity of religion in the epistemological rather than 
the psychological subject, thereby making religion one of the indepen­ 
dent constituents of reason. This accorded well with the strong in­ 
terest he had in Kant, even though it involved some modifications of 
Kant f s own position, which he discusses in Psychologic und Brkenntnis- 
theorie in der Religionswissenschaft, (final section). Also it provided 
a fitting philosophic structure for the subjective theological approach 
of Schleiermacher, to which he was more and more attracted.
Historically, the theory of Rickett and Windelband afforded the 
advantage of a system of logic for dealing with the material furnished by 
historical science, by which the results of that science could be worked 
over into a philosophy. This is not the place to describe Troeltsch's 
application of the Rickert-Windelband theory of the logic of history; 
for it will be the subject of a later chapter. Suffice it to say 
that it provided a suitable philosophic instrument for his
Troeltsch modified the Windelband-Rickert theory somewhat under the 
influence of Georg Simmel. His philosophy of history was also 
influenced by his association with the economist, Max Weber.
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work in the field of theology from 1903 on through to the publication 
of the Soziallehren, his greatest book in that field, and was the basis 
of the studies in the philosophy of history which engaged him from 
1915 to his death,
Troeltsch 1 s appreciation of the non-rational and alogical ele­ 
ments in history was enhanced by his familiarity with the philosophy 
of Bergson, to whom he often refers with approval. However, it seems 
fair to say that while this philosophy of Bergson did exert a certain 
attraction over Troeltsch ! s mind, he was too strong in his allegiance 
to the Kantian idealism to carry out fully this intuitional strain;
although it seems to the present writer he might have evolved a more
o 
consistent system, had he done so. Troeltsch, however, wished to be
a rationalist and an intuitionalist at the same time; but on the whole, 
his background in the Kantian system was usually dominant; for even in 
the early period, when his metaphysic was quite Hegelian, he seems to 
have believed that he was following Kant, with the consequence that 
the rational element usually won out in his thinking,
Troeltschfs own contributions in the sphere of philosophy were 
made in the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of history, but 
the two fall together to a large degree. Theologians have often dif­ 
fered about the question of the right of philosophy to touch the pro­ 
vince of religion, but Troeltsch was of the number who believe that it
^•Troeltsch, "Das neunzehnte Jahrhundert," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd, IV, 
p. 631, where he speaks of the philosophy of Bergson as providing 
freedom from the grip of psychology on the latter's own ground.
2Por a similar view, see t>. C. Macintosh, "Troeltsch's Theory of
Religious Knowledge, American Journal of Theology, July, 1919.
-Il­ 
ls the function of philosophy of religion to take over from theology 
the normative experiences of the religious consciousness in the higher 
religions, and evaluate their truth and validity in relation to the as­ 
sured results of knowledge furnished by the sciences, such as compara­ 
tive religions, historical science and psychology. Thus the task of 
philosophy of religion is, according to Troeltsch, to test and systema­ 
tise the normative experiences of religion in connection with other 
provinces of knowledge, just as the general philosopher criticises and
synthesises the results of any one of the natural or the social sciences
the 
in light of the rest of knowledge.
Troeltsch1 s own contributions to philosophy of religion were 
made chiefly along the line of evaluating religion in the light of the 
results of historical science; ,Some of his work in this field 
has also to do with the questions raised by psychology, — notably 
the essay, Psychologic und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft, 
in which by means of a religious epistemology of a modified Kantian order, 
he hoped to assure the truth of religion as over against the conclusions 
of psychology of religion in the work of William James and others who 
used the psychological approach in that study. However, it 
was the problem of history to which Troeltsch devoted himself most 
assiduously, and it was this strong interest in that subject which finally 
led him to give himself to the field of the philosophy of history. 
• The problem formulated itself in his mind philosophically as 
the quest of the absolute values in the relative sphere of history.
^•Troeltsch, "Religionsphilosophie," in Die Philosophie im Beginn des 
Zfoanzigsten Jahrhunderts, Festschrift fur Kuno Fischer, edited by 
Wilhelm Windelband, 1904 .
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Religiously it was the effort to discern revelation in the historical, 
the working of ihe Divine in the action of the human spirit. The 
psychological material with which the philosophy of religion must work 
is inextricably bound up with history. That is the field in which the 
religious consciousness is manifested, and where it interacts with 
social movements. If one attempts to make a philosophy which shall 
evaluate the workings of that religious consciousness, one must first 
make a philosophy of history itself; hence Troeltsch turned to the 
philosophy of history. The philosophy of history is not identical with 
the science of history; but the former works over and appraises, the re­ 
sults of the latter. It was in his efforts to construct a philosophy of 
history that Troeltsch found the theories of Rickert and Windelband a 
convenient tool for his purpose.
These two philosophers, and also Dilthey, had worked on the 
problem of the differences of method between the natural and the social 
sciences, of which history is one, Rickert, depending somewhat on 
Windelband, had created a system of logic of history, which is set forth 
in his book, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 
the original edition of which appeared in 1902. Troeltsch depends 
closely on this method, though with some departures from it, Rickert, 
in contrast to Dilthey, who had also worked on the problem of the 
differences between the natural and the social sciences, made an attempt 
to build a philosophy of history out of the analysis of the historical 
object by means of his logic of history; but Dilthey refused to attempt 
this because' it led into the realm of metaphysics about whicii he 
was a skeptic. Rickert, however, maintained that the values reached
^•Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, Dritter und Vierter 
Abschnitt • '"
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through his philosophy of history were formally and rationally based, 
rather than metaphysically. Troeltsch, in the formulation of his own 
philosophy of history, differed from both Dilthey and Rickert. As a 
theologian and a philosopher, Troeltsch could not rest content with 
Dilthey f s metaphysical agnosticism, nor could he be satisfied with 
Rickert 1 s purely rational and formal grounding of the values which con­ 
stituted his philosophy of history. He therefore constructed a phil­ 
osophy of history which frankly sought for the metaphysical implications 
in the finite realm of history, and in the absolute, metaphysical values 
that emerged in his analysis, he found the norms for the future cultural 
synthesis of the relative historical individualisation from which the 
analysis starts.
Troeltsch 1 s philosophy of history is set forth at length in 
his book, Per Historismus und seine Probleme, but long before the appear­ 
ance of this work near the end of his life, he had been using the method 
described there in his historic analyses. He intended to follow this
volume 'with a second analysing present-day European culture according to
o 
his own method; but he did not live to complete the task. It is a matter
of regret that we do not have this concrete application of his philosophy 
of history, but at least he has left us the legacy of a great method for 
the construction of a philosophy of history. No one has ever been com­ 
pletely successful in the creation of a philosophy about so vast an object 
as history, and perhaps Troeltsch would not have succeeded completely, 
had he lived to make the projected analysis. However, his method of ap-
•'•Troeltsch, "Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.
II, p. 709.
^Troeltsch, Gesammelte Sphriften, Bd. IV, p. 14.
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proach is sounder than the theoretical and dialectic one of Hegel; 
hence, if the method were applied, preferably by many hands rather than 
one, the success achieved would probably be greater than that of any 
previous attempt, Troeltsch's own Soziallehren is an effort to analyse 
the history of the Christian Church along the lines set forth later in 
Per Historismus. That work alone is the justification of the praise be­ 
stowed upon Troeltsch by von Harnack, who called him the greatest phil­ 
osopher of history in Germany since Hegel.
It is his construction of this method in philosophy of history 
which makes Troeltsch permanently significant in the field of history 
itself. As a historian in the strictly scientific sense of an investiga­ 
tor of the individual phenomenon, he is not nearly so important; for his 
own investigations were not so painstaking and exact as those of a 
scientific worker in that field should be; but that was not the purpose 
of his work. He never professed to do more than work over as a philos­ 
opher the results already obtained by the scientific historian, and use 
them in drawing the philosophic conclusions inherent in. them. A passion 
for accuracy in the smallest details is seldom combined with the ability to 
see the broad sweep of great movements, their interrelations, and their 
general aims. Troeltsch possessed this latter faculty to a supreme degree.
He has been much criticised for his presentations of particular historical
c
phenomena and personalities, — notably Luther, — in his Soziallehren.
Nevertheless Die Soziallehren is an important and imposing effort to 
determine the interaction between Christianity and the civilisation in
von Harnack, "Rede am Sarge Ernst Troeltschs," in Die christliche Welt, 22 Feb. 1923, p. 106* ——————————
of the most important of the criticisms of Troeltsch's presentation 
of Luther is that of Holl, Gesammelte Aufsatze ZUr Kirchengeschichte, 
Vol. I, pp. 241, 251, 255, etrrs —————————————————————————————
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which it grew up. Although individual parts of the book may not stand 
the test of intense historical scrutiny, as a whole it is a masterly 
analysis of the relation between Christianity and western civilisation; 
and in this sense it is, and must remain, a very impressive attempt at 
the application of his own method as a theologian and a philosopher of 
history.
Troeltsch himself confesses that he does not have a real phil-
2
osophic system, but that he has instead a dominating interest. This
dominating interest is, of course, the historical. It motivated his 
philosophic structure to a very large degree, for his very philosophic 
inconsistencies are largely due to his efforts to find some system that 
does justice to this historical interest. He tells us himself in the 
autobiographical sketch at the beginning of the fourth volume of his 
Gesammelte Schriften that as a university student he was attracted to 
theology because at that time it presented exciting historical problems, 
an- opportunity to pursue metaphysics, and satisfied the strong religious
JZ
urge of his being. His theological work is largely controlled by the 
historical interest, though this was not merely a theoretical one with 
him; for he felt the question of the relation between faith and history 
as a pressing, personal religious problem. The effort of his study along 
this line was to find the Divine revelation in the field of history.
A very fair and sober estimate of Troeltsch's Soziallehren is that of 
Prof, Georg Wttnsch, Evangelische Wirtschaftsethik, p« 104, where he 
characterises the book as a "standard work".
~Froeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd, IV, p, 3. 
3Ibid., p. 4.
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Theologically, as has been stated, Troeltsch started out as 
a disciple of Ritschlj but other influences contributed to his develop­ 
ment as well. To his teacher, Paul de Lagarde, he owed, as he tells us 
in the preface to the second volume of his Gesammelte Schriften, (which 
he dedicated to the memory of that teacher), his breadth of historical
perspective, his essentially historical conception of religion, his
a force
sureness of religion as^interacting with the cultural factors and con­ 
ditions of the ' ... background of which it is a part, yet independent 
of them all. Both through Ritschl at Gfittingen and through Baur at Erlangen, 
Troeltsch came under the influence of the theological tradition of 
Schleiermacher, to whose influence Troeltsch was greatly indebted in his 
theology as well as his ethical system, and to whom he turned more and 
more as he revolted from Ritschl. He repeatedly confesses his obligation 
to Schleiermacher, and the whole conception of his Glaubenslehre, both
in method and content shows a marked dependence on the latter, as he
2 himself states. Like Schleiermacher 1 s, Troeltsch*s whole theological
system is constructed on the plan of an analysis of the Christian con­ 
sciousness, though as we shall see, Troeltsch 1 s wider appreciation of 
history saved him from much of the extreme subjectivism that vitiates 
so much of Schleiermacher^ dogmatic system.
To his great regard for history and philosophy, we must also 
ascribe Troeltsch 1 s revolt from the Ritschlian school of theology. His 
chief disagreements with the Ritschlians were two: his philosophic sense 
was unsatisfied with their exclusion of metaphysics from theology; and
^Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, Vorwort, viii • 
^Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 130.
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his feeling for history was offended by their Biblicism and the sharp 
dualism which they erected between Christ and the rest of the universe. 
He then turned to the theological method of the so-called religionsge- 
schichtliohe Schule, which, although not strictly speaking a school of 
theology, had the historical method in that field as a common bond, 
and which numbered among its adherents the distinguished Biblical critics, 
Bousse-fe and Gunkel. Troeltsch soon became the leading systematic 
theologian of this group.
As its name implies, the procedure of this group of thinkers 
was to consider Christianity not as something a priori apart from, and 
above, all the other religions of the world, but as one of the great 
religions like the others, a part of its historical background with 
which it interacts; and also as one great religion, not separate from, 
but one constituent of the general religious development of mankind. 
Traces of this historical point of view may be discerned in Troeltsch 1 s 
own thought as early as 1894,where it comes to the fore in the essay, 
MDie ohristliche Yfeltanschauung und ihre GegenstrBmungen.'1 prom 
that time on, the historical setting of the Christian religion becomes in­ 
creasingly the material from which he draws his theological conclusions, 
using the method of the historian and scientific thinker in the erection 
of his theological structure. Employing this method, he worked over the 
results of historical criticism in regard to the origin and development 
of the Christian religion, and addressed himself to the problem of the 
relation between the facts of history and the convictions of faith. The 
method not only satisfied Troeltsch 1 s historical sense, which refused to
Troeltsch, "Die Dogmatik der religionsgeschichtlichen Schule," Gesam- 
melte Schriften, Bd. II, pp. 500 ff. ————
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rest content with anything less than an honest and thorough attempt to 
face the problems which historical criticism sets to faith, but also, in 
the search for the absolute,the Divine values and action within the field 
of history, provided scope for the metaphysical within its theology. 
Thus the religionsgeschichtliche Methode provided an approach to theo­ 
logy which corrected the two chief errors of the Ritschlian school, as 
Troeltsoh viewed it.
At the time when Troeltsch began to work, the problem of the 
relation between Christianity and history was much to the fore. A flood 
of new light was being shed upon the historical connections of Christianity. 
A century of Biblical criticism was just drawing to its close, •....
This tide of criticism had brought many problems for faith 
in its wake. « Besides the questions raised as to the revelation con­ 
tained in the Old Testament brought questions as to the beginnings of 
Christianity, and even the figure of Jesus appeared quite other than that 
which the tradition of the Church had presented to faith. Although 
this New Testament criticism had a positive side, its effect had been 
largely negative; for various and competing portraits of Jesus were 
being offered to the world by the critics so that there was great need 
for a careful and systematic rethinking of the problems of Christology 
in the light of all this new knowledge. To this task Troeltsch ad­ 
dressed himself.
The Ritschlian church historian, von Harnack, was also endeavor­ 
ing to answer the problems set to Christianity by historical criticism,
^There is no exact English equivalent to the German expression,
religionsgeschichtliche; therefore the German word is retained, Religio- 
his-coricai, -cne corresponding English term, does not quite express the 
meaning of the original.
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but under the influence of thoroughly Ritschlian presuppositions. Thus 
from his historical investigstions, the figure of Jesus emerged as the 
sole center of authority, and most of the subsequent development in the 
Church was represented as a falling away from, or at best, a misunder­ 
standing of Jesus' teaching. This position of von Harnack»s was un­ 
satisfactory to Troeltsch, who felt keenly that revelation was a con­ 
tinuing process throughout history, and that to find nothing valuable
in the historical development of Christianity after Jesus was to dis-
enriching 1 
regard much that was valuable and in the history of the church.
Therefore in his own grappling with the problem of Christianity and his­ 
tory, Troeltsch endeavored to discern the groundwork of revelation under­ 
lying the whole complex development of the Church, and to find in each 
period certain dominant trends, which carried forward the original reve­ 
lation, and were therefore of normative significance not only for their 
own day, but for the future as well. Not everyone would agree that 
Troeltsch succeeded in discovering these normative trends in the various 
periods of the history of the Church, but his method has much to commend 
it as being a far more inclusive and positive evaluation of Christian 
history than Harnack f s treatment.
Unfortunately we do not have any entirely complete account of 
Troeltsch 1 s theological system. We know it at first hand only as it is 
scattered through his shorter essays and articles; and in the Glaubens- 
lehre, which was published in 1925 from notes taken on his lectures in 
systematic theology at Heidelberg during the years 1911-12, by one of 
his students, Gertrud von le Fort. Although the Glaubenslehre was com-
Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. II, essay "Was heisst 'Wesen des 
Christen^ums 1 ?" pp. 386-391.
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piled in this manner, it accords sufficiently well with his thought as 
we can discern it from his own writings to be regarded as an accurate 
presentation of his theology. After 1915, Troeltwch wrote very little 
in the field of theology; but towards the close of his life, he did con­ 
template a third volume on the philosophy of religion in the series of 
which Per Historismus was to have been the first, which should embody 
the results of his historical studies applied to Christianity, and con­ 
taining his theological system; but his death prevented him from carry­ 
ing out this purpose.
His theology, so far as we do have it, is what any liberal theo­ 
logian of his day might have written, except that the historical interest 
bulks larger in it than is usually the case with such presentations of 
Christian doctrine. He maintains a Christian theistic position in re­ 
gard to God and His relations to the world, : 
1 i / : • ••, The theological structure is cast along
broad enough lines to give room for the convictions of faith in regard to
and
creation, the origin and nature of man, to prevent them from conflict­ 
ing with the results of science. In his effort to be fair to the re­ 
sults of historical investigation, Troeltsch rather overdoes the mat­ 
ter and gives us a somewhat low, though by no means Unitarian Christology. 
He regards Christ as an historical personality Iho is the greatest his­ 
torical revealer of God, the Mediator of redemption, and the center and 
symbol of the collective worship, fellowship and work of the Church. 
The approach to the whole subject of theology is essentially that of 
Schleiermacher, an analysis of the Christian consciousness of the present-
Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. IV, pp. 14-15*
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day; but Troeltsch 1 s historical emphasis saves him from the complete 
subjectivism which usually accompanies such an approach.
Some have denied to Troeltsch the right to the title of theo­ 
logian at all. Theodor Kaftan, writing in the interests of ecclesias­ 
tical Lutheranism, finds in Troeltsch 1 s system nothing which entitles him 
to call himself a theologian, but merely a philosopher of religion of 
Neo-Platonic stamp. This criticism is deserved only in the very 
qualified sense, that in his effort to be fair to the historical con­ 
siderations involved in his theological construction, Troeltsch some­ 
times left too far behind some of the positive convictions of the Church 
in regard to the nature of revelation as a supernatural manifestation, 
and that his Christology is too much dominated by the historical ap­ 
proach to do complete justice to the real significance of Jesus for the 
Christian community.
Moreover, Troeltsch is not a theologian in the sense that he 
created a great dogmatic structure of his own. To develop such a sys­ 
tem is usually the work of less all-seeing minds than his, for they can 
concentrate upon a single aspect or emphasis of a subject, and build 
systems of their own, without being drawn aside from their own line by the 
sweep of the whole. Y/ith his comprehensive mind, it is unlikely that 
Troeltsch would ever have produced such a system, even had he lived to 
complete the contemplated volume on religion. His contribution in theo­ 
logy was .-,• \- to point out with amazing sharpness the problems which con­ 
front theology in the modern world, and to devise a method for their treat­ 
ment, rather than to achieve results and conclusions of his own which
T. Kaftan, Ernst Troeltsoh, eine kritische Zeitstudie, 1912, pp. 55 ff.
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could be knit together into a compact and simple system.
With Troeltsch's essential contribution to theology, that of a 
method of approach, we come to the subject of the present treatment; for 
the concept of norms in theology which he devised is an epistemological 
contribution of no mean order. This theory was one that only such a 
person as Troeltsch could have made; for in the shaping of this theory, 
his wide knowledge of history, theology and philosophy are all united. 
The concept itself has to do with both philosophy and theology. 
History forms the groundwork from which the norms emerge. The norms are 
philosophical in character in that they provide the means by which to 
evaluate the results of historical investigations with a view to under­ 
standing the aims and ends implicit in the historic object of investi­ 
gation itself, and they are also the standards by which to direct its 
future development. The norms indicate the ideal direction of the pro­ 
gress of the historical object towards the absolute values already 
partially embodied in it. In the hands of Troeltsch the norms are more 
then philosophic; they are theological. The ideals toward which they 
point are not only metaphysical absolutes, grounded upon the great 
Absolute of philosophy; they point towards the God of the Christian faith, 
"Whose revelation in finite history they are.
For the complete understanding of the working of the theory 
of the norms, an extensive treatment of the subject is needed. Here only 
a few preliminary considerations as to the significance of the theory 
as a theological contribution can be given. The concept of the norms is 
important not only because it provides a means of dealing with the prob-
-23-
leras which historical criticism raises for theology; but also because it 
is in itself a valuable answer to the whole problem of authority in re­ 
ligion. At the time 1 in which Troeltsch lived, the traditional standards 
of authority in religion had been badly shattered for his contemporaries. 
The criticism of the Bible made it impossible for them to view it as the 
Reformers had done, as an infallible and absolute guide to faith and 
practice. To substitute a return to the authority of the Church is not 
a solution that is acceptable to Protestants, since the claims upon 
which such a position rested had been destroyed once for all for the 
Protestant world at the time of the Reformation. Yet there was need 
for some authority to save from utter subjectivism in which every in­ 
dividual would be a law unto himself. True the Ritschlians were sug­ 
gesting the figure of Christ as the sole center of authority; but that 
idea, too, presented difficulties, since nearly every New Testament critic 
made a different reconstruction of•the personality and teachings of Jesus.
Into this chaos came Troeltsch with a solution to the problem of 
authority in his concept of the norms which emerge through historical 
analysis of Christianity. This solution, as we shall see, is not without 
its difficulties; but it did provide a way of meeting the need for authority 
which avoided a number of the difficulties of the other solutions. It 
had no flavor of Catholicism upon it, such as any return to the Church 
as the final authority must have. It preserved the central place of 
Jesus without resting the entire weight of authority upon him, and there­ 
by disregarding the trends of development set in motion by Paul and the 
other leaders of the church, who faced new difficulties and found solu­ 
tions to problems which Jesus never confronted. The historical emphasis 
saved it from the subjectivism of allowing the religious experience of
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the individual to form the sole standard of authority, unchecked 
"by the social and historic aspects of the Christian faith.
In our day we are still wrestling with the problem of authority, 
to which we have found no complete solution. The method which 
Troeltsch proposed has much in it which should commend it to our care­ 
ful consideration. Just what it has to give us is the theme of this 
treatment. Although the method is not without difficulties, it is a 
very important step along the way towards an authority in Christianity 
which the modern mind can accept.
CHAPTER II
THE NECESSITY FOR NORMS IN THE FI3LD OF THEOLOGY 
We are living in an age -which at one and the same time spurns 
and craves authority. Our generation hates authority, not only be­ 
cause it is selfish and impatient of restraint, but because it has 
witnessed the complete break-down of a number of sanctions which had 
been regarded by former generations as infallible guides to conduct and 
action, but which are now seen to be outworn and useless in the modern 
world. This collapse of authority has affected almost every realm of 
life, — politics, economics, manners, morals, religion, —• with the 
result that many people are throwing aside all authority, and hoping to 
find freedom through entire absence of restraint. Others, finding so 
many of the traditional sanctions gone or inadequate, but realising the 
hopelessness of trying to get on without any authorities at all, are 
seeking for something to put in the place of those which have gone. Of 
course, the war hastened the dissolution of authority; but the process 
was alreadv at work before the war.•>
Perhaps nowhere can the effects of the shattering of authority 
be more clearly discerned than in the sphere of religion; since religion, 
by its very nature and essence, is to a large extent dependent on author­ 
ity, for otherwise every individual would be obliged to recreate the re-
A most penetrating analysis of the problem of the break-down of authori­ 
ty in our age is that of Walter Lippmann, in his book, A Preface to 
Morals, Chaps. I, II.
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ligious heritage for himself. Also, the process took place in that field 
somewhat before it was eo marked in other provinces; and although the war 
revealed in a startling light, religion 1 s appalling lack of authority, 
it did not cause it. Troeltsch's analyses of the situation, 1 written in 
the last decade of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth
century, might have been written today, for the conditions he describes
still 
are essentially those which we/face today. Much of the weakness of the
Church in the modern world may be ascribed to its lack of adequate autho­ 
rity upon which to base its claims to speak on modern problems. It must 
prove to the world all over again that it speaks with Divine authority. 
In the old days, the Chur<Sh had no lack of support for its claim. The 
Catholic Church early forged weapons with which to enforce its pronounce­ 
ments. In its very beginning, it took over the canon of the Old Testa­ 
ment from Judaism, and developed a new body of authoritative Scripture 
in the definition of the Canon of the New Testament. Gradually, also, 
it added the further weight of its own position as the ark of salvation, 
with the pope as the vicar of Christ on earth, and the whole hierarchy of 
the priesthood ordained to apostolic succession. It had also the decrees 
of oecumenical councils as authoritative pronouncements of the whole 
Church on any moot points, and the councils, along with the pope, could 
serve as living interpreters of the Scripture.
When the Reformation discredited the elaborate claims of the 
Church of Home to Divine authority for itself as the custodian of sal­ 
vation, with the pope as the Vicar of Christ on earth, the Reformers had 
the Bible as an infallible authority of Divine origin to replace the
^Troeltsch, Gesamnielte Schriften, Bd. II, the first nine essays, which 
deal with the state of religion in the modern world, particularly in 
Germanv, all of which were written before 1914. Cf. also his lecture, 
Die wissensohaftliohe und ihre Anforderungen an die Theologie, 1900.
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Ghurch, and assert the right to speak to the -world from the Scripture, in­ 
terpreted by the testimonium Spiritus Sancti. Protestantism was thus able 
to equip itself with an authority even more unassailable than that of the 
Church of Rome, However, in order to use the Bible as such an authority, 
it was necessary to maintain its inerrancy, and infallibility, and even in 
the day of Luther, the Copernican astronomy struck at the Biblical cos­ 
mology.
The end of the eighteenth century and the nineteenth brought with them 
a flood of new knowledge about the Bible which made it impossible any long­ 
er, to uphold its inerrancy and infallibility. Various factors contributed
»
to this change. Towards the close of the eighteenth century, Biblical 
criticism as a science began to arise, changing the conception of the com­ 
position of the Bible itself. The work of Lessing and Reimarus in Germany 
took place at this time. The beginning of the nineteenth century saw 
great strides in this science through the investigations of critics 
like Strauss in Germany, and Coleridge in England. The middle of the 
century gave rise to the contributions of great Old Testament scholars 
such as Wellhausen and Robertson Smith. The researches of these and many 
other critics too numerous to mention assured to Biblical criticism its 
position as a science.
By a careful study of the texts of the Bible manuscripts, many 
inaccuracies and breaks in the text itself were discovered. The work of 
the so-called higher critics revealed contradictions in the narrative, 
inconsistencies, and disagreements of one section of the Scriptures with 
other parts. The work of all this criticism made it clear that the Old 
Testament was/composite document, written at various periods by many 
hands, often containing divergent accounts of the same event, instead of
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a unified and inerrant record consistent with itself at all points. Nor 
was the process of criticism confined to the Old Testament, New Testa­ 
ment scholars subjected the gospel narratives to the same rigid scrutiny, 
with the result that discrepancies in some of the records in the gospels 
came to light, so that it became increasingly difficult to establish the 
details of the life and teachings of Jesus, and to disentangle his 
sayings and doings from the thoughts and feelings of the gospel writers,
Other influences such as the progress of archaeology, the newly 
acquired ability to decipher Egyptian, Babylonian and other ancient lan­ 
guages, and the development of the science of historical criticism also 
added new knowledge of the historical background of the Bible. The study 
of comparative religions revealed the kinship between the Biblical usages 
and observances and those of other religions. The sciences brought other 
shocks to the inerrancy of the Bible. Darwin promulgated the theory of 
evolution about this time. Geologists, biologists, astronomers, and 
anthropologists were producing an overwhelming mass of evidence about the 
way in which man and the universe came to be, that stood in direct con­ 
tradiction to the Genesis accounts of creation. In time the view of the 
scientists in regard to these matters established itself in Protestant 
circles, though not without a bitter struggle.
The combined force of Biblical criticism and the evidence of 
the scientists completely changed Protestant thought about the nature 
of the authority of the Bible. Instead of an absolute, inerrant and 
wholly consistent authority, they came to view it as the record of a 
progressive revelation, starting on a very primitive level and culmina­ 
ting in the work of Jesus, but with the gold of this revelation was 
mingled much human dross. The authority of the revelation itself was
seen to be wholly religious and ethical in character, instead of a dis­ 
closure of scientific knowledge about the structure of the cosmos and 
the origin and place of man in it. Thus the Bible could no longer hold 
the position of absolute authority which the earlier Protestants had at- 
i^ributed to it. This left Protestantism bereft of a complete and final 
norm for its faith and practicej for although the Bible retained a place 
of authority as the vehicle of revelation, there were endless differences 
as to how much could be regarded as real revelation, and where to draw 
the line between the human and the divine even in the gospels themselves.
A number of solutions to the problem of authority were, and are 
still being proposed; for many modern Christians feel acutely the need 
to replace the old authorities with new ones. The individual can no 
more be a law unto himself religiously now than in the past. He must 
have some standard for his faith which he respects, and which holds him 
when he cannot hold himself. We see various indications of the quest 
for a final authority about us. The fact that the Koman Catholic
Church is gaining strength where the grip of the Protestant church is
these.
loosening is one of / The Fundamentalist, in the very despair with 
which he clings to the infallibility of the Bible is another symptom 
of the widespread quest for authority. The Anglo-Catholic*s enthusiasm 
for the authority of the Church, and reunion with Rome, represents 
another form of the craving.
The whole program of the Anglo-Catholic movement is one proposed 
solution to the problem of authority. Unfortunately, it has the draw­ 
back of reunion with Home, which makes it unacceptable to those who do 
not wish to sacrifice the gains of Protestantism. Another way out is 
essentially individualistic and mystical in character, - that of making
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the individual's own religious experience the final seat of authority, 
That every religious soul must have a first-hand experience of religion, 
no one could or would wish to deny, otherwise religion would lose all 
immediacy and present value, but to erect the experience of the individual 
to the position of the only ultimate norm would mean chaos. The in­ 
dividual must have the confirmation of his religious experience from 
other and greater souls, and there must be some exterior social and 
historical standard to guard him and the Christian community against 
all sorts of aberrations and heresies into which religious mysticism 
left to itself can easily run. Moreover, if the Christian is to speak 
to his world, he must have behind him something more convincing to 
others than the subjective force of his own conviction.
A far more important solution to the problem of authority in 
Christianity was that of Ritschl. Following Schleiermacher, Ritschl 
placed weight of authority upon the figure of Jesus, but he went far­ 
ther in making Jesus the central, objective and exclusive authority 
than Schleiermacher, with his greater subjectivism, was willing to do. 
Ritschl f s answer to the problem of authority had the great merits of 
providing an authority that was really objective, and was thoroughly 
Christian in according to Jesus the central place in the religion he 
founded. However, in the form in which Ritschl stated his position, 
Christianity appeared as a supernatural religion quite apart from, 
and superior to, all the rest of the religious development of mankind; 
and his apologetic rigidly excluded metaphysics from theology. Instead, 
he based his claim for the supernaturalism of Christianity on the
. W. Adams Brown, The Essence of Christianity, Chap. VII »
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famous theory of value judgments. According to this, religious judgments, 
like those of ethics, are of a wholly practical nature. We know the truth 
of Christianity and its distinctive character because in Christ we find 
the power of God unto salvation, which lifts us up to a redeemed positioi 
of moral power and freedom which we find nowhere else. Thus the Rit- 
schlian theology involved a marked dualism between Christianity and the 
rest of the religious history of mankind, and its exclusion of meta­ 
physics was unsatisfactory to the more philosophically-minded. It was 
exactly these points that Troeltsch saw as weaknesses, and endeavored 
to correct.
The Ritschlian Biblicism shown in the separation of Christianity 
from the rest of religious history did not satisfy Troeltsch's strong 
historical sense, and since he possessed a more philosophic mind than 
Ritschl had had, he could not rest content with the exclusion of meta­ 
physics. He says in criticism of that school, "It is a fundamentally 
unphilosophic and anti-philosophic theology, which uses only as much
philosophy or epistemology as it needs to free itself from philosophical
gand metaphysical competition." For this purpose they appeal to Kant
and those Neo-Kantians who are critical of metaphysics to the extreme of 
denying it altogether, and ignore the positive theories of religion 
of both Kant and the Neo-Kantians. Instead of using metaphysics, the 
Ritschlians prefer to turn to history, but here, too, Troeltsch goes 
on to say, "They concern themselves with free, scientific history only
Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, (translation by H.R. 
Mackintosh), pp. 203 ff.
^Troeltsch, "Riickblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert der theologischen 
Wissenschaft," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p. 204.
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in so far as it offers support for the ideational structure of religion 
in the great centers of the history of Christianity, and is adapted to 
the justification of a metaphysically agnostic theology."
This selective use of history to serve the ends of Biblicism 
and supernatural!sin also vitiates the theory of the value judgments, 
according to Troeltsch, for unless these value judgments are to become
wholly subjective in character, they need the objective support of
pa thorough historical grounding. In order to furnish such historic
supplement for the inadequacies of the Ritschlian use of history, 
Troeltsch turned to the method of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule. 
Working on this historical approach to religion, he endeavored to dis­ 
cover a method that would overcome the difficulties of the Ritschlian 
theology.
The presuppositions of the re1igionsge s c hi cht1iche Schule are 
quite different from those of the Ritschlians in regard to the relation 
of Christianity to history, and the in/hole theological method is in 
consequence quite dissimilar. Troeltsch, it is true, denied that 
this religionsgeschichtliche Schule was a school in the sense that 
it had a common theological viewpoint; but rather the group was com­ 
prised of thinkers with dissimilar aims who had merely a common method 
of approach as their bond of unity, (in fact, the group included among
its modern representatives individuals of such divergent aims as himself
gand Otto Pfleiderer.) Troeltsch himself was the chief systematic theo­ 
logian of the school. The essence of the method, according to him, is
Troeltsch, "Rttckblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert der theologischen 
Wissenschtfft," Gessamelte Sohriften, Bd. II, p. 204.
2Ibid., p. 217
3Troeltsch, "Die Dogmatik der religionsgeschlichtlichen Schule," 
Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, pp.,502-505.
-33-
that in the construction of a dogmatic, one renounced all efforts to 
base it upon a supernatural apologetic for one's own religion, and ap­ 
proached Christianity and Judaism as a constituent part of the religious 
development of mankind, not something a priori distinct from, and superior 
to the other religions of the world. In this historical light, one could 
then survey and decide the competing claims of the world religions to 
finality, (His own Absolutheit des Christentums is a good example of 
the application of the theory.)
Historically, the method has affinities with the approach of 
Locke and Hegelj but its real father is Schleiermacher. Since his time, 
however, a much larger body of knowledge about the genesis of religion 
has come to hand from the investigations of anthropologists, ethnologists, 
and psychologists so that the results of the application of the method 
are much surer than in his day, when comparatively little was known in 
these fields, and the science of history was still in a very undeveloped 
state. The increased knowledge of the subject of comparative religions 
enables the present-day investigator to make an historical analysis of 
the great religions of the world, and to measure them all by a common 
standard which arises out of the process itself. By this norm that 
emerges from the historical analysis itself, the claim to truth and 
validity of the various great religions can be decided, although it is 
impossible to prove on this historical basis that any one of the present 
world religions is final. All that can be done is to discern the pre­ 
sumption as to ultimate victory of the one which best conforms to this 
inherent norm arising from the analysis. As far as the norm by which to
^Troeltsch, "Die Dogmatik der religionsgeschichtlichen Schule," 
Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p. 501.
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measure the claims of the religions itself is concerned, it cannot be
scientifically established, but in the investigation of the several re-
norm 
ligions, the /urges itself upon the consciousness of the competent in­
vestigator with self-evidencing force as the ideal inherent in them all, 
but realized in varying degrees in its several historic manifestations. 
The one that most fully actualises this norm would therefore be the one 
with the greatest presumption of finality in its favor.
The second theological aim of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule 
concerns Christianity more particularly. It is the construction of 
the normative essence of Christianity through the historical analysis, 
or in other words building a dogmatic structure for the present time. 
Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre is the first attempt which uses the his­ 
torical approach. Hegel also tried to construct such a system for the 
Christianity of his day. Both of these efforts contained defects due 
to the inferior historical knowledge of their times, and in the case of 
Hegel to a rational approach to history rather than a factual one; but 
these theologies served their day and generation, — which is all we can 
hope for, or expect of any formulation of dogmatics, including our own. 
In fact the aim of the construction of the normative
essence of Christianity is exactly this: to determine what Christianity 
really is for our own time, and to make a consistent and convincing 
statement of it which shall include both the historical sources of 
revelation which have come down to us from the past, and the religious
convictions of the present-day Christian community, systematised and
n criticised in the light of the best knowledge of our time. It was
~Troeltsch, "Die Dogmatik der religionsgeschichtlichen Schule," 
Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p. 509.
2Ibid., pp, 510-515-
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in the effort to construct such a dogmatic that Troeltsch developed his 
concept of norms in theology,
Before giving an exact definition of the norms, and the method 
by which Troeltsch evolved the concept, it will be necessary to con­ 
sider the problems which the idea was intended to meet. We have spoken 
at some length of the break-down of the authorities that had been re­ 
garded as absolute and final in religion, and the resultant confusion 
among religiously inclined people. No one realised this situation more 
clearly than did Troeltsch. He saw that the old authorities had lost all 
hold upon the mind of at least his educated contemporaries; and that the 
newer substitutes for the old standards were unsatisfactory, as we have 
pointed out in his criticism of the Ritschlian school. He comprehended 
also that the search for any single seat of authority had been rendered 
futile by the progress of the historical criticism which had affected
the theological world; that a marked trend towards scepticism was
that 
abroad in some quarters, and/in tothers the whole body of religious con­
victions had become unsure and relative. Those who were not content 
with the popular secular attitude of living in this world alone were 
turning to artificial religious fads of a purely modern sort: monistic 
pantheism of an aesthetic character, humanism, enthusiasm for eastern
cults, theosophy and even Buddhism under the influence of Schopenhauer,
forming 
or were / groups, who under the sway of Nietzsche, or the material­
istic natural scientists, had given up any belief in God, but still 
clung to ethics.
At the time in which Troeltsch began to work, the trend away
•^Troeltsch, "Die ohristliche Weltanschauung und ihre GegenstrBmungen,"
"Die theologieche und religiose Lage der Gegenwart," and 'Atheistische 
Ethik," Gesainmelte Schriften, Bd. II. Also Die wissenschaftliche Lage 
und ihre Anforderungen an die Theologie.
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from Christianity had doubtless gone farther in Germany than in the 
English-speaking world, but his description of the groups ^vho were 
seeking some new religious solution soundsvery like similar groups - At
least in the American world - today. Since the problems to which he
addressed himself 
/ so closely resemble our own, it seems probable that the solutions
he endeavored to give for them are worth careful consideration in our 
time. It was to this group who were already confused and for whom the 
old religious positions were shattered that Troeltsch particularly directed 
his efforts. The points of attack on the Christian position were then, 
as now, from three chief sources: the onslaughts of the natural sciences,
psychology, and historical criticism. With the problems of natural 
science and its relation to the Christian world view, Troeltsch did 
little more than to try to build a framework for theology large enough 
to afford scope for the results of their findings, and to emphasise 
the metaphysical aspects of the ultimate problems involved in those
questions which were beyond the power of science to settle. The
under 
psychological side was subsumed/ the historical and epistemological
part of his contribution.
There remained the historical problems as his chief center of 
effort. In order to give a real answer to the questions in this sphere, 
he tried to put aside all remnants of the older dogmatic method in theo­ 
logy which had the a priori criterion of the supernatural by which to 
judge all historical phenomena connected with the Christian religion, 
and to give an answer to the questions set by historical criticism on 
their own ground. The interconnections between history and the
Troeltsch, "Logos und %thos in der Theologie," Gesamrtielte Schriften, 
p.817.
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Qiristian religion are numerous and inextricable. The Christian church, 
following the example of its Master, took over the Old Testament re­ 
ligious heritage, whose revelation was contained in the long historic 
process through which the Hebrew people gradually came to understand 
the character of the God Who was revealing Himself to them. That in 
itself brought a train of connections between faith and history. More­ 
over, the redemption which Christianity promises, and its chief revela­ 
tion of God center in the historic figure of Jesus, its Founder; hence 
the faith of the Church must always have the sure basis of that historic 
figure from which to draw its most vital experience of the character 
of God, its certainty of redemption, and the inspiration for its wor­ 
ship , education and missionary activity for the extension of the King­ 
dom of God in the world. The fact that the Christian church goes back 
to its Founder as a historical personality is, of course, the greatest 
connection between faith and history. Not only these considerations, 
but also the facts concerning the rise of the early church make it
necessary for the Christians to face the need for a firm historic basis
1 
for its whole heritage.
There are further questions to be decided on historical grounds: 
such as how much of the later elements which the Church assimilated from 
the ancient and the medieval world are in accord with its essential ideal 
and the trends inherent in it from the beginning, and ho.v much is extran­ 
eous and foreign to its spirit; and finally, the problem of what elements 
in the historic heritage are vital and necessary to the present-day Christ­ 
ian community. N ow in the old days, no one
1
Troeltsch, A rticle, "Glaube und Geschichte," in Die Religion in 
Geschichte und Gegenwart t edited by Schiele, 1910 edition,
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thought of questioning the facts recorded in the Bible, nor was there 
much difficulty in accepting naively the traditional heritage of the 
Church. Questions about matters of this kind are quite largely a modern 
affair, raised by the progress of historical science and Biblical 
criticism. Of course, the systematic theologian must leave to the 
Biblical critics and the Church historian the task of ascertaining 
the facts about these matters, but he must appraise the signifi­ 
cance of their findings for faith. Out of the complex historical 
phenomenon that history shows Christianity to be, the theologian must 
determine what elements are really essential, vital and normative for 
the present-day, in other words i erect a theological structure for
-»
the modern church.
But how can any decision be reached as to what these normative, 
vital and essential elements in the Christian heritage are? The 
great historian, von Harnack, in his Wesen des Christentums (English 
translation entitled What is Christianity?) had given the answer that 
the essence of Christianity was to be found in the life and teachings 
of Jesus. Troeltsch, however, believed that no single answer, of this 
kind could be given; since in a historical phenomenon so vast and com­ 
plex, it is impossible to point to one element or one period, even though 
that be Jesus and his teaching, as the essence and weight of author­ 
ity for the whole. Instead, one must determine the essence of 
Christianity for each separate period, for this essence is different 
for each era of Christian history. The theologian must determine it 
for his own day, considering the historical trends which have moulded
^•Troeltsch, Die Dogmatik der religionsgesohichtlichen Schule, pp. 511-512 »
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the present, and the present-day religious consciousness of the 
Christian community. Only thus can he do adequate jus­ 
tice to the historical heritage of revelation, and to the living character 
of the latter as a present fact of the religious consciousness.
Two further questions arise in connection with the determination 
of essence of Christianity: How can the field of history, which is 
really relativistic in character, furnish normative and therefore 
authoritative standards for theology? And secondly, how are these 
norms derived? The answer which Troeltsch gives to the first of these 
questions is that although the province of history does relate to facts, 
to temporary individualisations, and relative forms, these individual- 
isations nevertheless are incarnations of, and approximations to an 
ideal which is inherent in them, and towards whose fuller embodiment 
they strive. This ideal is never to be found in the abstract, but only
in the concrete. Thus the separate eras of Christianity are efforts to
to 
embody the ideal inherent in its historical heritage, and also/incarnate
whatever new aspects of the continuing revelation of the Divine Spirit 
that age has apprehended for itself. Even revelation is not to be 
found detached from the personalities who are its historical bearers, 
The effort of the method, is then to discern this absolute element in 
its relative form, and to separate the Divine working from the human 
dross surrounding it.
The answer to the second question concerns the derivation of 
the norms themselves, Troeltsch saw in history not a chaos, a mass of 
relative and fleeting forms without purpose or meaning, but the scene
Troeltsch, "flber historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie," 
Gesammelte Schriften, Bd« II, p. 747,
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of the ^ivine activity, moving towards definite goals and ends of its 
own, of which all the individual forms were constituent and contributing 
factors. The investigator who seeks the norms by which to judge this 
vast historical object must abandon himself to it, for the norms are in­ 
herent in the object itself. He starts from the data furnished to him 
by history; but instead of finding the object a disordered mass of 
divergent trends that lead nowhere, he finds norms, directive trends, 
emerging from it. Indeed they arise almost spontaneously out of it; 
and are discerned as the ideals which are inherent in it, and which 
it is striving to express. The norms in the historical analysis are 
never external standards such as the canons of logic, which are applied 
from without; they are intrinsic to the object, and can be discerned in 
no other way than through the analysis of the object itself. Of course, 
with the discerning of the norms, history as an empirical science has 
been left behind, and the investigator has passed over into the sphere 
of philosophy, or more properly metaphysics? but only through this 
transition can the full meaning and ultimate ends inherent in the his­ 
toric object be understood, the truly absolute values be reached, 
and the divine ends be apprehended through the concrete forms that 
partially express them.
The process of ascertaining the theological norms is not only 
a philosophic one, it is a theological or religious act as well; for 
Troeltsch always maintained that knowledge of the religious Object, 
the God Who thus reveals Himself in history could be reached only
Troeltsoh, "Tiber historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie," 
Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. IT, p. 747.
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through religion. The investigator who would discern this Divine reve­ 
lation must therefore be religious himself, or he will miss the norms, 
these trends which show the Divine activity in the historical process. 
An illustration may help to clarify this point. Let us suppose that a 
Beethoven symphony is being played at a concert. The layman who listens 
to it may hear nothing but a pleasing melody. A mathematician who is 
present may understand the rhythmic structure behind it . But if a 
trained musician is there, he will not only be pleased by the melody, and 
understand the rhythmic structure, he will penetrate behind them both to 
the theme which the piece expresses, to the idea it incarnates. So also 
when the theologian comes to the analysis of the historic object, he 
sees in it more than a mass of facts as the empirical historian does, 
he sees more than an ordered structure as the philosopher might, he pene­ 
trates to the Divine activity which motivates it behind its concrete form.
It now becomes necessary to attempt a definition of the norms 
in the sense in which Troeltsch uses the term. The norms are direc­ 
tive trends or tendencies which arise spontaneously from the analysis of 
the historic object, striking the observer with an inescapable force that
makes them self-authenticating in their cogency. The norms may be values,
in the direction 
meanings, ideals or tendencies towards an ideal/of which the object is
moving. They may be incorporated in the life of a certain group, 
within the historic object, or common to the whole object at a certain 
period or periods, or they may be incarnated in a historic personality 
within the object. The norms are a priori and self-validating in char­ 
acter; but are not necessarily timeless, universally valid and absolute,
Troeltsch, "Die Selbsta'ndigkeit der Religion," in Zeitschrift fur 
Theology und Kirche, Heft 5, 1896, p, 432.
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since they inhere in individual historical aggregates, and may vary from 
one epoch to another. The norms for the Christianity of the Middle 
Ages, for example, might be very different according to Troeltsch*s 
view from those for twentieth century or primitive Christianity. Also, 
if China or India should become Christian, the norms for their Christian­ 
ity might be entirely unlike those for the Christianity of the European- 
American world at the same timej since the historic aggregates out of 
which the norms arise would be different in each case.
The authoritative nature of the norms rests principally upon 
two of their characteristics. The first of these is the fact that they 
are inherent in the object itself, instead of external standards applied 
from without. The second is their objective, or self-authenticating 
quality. Even in the realm of sense perceptions, the norms for some 
particular concept derive their authority from these two aspects of their 
nature. They are inherent in the object, and they strike the observer 
with a force that is compelling, or as Troeltsch would say, a priori, 
or self-authenticating. If one wishes to form an ordinary sense-concept, 
like cat, it is only necessary to examine individuals of that species, 
and one can soon determine entirely to one's own satisfaction what the 
norms, the indispensable characteristics of that genus are5 but there 
is no process in the world by which one could learn from applying the 
canons of logic to the object what that animal really is. Its norms era 
inherent in ths objcc^, end binding and cogent in their force.
Nor is the process of the discovery of norms different in the 
less tangible realm such as art and religion. There, too, the norms
Troeltsch, Der Historikmus und seine Probleme, p. 166*
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are inherent in the object. The concept of the beautiful cannot be dis­ 
covered by the application of logic to the object. One derives the norms 
for the beautiful in art from examining the works of the masters, from 
which certain indispensable characteristics such as harmony, symmetry, 
balance, and a subtle but compelling quality suggestive of an ideal truth 
beyond the concrete expression embodied in the object emerge as the norms 
for the beautiful and strike the observer with self-authenticating force.
The same kind of process goes on determining the norms in the 
sphere of religion. Here history furnishes the object of investigation 
from Which the standards are derived, for it presents the pageant of the 
interaction of the Divine with the human spirit both in the consciousness 
of groups and in the consciousness of individuals. Through the contempla­ 
tion of the historic object, the norms, that is, the absolutes, the Divine 
characteristics, meanings and ends do emerge from the human dross with 
which they are intermingled, and strike the investigator with inescapable 
force. The Reformation is a good example of a period in which one can 
see how Troeltsch's concept works. The analysis of it, of course, re­ 
veals human failings and faults, but it shows larger values, absolutes in 
their partial expression, and the undoubted action of the Divine behind 
them, which no religious observer can miss.
The matter of the validation of the theological norms is the 
final point in the explanation of the working of the whole concept,. 
How are we to guard against the possibility of error upon the part of 
the investigator? Is there not a chance that he may be mistaken in his 
apprehension of the norms which thus arise from his investigation of the 
historic object? Troeltsch frankly admits that there is a certain danger 
of subjectivism attendant upon the ascertaining of the norms, and that
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there is the possibility of various investigators disagreeing about the 
norms for a given period. However, he feels that the normative elements 
are so compelling in themselves, and the force of the Zeitgeist is so 
strong in the object of investigation at any particular period as to 
insure fundamental agreement among the investigators. Not content with 
this objective validation for the norms from the nature of the object, 
he has a further subjective validation in the religious a priori, a 
form in the epistemological subject by which the human reason acting 
in the religious shhere is able to recognise the working of the Divine 
reason in the object of investigation. This theory of the religious 
a priori will engage our attention at length later on, but here it must 
suffice to say that by means of this postulate of the religious a priori, 
Troeltsch tried to insure to religion an independent position among the 
constituents of the human reason, and also to minimize the possibility 
of subjective error in the discerning of the norms which constitute the 
essence of Christianity.
Such in brief is Troeltsch 1 s construction of the concept of 
norms. It is this group of norms which constitute the essence of 
Christianity which he would substitute for the single authorities of 
the older theologies. His claims for his authority are modest. He 
nowhere promises from it the absolute certainty that the older religious 
authorities seemed to assure. He does not assert that the norms are 
necessarily absolutes for more than the particular period from which 
they are derived, although they may be. Nor does he maintain that they 
are always applicable to other historical aggregates than the one from
froeltsch, "Die Dogmatik der religionsgeschichtlichen Schule," 
GesammelteSchriften, Bd, II, p. 512•
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which they arise, although in some cases they may prove capable of this
wider application, and become absorbed into the historical continuum of 
the Christian heritage. Their real function is to provide a normative 
essence of Christianity for the present, by revealing the ideals passed 
on from the historical heritage in a manner authoritative for the 
present, and indication the directions along which the future should be
shaped in order to attain a fuller expression of the ideal inherent in
1
the object. Their authority is a living, growing one, but it also pre­ 
serves the ideals and the urges inherent in historic' Christianity, from 
which they spring.
Furthermore Troeltsch claims for the construction of the norma­ 
tive essence of Christianity, the authority of a science only in so far 
as the material with which it starts, the historic data, are scientific, 
and in so far as theology always works with the concepts of theoretical 
knowledge and philosophy. The, rest of the structure rests upon faith,
which is necessarily personal; hence theology cannot be a pure science,
2 (Wissenschaft) Faith does, according to him, furnish the believer with
real knowledge of the religious Object, but it is a personal assurance 
resting upon experience, and therefore incapable of scientific demonstra­ 
tion.
This double nature of theology is a logical outgrowth of 
Troeltsch's position. He was not content to base theology upon the ex­ 
perience of faith alone,.lest one run into the danger of self-deception;
therefore he felt that it is necessary to criticise and check this personal/
experi-
xroeltsch, "Was heisst'Wesen des Christentums'?" Gesammelte Schriften, 
Bd. II, pp. 425 ff.
2Tro61tsch, Article, "Dogmatik," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegen- 
wart, 1910 edition.
^Troeltsch, Article, "Glaube," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. 
1910 edition. '
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ence of religion with the best knowledge of the time upon matters rele­ 
vant to it. On the other hand theology could never be entirely a matter 
of science or philosophy, since only through religious faith could the 
religious Object ever be known,
At the time when Troeltsch first formulated the main outlines of 
his approach to theology, with its method of the norms, in the essay, 
Die Selbstgndigkeit der Religion, which appeared in the Zeitschrift fiir 
Theologie und Kirohe in 1895-96, there were many who questioned the 
possibility of building a dogmatic along the lines he suggested. Julius 
Kaftan replied to his article by raising grave doubts as to the carrying
out of Troeltsch*s approach without granting the unique supernatural ism
2of Christianity. A somewhat similar criticism is that of Prof. H. «»
Mackintosh, who expresses the opinion that a method of constructing a 
dogmatic such as Troeltsch suggests, a priori excludes the possibility
of recognising the absoluteness of Jesus, since the relative field
this would be 
of history knows no absolutes 3 and thai/to cut the very nerve of the
2Christian religion from the start. Certainly Troeltsch*s own norma­ 
tive construction of theology did work out much as these theologians 
prophesied; but that effect was du« more to a failing in Troeltsch 1 s 
own temperament • ~ ttoan to the inherent logic of his method, 
Troeltsch, in his great conscientiousness, as an objective thinker, 
sometimes failed to recognise the absolutes as such, even when the 
logic of his concept of norms demanded it,
Troeltsch, "Die Selbstst&idigkeit der Religion," Zeitschrift fUr Theo­ 
logie und Kirche, Heft 5, 1896, p. 432- ——————
2J. Kaftan, "Die Selbstftndigkeit des Christentums," and "Die Methode; 
der Supranaturalismus," in Die Zeitschrift fdr Theologie und 
Kirche, Heft 5, 1896 and Heft 1, 1898 •
, R. Mackintosh, "Does the Historical Study of Religion Yield a Dog 
matic Theology?" in American Journal of Theology, 1909, pp. 505-519.
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The concept of the norms as a method promises more authority 
and greater assurance for Christianity than it actually attained in 
Troeltsoh's own hands. If this were not so, the method would be, 
like Troeltsch 1 s own personal quest for certainty, a glorioiu yet 
tragic failure, Troeltsch himself was never content with anything 
he devised, and at the end of his life, as at the beginning, was still 
seeking the truth along new lines, tearing down with his own hands what 
he had previously built up. Yet he had within his grasp the possibility 
of achieving the certainty he craved, had he been content to concentrate, 
to systematise, and to think through to their ultimate consequences the 
positions he had reached. Since he himself did not do this, it is 
for those of us who feel the greatness of the main outlines of his 
work to endeavor to shape and focus it so as to bring out its inherent 
possibilities and the values for the future which lie in it. It is in 
the hope of making a small and humble contribution towards the better 
understanding of Troeltsch's concept of norms as indicating the lines 
along which a solution of the vexed problem of authority in religion 
might be reached that the present paper is undertaken.
With that aim in view, it will first become necessary to show 
how Troeltsch evolved the concept of norms in the field of philosophy of 
history, then the relation of the norms of philosopiiy of history to 
those of theology. The relation of the historical norms to the theo­ 
logical ones will lead into the peculiarities of the derivation of the 
theological norms themselves, and the application of the method in the 
construction of the normative essence of Christianity, with particular 
attention to the unique normative position of Jesus. Although the ap­ 
plication of the norms to the general field of the world religions from
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some points of view belongs to the sphere of philosophy of religion, it 
is included here partly because no account of Trpeltsch's method
-would be complete without it, but also because this phase raises 
the question of the finality of Christianity, which is a theological 
concern as well as an interest of philosophy of religion. Finally, we 
shall endeavor to appraise the concept as a contribution towards the 
solution of the problem of authority, with some criticisms of, and sup­ 
plements to the theory with a view to clarifying its real intent and 
indicating some of its applications. It is not the intention of this 
criticism to go beyond the broad outline which Troeltsch set, but only, 
so far as possible to fill in the fine points which the grand scale of 
his outline leaves bare, in the hope &f illuminating thereby the great­ 
ness of the original a little more fully.
CHAPTER III 
TROELTSCH'S DETERMINATION OF NORMS IN THE GENERAL FIELD OF HISTORY
We have seen that Troeltsch considered history of vital impor­ 
tance to the theologian, because revelation takes place within that 
sphere. The Divine self-manifestation has been made chiefly through 
the medium of personality rather than the world of nature. Even Jesus 
can be understood only in the light of the historic development of the 
religion of Israel, which preceded Him, and His greatness can be fully 
estimated only in connection with the succession of the great figures 
of the Christian Church, whom fie inspired. Christianity itself can be 
best interpreted as it is seen in the setting of the general religious 
history of mankind. Yet not all of the sweep of history is of equal im­ 
portance to the theologian. Troeltsch believed that only the history 
of the higher religions can yield material that is of real significance 
in understanding the true nature of religion. The more primitive side of 
the history of religion, while it does throw some light on the later development
from a psychological point of view, is too intermingled with myth
n
of an uncritical sort to display the real aims of religion. He there­ 
fore confined his attention to the more developed forms, where the moti­ 
vations and ideals that underlie the separate manifestations of re­ 
ligions could be clearly perceived.
The more he studied the higher religions, the more Troeltsch 
came to feel that it was impossible to understand them fully without
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 72»
2Troeltsch, "Religionsphilosophie," in Die Philosophie im Beginn des 
zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, Festschrift""fur Kuno Fischer, edited by 
Wilhelm Windelband, p. 139- '——~——
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investigating the cultures of which they were a part. This was one 
main consideration which caused him to shift over from theology to the 
study of philosophy <af history? "but, as Bornhausen points out, his in­ 
terest in the latter field always remained that of a theologian. The 
same motive, the search for the absolute in its relative historical em­ 
bodiment, dominated Troeltsch f s historical studies, as it had engaged 
him in his theological pursuits. Although a philosopher of history, he 
sought the Divine ground of revelation behind the human activities which 
make up history. The quest of the normative elements ever engaged him. 
It is therefore necessary to trace his method of discerning the norms 
in the field of history itself in order to understand his concept of 
norms in theology; for in his historical studies, the method xvhich he 
had long been using in his theological research reached its final fruition.
Troeltsch 1 s philosophy of history is set forth at length in his 
book, Per Historismus und seine Problems, which he published in 1922, just 
a few months before his death. Several of the shorter essays such as 
Moderne Ge s c hi chts philosophic, Geschichte und Metaphysik and Die Bedeu- 
tung des Begriffes der Kontingenz also deal with the subject; and an out­ 
line of his method is available in English in the article on Historio­ 
graphy in the Hastings Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. 
The discussion of this chapter is based mostly upon Der Historismus,
which is by far the most exhaustive treatment of the subject which 
Troeltsch left, with such reference to the other essays as is necessary 
or desirable to supplement the lengthier work.
The method of the derivation of the norms in the field of the
Karl Bornhausen, "Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem der wissenschaft- 
lichen Theologie," in Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, 1923-24, 
p. 198. ——
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philosophy of history throws much light upon the concept of norms in 
theology, for the method is much the same in the two cases. In fact one 
might almost say that the theological norms are one aspect of the his­ 
torical. This does not mean that the norms in the two fields are iden­ 
tical, though at times they arej but merely that the method of determina­ 
tion is much the same in both cases. First of all, it will be necessary 
to the understanding of the "workings of the norms in the field of his­ 
tory to survey the method of historical science as Troeltsch conceived it, 
then to see how the transition from the science of history to the phil­ 
osophy of history takes place, and finally how the norms are derived, and 
what their purpose is.
In Per Historismus, Troeltsch begins by a discussion of the science 
of history, and how it passes over into the philosophy of history. 
The science of history belongs to the general group of the social sci­ 
ences, which includes others such as anthropology, sociology and ethno­ 
logy. Like the other social sciences, historical science can be best 
understood by contrasting it with the natural sciences. The natural 
or physical sciences have as their object of investigation the physical 
universe, whose laws they trace with great exactness. The social sci­ 
ences, on the other hand, investigate the complex activities of mankind. 
History as a science has its special province in the endeavor to under­ 
stand the pursuits of men in the past, both as individuals influencing 
the currents of group life, and as social units acting collectively upon 
other groups or individuals. The results of its investigations must
For an extended discussion of the contrasts between the social and the 
natural sciences, see Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissen- 
schaften Erster Teil. Troeltsch follows l)ilthey closely in his 
discussion • The same general distinctions between the two groups // 
were made by Wilhelm Windelband in his Geschichte und Naturwissen- \~- 
sohaft, 1894. "
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from the nature of its object, be less precise and exact than those of 
the natural sciences, whose object, the material universe, is rational 
and law-abiding, instead of complex, dynamic, and creative as the his­ 
torical object is.
Since the object of investigation with which history deals is 
so different from that of the natural sciences, its method also presents
a marked contrast to theirs. The natural sciences employ the concept
causation, 
of / , and go on the presupposition that their object is capable of
fc. ? 
rationalisation by the laws of mathematics and logic. The object of
history is free, creative, and incalculable. At times it can be under­ 
stood only through intuition, and, in comparison with the physical uni­ 
verse, one might almost venture to call the historical object irrational,
if that be understood to mean that it is alogical, and contains incal-
g culable elements of freewill. The concern of the science of history
must therefore be to penetrate into the nature of its object, to find 
its meaning, to interpret it, and to find the values it contains.
. When questions of meaning and value emerge, history passes over 
from the realm of pure science into that of philosophy and metaphysics. 
Up to this point in his discussion, Troeltsch follows very closely the 
theories of Dilthey and Rickert as to the nature of history, but here 
he diverges from them. Dilthey was skeptical about going into the
^•Troeltsch, Per Historismus und seine Probleme, pp. 83-84-
2of course, most of Troeltsch 1 s work was done at a time when natural 
law was regarded as much more fixed than is the case at present-
3Troeltsch, Per Historismus und seine Probleme, pp. 42-43, 49» 
4Ibid., p. 77,
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metaphysical aspects of history at all, as he sets forth at length in the 
two final sections of his work, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften; 
and Rickert, in his Die Greazen der naturwiseenschaftlichen Begriffs- 
bildung, had tried to ground the values he discovered through the phil­ 
osophy of history upon the scientific facts involved in the situation 
rather than upon any metaphysical implications behind them. Troeltsch 
criticises this caution of Rickert 1 s; for he believed that it was quite 
impossible to find such a scientific ground for these meanings and 
values, which by their very nature , most be rooted in some higher 
metaphysical or religious Absolute behind the historic facts.
From the standpoint of religion Troeltsch was undoubtedly right 
in upholding this metaphysical and religious interest in the values in­ 
herent in the historical object. Not only in the interests of theology 
is Troeltsch correct in holding to the necessity for this transition to 
metaphysics, but also as a philosopherrvof history, he was true to a con­ 
viction that he had held for years, that one of the main purposes of 
that study is to determine the most valuable trends in the past and 
present around which to shape the future, rather than to lay the whole 
weight on the factual side, which leads only to relativism and skep­ 
ticism. Since the process discerns value and meaning, the indications 
of the Sein-sollen in the Sein, (that which ought to be in that which
is), it naturally leads into the realm of the ideal, that is the meta-
2
physical, the superempirical.
What is then the method by which philosophy of history pro­ 
ceeds in the interpretation and evaluation of its object? It starts
Troeltsch, "Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie," Gesammelte Schriften, 
Bd. II, pp. 677, 688. —————
o
Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, Vorwort, p. vii«
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with a logic of history, quite distinct from ordinary epistemological 
logic, and composed of categories and concepts derived from the object 
itself. This logic of history differs from ordinary logic in several 
important particulars. Its contact with its object is immediate; for 
it has its source in the object instead of being an external canon, like 
those of ordinary logic. Instead of having only one method of procedure, 
like formal logic, the logic of history has a variety of methods, which 
are used from time to time as the inner necessities of the object demand. 
Finally the logic of history may even contain contradictions and an­ 
tinomies quite impossible to epistemological logic. In spite of this 
fact, the principles or categories of historical logic emerge from their 
object with sufficient clarity so that they can be formulated into a 
system of their own.
The logic of history is formal in its nature, and yields certain 
categories and concepts by which to interpret the material of history. 
When the categories are applied to the material, they produce the re­ 
sults and evaluations which constitute the philosophy of history. 
In his work upon the formal logic of history and its categories, 
Troeltsch acknowledges his indebtedness to Windelband, Si
and Rickert, whose general method he follows; for the system is largely
2the creation of these three men. The categories are presuppositions,
and principles of selection, construction, and combination which are 
originated by the inherent necessities of their object, which they in 
turn interpret. They are not general principles or laws which are
Troeltsch, Per Historismus und seine Problems, pp. 27-29 • 
2Ibid., p. 31.
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capable of universal application; they belong only to their own object.
There are two main categories:that of the historical aggregate 
or historical entity and that of development. The historical 
entity ' or aggregate is the unit of historical investigation, 
a group with similar historical and cultural antecedents, such as the 
state, the nation, or some other homogeneous social unit. History is 
concerned with groups and their activities rather than with the in­ 
dividuals as such; hence it is the group as an entity that is the center 
of the investigation, and its real object. The category of the histori­ 
cal individualisation is interpreted by means of several concepts or sub- 
categories which further illuminate the activities and significance of 
the object. These are: originality and irreproducibility, (Einmaligksit); 
the representative; the essential; unity of significance or value, (Sinn- 
oder Werteinheit); the Common Spirit; the unconscious; the creative; 
freedom in the sense of uncompelled volitional actsjand chance. A short 
explanation will be necessary in order to make clear what TroBltsch means 
by these sub-categories.
The first of these interpretatrresub-categories, originality and 
irreproducibility in the sense of Ljo:;,ething which happens once, and once- 
for-all, applies to those individual peculiarities of nations or cul­ 
tural groups, or to the impress of outstanding personalities such as 
the genius, upon the individual totality, which cannot be explained by 
any survey of the environmental, historical or psychological factors in 
the case; but which must be taken as a given element in the historical 
investigation, even though no rational ground for its presence can be
These categories are enumerated and discussed by Troeltsch in Per 
Historismus, pp. 32-61»
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brought forward. Examples of this originality and irreproducibility 
would be the peculiar religious genius of the Hebrew people, or the 
impact of some great personality such as Buddha or the other founders 
of the great religions.
The representative is the means of selecting from the complex 
trends in the historical object those which particularly embody, 
typify and symbolise the thoughts, feelings, and aspirations of the 
countless individuals who comprise the historical entity at some par­ 
ticular time. The Reformation would be an example of such a movementj 
for it is significent not merely as an expression of the insight of its
leaders, but as an outburst of the feelings and ideals of multitudes of
2 
ordinary people which found a voice in Luther and the other Keformers.
The category or concept of the essential, as its name implies, 
relates to the effort to select the vital and important trends inherent
in the historical unit. Such a work as Harnack's Wesen des Ghristentums
g
is an attempt to apply this concept to the history of Christianity.
Closely related to the category of the essential is that of unity or 
oneness of value or meaning. This concept refers to the apprehension of 
the common aim or value which holds the aggregate together, and makes it 
a unity. This common aim or end may be either conscious or unconscious 
on the part of the group. If the group is unconscious of this cohesive 
aim or end, it may require an act of historical intuition on the part 
of the investigator witbtotoeaosawfcx* to discover it; for though the unify-




ing factor is sometimes very obscure, it is sure to be present. Even a
robber band, Troeltsch says, may be a Sinneinheit in this sense. 
The next sub-category, the Commoii Spirit, explains itself 
through its name; but it differs from the Siiineinheit in that it refers 
to the psychological forces, the reactions of the various individuals 
in the group upon one another so that they can unite for action and co­ 
operate in spite of their individuality and separateness from each other, 
"Why they should unite in this manner in spite of the clashes of interest 
as individuals or classes which exist among them is an antinomy which 
history cannot explain, but must accept as a fact with which to reckon 
in formulating its philosophy. In short, this is the concept which de­ 
fines the relation of the component entities to the whole, and of the
2 
whole to the individuals comprising it.
The concept of the unconscious serves to illuminate further 
that of the common spirit. Some of the drives which hold the individuals 
in cohesion so that they form a united group are instinctive, unreflec- 
tive and too much a product of tradition and background to be present 
in the conscious mind. These factors, unconscious as they are, neverthe­ 
less contribute to the common spirit. This historical category of the 
unconscious must not be confused with the "unconscious" of which the 
psychologists talk. The unconscious in the sense Troeltsch uses it here
applies to the group rather than the individual, and belongs to the historic
5 
object itself, not to the realm of psychology.
Troeltsch, Per Historismus, pp. 42-43*
2Ibid., pp. 44 ff. 
3Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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Certain trends and movements in the life of the individual total­ 
ity fall into the sub-category of the creative. By this Troeltsch under­ 
stands the impact of certain unusual individuals upon the group, which 
has the effect of changing or redirecting the channels of the life of the 
entire social entity. The influence of some of the great personalities 
of history like Caesar or Napoleon would be classified by this concept; 
but it is to be distinguished from the category of irreproducibility by 
the fact that it is a recurrent phenomenon rather than one which happens 
once-for-all. This element accounts partially for new currents in the
life of the group. It is one of those incalculable features of the his-
the rigid operation of 
toric object, which set the latter apart from/the law of cause and effect
which prevails in the natural world.
A sub-category of the creative is freedom, that is, conscious acts 
of volition, (Frejheit im Willkiirsinne). This means the voluntary 
modification of the life of the historical entity by the conscious 
erection of aims or goals for the group, either by the creative in­ 
dividuals or the group as a whole. This is another of the incalculable
2elements of the historic object. Two examples seem to illuminate
Troeltsch 1 s conception of this category: Alexander the Great, with his 
desire to blend the cultures of the East and the West through his con­ 
quests, is an illustration of an individual who changed the life of his 
historic group through his achievement of a conscious aim for the group- 
life. The Russian five-year plan is a clear instance of a group as a 
whole setting up a definite goal for its life through its own will.
Troeltsch, Per Historismus, pp. 49-50*
2Ibid., p. 51*
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To the list of the sub-categories for the interpretation of the 
individual totality in the historic sense must be added that of chance 
as a profound modifier of the life of the historical entities. Natural 
catastrophes such as floods, fires and earthquakes would come under this 
classification,which is really quite self-explanatory. This concludes 
the list of the sub-categories for the interpretation of the historical 
entity.
The second of the chief categories for the interpretation of 
the historical object is that of development. This is not to be confused 
with evolution upon the one hand, nor with progress in the sense of some­ 
thing which takes place automatically on the other. It refers to the 
changes which take place within the object through its own inherent 
drives or aims. These changes may be regressive as well as progressive. 
Sometimes the aim of the historic aggregate is hard to recognise, 
but what this category really denotes is the so-called "historical ideas" 
such as the Renaissance, capitalism, or Christianity^ which change their 
object through their own intrinsic drives or aims quite apart from factors 
of chance, conscious will or other modifying forces, such as those covered 
by the sub-categories. This category is one of the most interesting, 
historically speaking, of them all.
By means of the categories, the logic of history then turns to 
the interpretation of the material of its object, and ofct of the process 
of their application to it, formulates a philosophy of history. The 
mere erection of the system of categories is only one side of the process, 
which would be very formal indeed if the philosophy of history stoppe d
Troeltsch, Der Historismus, pp. 54-58•
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there. The second aspect of the philosophy of history, which is the 
material side, comes with the application of the categories to the inter­ 
pretation of the object with a view to ascertaining the ends towards which 
the historical entity is striving, and to comparing it with other historical 
aggregates. It is through this comparison of the aims and goals of the 
several historical complexes that the philosopher of history seeks to 
understand the meaning and aim of all human history. The process of 
comparison not only seeks for this universal meaning of human history; 
but it also serves to illuminate further the significance of the several 
aggregates, which cannot be fully understood by themselves, but only in 
their relation to "the others with which they come into contact. It is 
through this contact with the others that the inherent aims of the separate 
entity reach full fruition, just as the individual man cannot attain 
his highest development by himself, but only through his social contacts, 
On the other hand, it would be an impossible task to unravel the meaning 
of history as a whole if the significance of each separate entity
could not be at least partially discovered through the examination 
of it taken by itself. Thus it is necessary for the historical observer 
to apprehend the values and ideals of his own group in order to begin to 
understand its connection with the whole of laankind, and it, in turn, 
throws light upon the meaning of the whole. j n the modern world, which 
is so closely interrelated, this proposition of Troeltsch 1 s needs no 
proof; for we know only too well how closely the destiny of each histori­ 
cal unit is bound up with that of all the others,
To find out the meaning of all history through the study of the
Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, pp. 67-73.
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historical aggregates by themselves and in their relation to each other 
is the purpose of the philosophy of history: but to Troeltsch this does 
not mean a vast rational construction of universal history with universal 
concepts and principles drawn from reason alone, like the Hegelian phil­ 
osophy of history. The construction takes place chiefly with reference 
to the observer's own group, — that is the Viestern-European, in 
Troeltsch 1 s own case. The construction also takes place from the 
standpoint of the present; but it includes the past which has created 
the present, and looks towards the future, which should be consciously 
shaped and directed along the lines of the values and ideals that appear 
to be most vital and significant in the present. The function of the 
historical philosopher is a practical and vital one, in that his deter­ 
mination of these values in the present life of the group is made with 
the object of shaping the future so that it will approximate the inherent 
ideals of the entity more fully. He shows the way to the creation of a 
new cultural synthesis. He aids in this formation of a new cultural syn­ 
thesis in two ways: by discovering the ideal towards which the group it­ 
self is tending so far as that is already partially realised in the pre­ 
sent aggregate; ' and by comparing this ideal trend with that of 
other historical entities, with the consequent clarification of the place 
of the group in the relation to the whole.
This construction, with a view to a new cultural synthesis, 
involves a thorough self-criticism of the philosopher's own group. It
Of. Troeltsch1 s discussion of the European group in the second section 
of Per Historismus as the object of such an investigation. It is a 
matter of great regret that Troeltsch did not live to write the vol­ 
ume in which he meant to construct the normative essence of the modern 
European cultural group »
is a measuring of the actual attainments of the group upon its own in­ 
herent ideal, as the latter has come down from the past, and appears in 
the present in order that the group may consciously move towards the 
more perfect achievement of that ideal. Just here the philosophy of 
history merges into ethics, the realm of the "ought" (Sollen). We now 
come to the concept of the norms; for these directive trends about which 
the new cultural synthesis should be built, have the authoritative char­ 
acter of standards according to which the life of the group must be guided 
if it is to move in the direction of the ideal. Through this transition 
from that which is to that which ought to be, in the apprehension of the 
norms inherent in the historical object, the philosophy of history enters
the realm of metaphysics, for the norms are nothing less than indications of
9
or trends towards absolute values, which have their Ground in God.
The nature of the norms deserves careful consideration. First 
of all, these norms have their temporal, historical basis in the object 
itself. Although they are embodied in the object, they do not receive 
their sanctions from their present sociological or psychological condi­ 
tions with which they are mingled, nor from any laws of science of one 
kind or another. Indeed, it must be remembered that one of the main con­ 
trasts between the historical object, and the object of the natural sci­ 
ences, the physical universe, is that the historical object can only be 
interpreted to a very limited degree through the working of the law of 
cause and effect. In history there is freedom for the human will to act, 
and room for the new, the original and the creative to appear*. The his-
Troeltsch, Per Historismus und seine Probleme, pp. 79-83. 
2Ibid., p. 212.
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torioal and ethical life of mankind, though at points subject to the 
sphere of nature and natural law, does have a margin of independence. 
It is in this margin of independence that the norms arise.
The fact that the norms do arise out of a particular histori­ 
cal aggregate causes them to have an individual significance or valuej 
yet this value transcends its concrete form in the object, for it is a 
part of an absolute value which is intuitively perceived to be present 
even in that concrete and partial expression. This fact does not nec­ 
essarily put the norms into the category of universal values, but merely
postulates that in them there is a potentiality or a direction towards
Z 
values wider than present and finite significance. This potentiality
is one aspect of the authoritative character of the norms. It should be 
observed, however, that this universal or absolute potentiality which 
the norm bears is not rooted in any abstract universal, rational con­ 
cepts, as in Hegel's philosophy of history, nor yet in a rational and 
formally grounded ethic, which receives its content through the scienti­ 
fic grounding of the values, like the norms in Hlckert's system, which
3 
Troeltsch criticises severely. Through his emphasis on the historical
entity from which the norms emerge, Troeltsch saves his 
theory from the abstract and rational character of Hegel's construction, 
which takes place on a purely dialectic basis, and also from the formal 
character of Rickert's, which loses touch with the concrete object in its 
effort to conform to the necessities prescribed by grounding an ethic on 
science.
Troeltsch, Per Hietorismus und seine Problems, p* 95« 
2Ibid., p. 117.
3 Troeltsch, "Moderne Geachichtsphilosophie," Gesammelte Schriften, 
Bd. II, pp. 704 fi.
-64-
Although Troeltsch's norins cannot be considered as timeless, 
universally valid and absolute, they are nevertheless a priori, objec­ 
tive, and authoritative for their particular situation. A priori in the 
sense in which Troeltsch uses it hero seems to mean, "spontaneously gen­ 
erated by the object." His thought on the question of a prioris varied 
considerably at different periods of his life, but the final sense in
which he uses the term here is not the Kantian meaning of a form in the
n
subject, like the a prioris of time and space in the Kritik der reinejjf Ver-
nunft. Troeltsch himself in his earlier conception of the religious a^ 
priorjl certainly considered it such a form, but here he clearly means a 
self-authenticating, spontaneously generating quality in the object. 
The norms are then objective, a priori, so that the investigator by an 
act of will recognises them, and finds in them the keys to the essential
meaning of the historical object out of which they arise. In this final
the 
stage of Troeltsch's thought on the subject of/a prioris, the term is
then one of content rather than form, and objective rather than subjec­ 
tive. He himself says that it more nearly resembles Kant's a priori
of practical reason, an intuition -which becomes a practical necessity
2only through an act of the will which recognises it as such. Here d.
priori is to be defined as self-authenticating and autonomous.
The self-authenticating manner in which the norms arise from the 
object itself is the assurance of their objectivity. They illuminate 
and clarify even the conflicting tendencies of and antinomies in the ob­ 
ject. It is to them that the investigator abandons himself. Of course,
Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, pp. 166, 179-180* 
2Ibid. f p. 180.
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he may apprehend them wrongly, but there is little danger of this if he 
really lets them guide him instead of bringing with him to the in­ 
vestigation some ready-made criterion of his own into which he wishes to 
fit the object. If the investigator is competently trained, he can recog­ 
nise the norms without difficulty, and thus indicate the future cultural 
synthesis which the historical aggregate should take.
Though the norms are a priori and objective, this does not carry 
with it the assumption that they must therefore be timeless, eternal, 
and universally valid. It must be kept in mind that they arise out of a 
particular situation, and at a particular time, — a fact that originates 
in the individual and developing character of the historical object. 
They may be timeless if they prove valid for more than their own situa­ 
tion, as for example, the teachings of Jesus are timeless. To say that 
the norms are eternal would be possible only for a Divine Intelligence 
which contained all time in itself. The norms start as particulars il­ 
luminating their own situation, and are not, like the canons of logic,
o 
necessarily applicable everywhere and at any time.
The question of those norms which apply only to their own 
situation, and those which have wider applicability so that they approach 
universality and absoluteness, leads us to the distinction which Troeltsch 
makes between primary and secondary norms, (Normen des ersten und des zweiten 
Grades). The differentiation of these two sorts takes place in the com­ 
parison of the investigator's own historical aggregate with other histori­ 
cal entities. Let us suppose that the historian has investigated his
Troeltsch, Per Historismus und seine> Probleme, pp. 169, 181. 
., pp. 162, 183.
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own group, and has ascertained the norms for the present time. He has 
discovered in these norms the direction which his group should take to 
achieve a cultural synthesis which will best realise its inherent poten­ 
tialities. Now he compares it with some other aggregate. He does this 
by trying to understand the life of that strange group as if it were his 
own, until he intuitively apprehends its norms. The lattor he then con­ 
trasts with those of his own historic unit. He applies to both groups 
the standards that arise from each. He may find that some of the norms 
are the same for the two groups, that others are valid only for their 
own, and that out of the comparison new norms are evolved that embody a 
more universal value than the special norms originally contained in either 
of the historic groups. The primary norms would be those which hold only 
for their own group; the secondary ones would be those applicable for both 
groups. This latter class can be regarded as carriers of something vfhich 
approaches a universal value, though it would be necessary to carry out 
the comparison for all of human history before their universal, absolute 
character could be entirely demonstrated.
The fact that some of the norms do not partake of this wider 
applicability does not invalidate their authority for their own group; for 
they may well express some peculiar trend which is very valuable, but has 
not yet appeared anywhere else. Perhaps an illustration may serve to show 
what Troeltsch means here more clearly than a discussion could do. If some 
historical observer had been making an analysis of Egypt at the time of 
Ikhnaton, the monotheism of the religious movement he initiated would cer­ 
tainly have been a peculiarity of his own historical entity at that par-
Troeltsch, Der fiistorismus und seine Problems, pp. 169-172.
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ticular time, which had nowhere else appeared. That value was not carried 
forward into the next epoch, but just for that one brief time, a religious 
universal was incarnated in the Egypt of that moment. This is the one 
trend of all others in that day which should have been perpetuated. Now 
the purpose of the historical analysis as Troeltsch formulated it would be 
to grasp and pass on into the historical heritage of the group this pecu­ 
liar kind of trend which may be a universal, and the source of infinite 
richness not only to the group concerned but to all humanity.
In practice it is very difficult for the single historical ob­ 
server to do more than to see the norms for his own group. The other his­ 
torical entities are too different from his own, and too few of the norms 
are common to the others. Also the task is so vast that one individual 
could scarcely compass it, or carry through the comparison for even one 
other group, to say nothing of all humanity. The most that the single 
investigator can hope to do is to apprehend the norms for his own group, 
and to understand its orientation in the vast panorama of its interaction 
with the other entities.
Once more an illustration may show how this process should work. 
Suppose some American philosopher of history wished to make an analysis 
of the American nation at the present time. By using the logic of history 
upon his object, he would ascertain the norms around which the future cul­ 
tural synthesis of America should be shaped. He would then wish to go 
further with his analysis. He might compare America with the European 
cultural groups, whose historical background is similar enough to the 
American so that many of the norms would be applicable to both groups,
roeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Problems, pp. 186, 189.
though some migtyt prove peculiar to America. If he decided to go on 
to examine a totally different group, for instance Japan, most of the 
norms for the American group would be useless. He would not be enough 
in sympathy with Japanese culture to understand Japan and evolve norms 
which would represent the essence of present-day Japan. (Only a Japan­ 
ese could do that). Yet from his knowledge of the norms for his ov/n 
group, the American could tell enough of the direction of America's 
ideal development to see her destiny not only in reference to th simi­ 
lar group of European nations, but also in relation to Japan, — even 
though that might be only a clash between the two conflicting sets of 
values inherent in the life of those two nations respectively.
The norms, indicating as they do the strongly individual char­ 
acter of their several objects, promise no easy synthesis of all the 
groups on the basis of some grand, abstract concept of the universal goal 
of humanity; but only on the ground of a synthesis that takes account of 
the unique character of each separate entity. It is really largely an 
act of faith to believe that such a combination is possible at all. 
Troeltsch does not tell us in Per Historismus how it is possible for the 
groups to cooperate or fuse with one another in this larger synthesis, 
but fortunately we have in Lecture II of the book published posthumously 
under the English title of Christian Thought, (published in German under 
the more appropriate title Per Historismus und seine ftberwindung) some 
light on how this may take place.
The norms partake of the general nature of ethical values in 
so far as they themselves are bearers of value, or trends towards an ideal,
Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, p. 199.
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Now the ethical personality, according to Trotfltsch is built up by two 
means; first by the categorical imperative which in the form of con­ 
science, causes the individual to feel a duty to consider not only him­ 
self, but also his fellows. This categorical imperative which compels 
the individual to fulfil his obligations is never realised in himself 
alone, but only as these duties confront him in the concrete form of social 
situations which make demands upon him, and call upon him to adjust, sub­ 
ordinate, and even sacrifice his own individual interest in the interest 
of his fellows. This response to duty benefits the individual; for only 
through it does he become a free, creative and moral personality by the 
attainment of the virtues of justice, goodness, kindness, love, and all 
the rest. It has also the larger effect of creating a unified and co­ 
operative group out of separate personalities, who are able to work to­ 
gether for common ends, even to the extent of sacrificing their own in­ 
terest when the highest good of the whole demands it. The individual ac­ 
cepts this sacrifice voluntarily because in response to the demand made by 
the concrete occasion, he realises the categorical imperative, and gives 
up his smaller interest to the greater. Now according to Troeltsch, the 
ego of the corporate group is bound by the same categorical imperative in 
relation to other groups. It, like the individual, must learn to respond 
to the categorical imperative in its dealings with other groups, even 
where cultural, or economic purposes conflict. It is only thus that 
anything like a cultural synthesis, or a working unity of the separate 
historical aggregates can be reached. In other words, the virtues, the 
goods of ethics, apply to groups as to individuals; they are the ultimates
Troeltsch, Christian Thought, pp. 49-55.
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by which even cultural conflicts are to be resolved. It is, of course, 
a matter of faith to believe that such a synthesis of all the groups is 
possible, but Troeltsch believes that we must learn to recognise the
presence of these ultimate values in the concrete forms in which they
the latter 
present themselves in the channel of history, and guide/ according to
them.
The foregoing discussion leads directly into the subject of 
how the norms relate to ethical values. In reference tot-heirown object, 
the norms have the quality of a standard of value from two points of view} 
first, as a measure of the present and the pact by the idoal which the 
group has inherent in its heritage; and secondly, as indications of the
direction which the future must take if it is to find a larger and fuller
2 expression of this inherent ideal. Thus in the ©mergence of the norms,
the philosophy of history passes over into the field of axiology. The 
question then arises, how these norms whose genesis is admittedly of such 
an individualistic character that they not only vary with the object, but
•
also with the time at which the investigation is made, can really be 
universal^ and approximations towards absolute values. This transition 
is possible only because the historical aggregates themselves par­ 
take of a two-fold nature. On the one hand, they are historical, that is 
to say, transient and relative forms, but on the other hand, they are in­ 
carnations of values and ideals which are absolute and universal, just as
the saint of the Christian Church, though a mortal, is an incarnation of
which comprise 
the virtues / the Christian ideal. Naturally the historic entity
Troeltsch, Christian Thought, pp. 61 ff., 84-99-
n
Troeltsch, Der Historismus, p. 200.
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cannot be an exhaustive and complete presentation of the ideal, any more 
than a particular saint is an incarnation of the whole of the Christian
ideal. It is merely an approximation of, and a striving towards the full-
x 
ness of the ideal of which something has been captured in the one case as
in the other. Ethical values are never found in pure and isolated form, 
but always in some concrete expression. The entities of history are par­ 
ticularly important to axiology for just this reason, — that they present 
such varied and new combinations of the ideal and the actual, and have so 
much to teach about the formation of new systems of value.
In the historical entity/ then, the factual and the ideal, the rel­ 
ative and the absolute come together, Now the norms are really the values, 
the absolute elements which emerge from their concrete embodiment. As values, 
they have wider or potentially wider significance than just for the partic­ 
ular aggregate from which they are derived. The historical aggregates may 
be compared to tiny monads, which partake of and reflect the nature, though 
partially, of the greater absolute behind them, or, as Troeltsch puts it,
quoting a sentence from Kierkegaard, "The historical is really the union of
P .•the metaphysical and the chance elements." The norms represent the absol­ 
ute elements. They may be applicable at the moment only to their own sit­ 
uation, for their object may be representing some value not being embodied 
by any of the other aggregates; but it may also be identical with the values 
incarnated by one or more of the other groups. When the norms for two or 
more groups coincide, they form a bond of sympathy between the latter and 
in the recognition
Troeltsch, Per Historismus, p. 201. 
2Ibid., p. 214.
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of their authoritative character, the way is provided for understanding 
between even the most divergent cultural groups.
With the absolute element predicated by the valuational character 
of the norms, Troeltsch realises that he has stepped over into the 
realm of metaphysics; and he does so purposely, for it is his conviction 
that the philosophy of history must ever lead there. History cannot be 
understood by itself, and in itself, but only as it goes back to the super- 
historical realm behind and beyond, yet in it. The absolute values in the 
norms are to him nothing less than the meeting of history, the finite
sphere of the human spirit, with the Ground of all values, God, the In-
2finite Spirit. This is a religious intuition, that cannot be demons­ 
trated by science or logic, but Troeltsch believed that it was the only 
basis upon which to understand history fully, and that the analysis of the 
historical object inevitably led to this position. The ultimate authority 
of the norms is thus grounded in their metaphysical character, in God, "Who 
is behind all history. The norms that carry the highest values, those which
i
point most directly to their divine origin, and goal, the religious goods, 
would thus be those around which he would propose to create a new cul­ 
tural synthesis. It is through these norms, the carriers of absolute 
value in and through their temporary embodiments that he would seek the 
way out of the seeming relativism of history. This is the overcoming
of the relativism of history through the deeper understanding of history,
3
of which he speaks at the end of Per Historismus.
 ^Troeltsch, Per Historismus, pp. 199, 200-220. 
2Ibid., pp. 184, 214-216. 
3Ibid., p. 772.
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The foregoing pages have been occupied with an attempt to 
describe Troeltsch 1 s dsteminatkii of the norms in the field of history, and 
with his general method and construction of the philosophy of history. 
Before passing on to the discussion of the relation of the historical 
norms to the more distinctly theological ones, it is well to pause to try 
to estimate the colossal method that he outlines for us in Per Historismus. 
One must deeply regret that Troeltsch did not live to ivrite the second 
volume in which he intended to use the method in indicating the lines along 
which the new cultural synthesis which he would suggest for present-day 
Europe would be shaped. He realised himself, however, that it v/ould be an 
almost superhuman task for one individual to attempt the proposal of such 
a synthesis, and that the best results in the application of his method 
would come from the work of many hands. Since we have only the method, 
we shall have only that by fchich to judge, and must form our estimate of it practically 
with reference to its significance in the religious field. It would be 
quite beyond the capacity or the province of the present writer to pass 
upon the technical historical questions involved.
Certainly Troeltsch1 s conception of the philosophy of history is 
magnificent and imposing. When so competent an expert in historical 
matters as von Harnack called Troeltsch the greatest philosopher of his­ 
tory since Hegel, one cannot but feel that such praise would not have
2 
been bestowed, had it not been earned. Indeed, even a layman in the
field of history must be struck not only by the vast sweep of a mind 
that would undertake such a task, but also with the fact that Troeltsch 1 s
Troeltsch, Per Historismus, p. 771*
2A von Harnack, "Rede am Sarge Ernst Troeltschs," reprinted in Die 
christliche Welt, 22 Feb. 1923. ——
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approach seems far sounder than the a priori and highly abstract rational 
one of Hegel. Behind Troeltsch f s work lay the logic of history that 
Dilthey, Rickert, and Windelband had created. Certainly there is at 
least a beginning that strikes one as scientific. Starting with the in­ 
vestigator's own historical group as the object of his research is an 
improvement over the wholesale generalisations from the entire sweep of 
history in which so many would-be philosophers of history indulge. The 
separate historical entity is so srna.ll that it can be studied thoroughly 
enough to yield its own values to the discerning eye.
The real question in Troeltsch f s own particular philosophy of 
history would be most likely to come in his extension of his philosophy of 
history into the realm of metaphysics, where he parts company from Rickert. 
Benedetto Croce, in his book, Theory and History of Historiography (English 
translation by Douglas Ainslie^- 1920), criticises the philosophy of his­ 
tory of Rickert himself for its flight into the realm of values and 
metaphysics,which he views as a withdrawal from the realities of history 
into the sphere of myth and imagination. Croce believes that there can be 
no such thing as a philosophy of history, except in the sense that all his­ 
tory is philosophy, and all philosophy is history. His opinion, therefore, 
is that there is no real connection between history and values, and that
it is never the function of the historian to pronounce judgments of an
2 ethical character. Certainly if he criticises Rickert on this point,
Troeltsch would oome under even more severe condemnation.
Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissensohaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 3rd 
and 4th edition, 1921, pp. 410-411.
o
Benedetto Croce, The Theory and History of Historiography, pp. 72-83 •
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Nevertheless, the criticism of Benedetto Croce is by no means 
decisive against the possibility of philosophy of history, or the deriva­ 
tion of ethical norms by that means* After all, the religious man sees 
more in the world about him than the unreligious one. His faith is a means 
of knowledge which reveals much that lies- hidden from other men. In the 
sphere of history this is as true as anywhere else. It was not a mere at­ 
tachment to his own theories which led Troeltsch to feel that history never 
could be fully understood out of the facts alone, but only through the 
great, overarching realm of the superhistorical, the metaphysical, that 
lies above it, yet through it. This position is a religious insight; 
natural to a religious man, and a source of real knowledge; for God, the 
religious Object, as Troeltsch repeatedly points out, can be known only 
through religion. It is this difference in the personality of the inves­ 
tigator that accounts for the differences in the results that the various 
observers in that field present. One cannot expect a positivist like Croce 
nor an unreligious investigator like Oswald Spengler to see all that 
Troeltsch sees. They simply cannot do soj for they are blind to the 
Greater Reality behind the facts they so carefully investigate and inter­ 
pret.
Another attack upon Troeltsch 1 s approach to the philosophy of 
history comes from quite a different quarter, Friedrich Gogarten, a theo­ 
logian of the Barthian group, in his book, Ich glaube an den dreieinigen 
Gott, attacks Troeltsch from the religious point of view. Gogarten be­ 
lieves that theology can have nothing to do with the whole idea of phil­ 
osophy of history. Particularly the metaphysical realm of the absolute 
values and the eternal truths is abhorrent to Gogarten from two points of 
view: first it is, according to him, a presumption on the part of man, who
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is a creature, and a part of history, to set himself up to penetrate into 
the realm of these eternal realities, and an unwarranted and proud self- 
assertion of the human reason to think that it can go beyond the bounds 
of history which its Creator has set for it, to discover the goals of 
history. Secondly, we cannot understand the reality of history 
by appealing to the superhistorical, or the metaphysical; for instead
of getting at the reality of history in this way, we merely sweep aside
o
the problem. Gogarten will have none of Troeltsch's categories for
the interpretation of history, which he thinks we cannot and must not
seek to understand, or to interpret as a part of God's plan. All such
g
attempts are improper and unbecoming to us as creatures. We cannot
and dare not set ourselves up to select what is history, as Troeltsch 
does, even for the purpose of making a cultural synthesis. Such at­ 
tempts are not only futile, but wrong from a religious point of view, be-
4 
cause they exceed the limits which God has set to our knowledge.
Instead of any philosophy of history Gogarten presents us 
with a kind of religious formula by which we can deal with as much of 
history as concerns us. The essence of history to him is what he calls 
the me-you, (ich-du), relationship. It is not understanding the you, 
but recognising him as a creature of God, like ourselves, and therefore 
with a claim upon us. The only history that counts in this me-ypu re­ 
lationship is not that which has to be established by investigation, but
^Gogarten, Ich glaube an den dreieinigen Gott, pp. 51, 67, 74. 
2Ibid., pp. 72, 62. 
5Ibid., p. 96. 
4Ibid., pp. 57-67,
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that which is a living, self-evidencing event in the present where the
the Divine you 
you/presents his claim upon the m£, and calls me to decision. The only
parts of the past which present this claim upon the me are the history 
of the Hebrews, who were witnesses of the promise to salvation made to 
them by God, their Creator, and Jesus Christ, Who is and speaks the
Word which calls us to salvation. If we respond to the claims of the
in 
you presented to us/this way, we are understanding all of history that
is necessary for us in our concrete situation. We can know this his­ 
tory without trying to understand or interpret history. If we try to 
understand it, vie are merely pushing it aside by our self-assertion 
and the pride of our reason, which makes us believe that we can under­ 
stand and investigate history out of some laws of the mind, or meta­ 
physical absolutes which really do nothing but deafen us to the claim 
of the you.
The point of Gogartenf s criticism is plainly the religious 
question of whether Troeltsch in his philosophy of history steps beyond 
his proper place as a creature, and wishes to penetrate into the secrets 
of his Creator, thereby showing himself lacking in proper humility. One 
must appreciate Gogarten's keen feeling of the humble position of man 
as a creature, before God, his Creator, which plainly motivates the whole 
of his criticism. Yet, however valuable the counter-proposal that Go- 
garten offers us may be as an individual religious attitude, it hardly 
touches the real problems with which Troeltsch deals, and even as a re­ 
ligious attitude, it is an over-emphasis upon the transcendence of God, 
to the entire exclusion of His immanence. It is well to have our at-
1 Ibid., pp. 70-73.
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tention called to the humility befitting us as creatures in the presence 
of our Maker, but must we therefore conceive this relationship in terms
singularly reminiscent of the Tower of Babel story in Genesis lit.
tation
A second limi/ in Gogarten's criticism of Troeltsch f s whole ap­ 
proach would seem to lie in the meager content of the redeemed life, which 
Gogartenig standpoint implies. If the redeemed are indeed "fellow-heirs 
with Christ," does that not mean that God in His goodness, admits them 
to fellowship with Himself, and gives them the right to try to see His 
Will and His purposes in history as well as their own lives? If this 
be true, certainly there can be no irreverence in trying to "think God f s 
thoughts after Him" and to discern in the events of history the workings 
of His Will. The prophets themselves would stand condemned at Gogarten's 
bar if this were so. Today we stand in a time of decision. 
If religions philosophers of history do not show us the way to a cultural 
synthesis that is religious in character, then some one else will point 
the way to one that ignores religion, as the Russian experiment shows, 
If we were to listen to Gogarten, we should simply be abandoning the task 
of the creation of a new cultural synthesis to the irreligious.
The real weakness in Troeltsch 1 s method is not that he would 
make the attempt to find the norms for the new cultural synthesis at all; 
but that in his construction of the method, the norms are not entirely 
guarded from the dangers of subjectivism. Troeltsch himself is con­ 
scious of this difficulty at times, and tries to safeguard himself 
against it by laying stress upon tho self-evidencing character of the 
norms, and the fact that competent investigators can check topon one another;
Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, p. 108.
He also lays emphasis upon the necessary qualifications of the investigator, 
who must not only be a competent scientist in the field, but also be free 
from prejudice and quite objective in abandoning himself to the evidence 
in the matter. Furthermore he must be a man of fine ethical perception. 
The task of discerning the norms for the new cultural synthesis is not 
one that every one and anyone is competent to undertake. It must always 
remain the occupation of a few great thinkers,
There are other times when Troeltsch seems to think that the sub­ 
jective element is a real virtue of the method. He feels that the 
process through which the investigator discerns the norms, and aligns him­ 
self with the truth that they indicate, is a real act of religious faith
pand moral decision. Dr. Heinrich Benckert, in a recent article in the
Zeitschrift fiir theologie und Kirche, entitled Per Begriff der Entscheid-
2 ung bei Ernst Troeltsch, calls attention to the way in which this idea
of personal decision runs through all of Troeltsch 1 s thought, both in
theology and in philosophy of history. Troeltsch seemed to feel that
at 
it was a very vital point, /which his theoretical work touched the
practical currents of life. This element of decision may well be im­ 
portant for the investigator's own personal attitude towards his work; 
but as a part of the method, it is a weakness and a contradiction. If 
the norms are really self-evident, it seems hard to see why they should 
have to be the center of such a momentous decision. One does not need to 
decide about the self-evident. On the other hand, if they do require such
Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, pp. 173, 181, 117, 82 . 
2Ibid., p. 185. 
5Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, Heft 6, 1931.
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decision by the investigator, it looks as though they were not self- 
evidencing and objective at all, but merely subjective, dependent upon 
the investigator's point of view. However, it is never possible to 
escape subjectivity entirely; and at least Troeltsch reduces the sub­ 
jectivity of the method as much as he can.
One cannot tell whether the method really will furnish norms 
until someone tries to outline such a cultural synthesis. Since Troeltsch 
himself did not live to do it, we can only hope others as competent and 
as reverent will take the task in hand; for a new cultural synthesis 
would not only be a benefit to western civilisation; but would be a 
great contribution towards the ideal of the Kingdom of God. However, 
for an important sociological and religious experiment such as the 
practical carrying out of Troeltsch 1 s proposal would be, it would be 
necessary to have stronger guarantees against the danger of subjectivity 
in ascertaining the norms than Troeltsch offers us in his method.
CHAPTER IV
THE RELATION OF HISTORICAL NORMS TO THEOLOGICAL NORMS
The theme of the preceding chapter was the determination of the 
norms of philosophy of history from the individual historical aggregates, 
which, though relative by their very nature as historical forms, never­ 
theless embody values of an absolute, or potentially absolute character. 
The norms which the philosophy of history discovers, as we have seen, 
partake of the nature of ethical values, and indicate the significant 
trends in the life of the present, around which the future should be 
shaped in order to secure a better and fuller incarnation of the ideal 
already inherent in the past and present of the group's life. We now come 
to the relationship of these ethical, historical norms to those which 
are distinctly theological or religious in character*
Two questions are involved in the understanding of this rela­ 
tionship between the two kinds of norms. The norms of history are eth­ 
ical; but since religious values and ethical values are by no means al­ 
ways identical, we shall first have to answer the larger question of the 
relation of ethics to religion, as Troeltsch viewed it. This answer will 
reveal clearly where the two groups of norms are identical, and where they 
diverge from each other. The second question relates to the discovery of 
the particular sources of the theological norms. Troeltsch believed that 
history is the sphere in which God's revelation of Himself to men chiefly 
takes place; but not all of history is to be regarded as revelation. 
Therefore, in discerning the theological norms which are so closely con­ 
nected with revelation, we shall have to ascertain where in the vast sweep 
of history, Troeltsoh would look to find this Divine revelation.
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Before turning to the second question, as to where revelation may
be sought in history, it will be necessary to clear the ground by discussing 
the prior question of the relation of religion and ethics to each other. It
was on this latter point that some of Troeltsch ! s best thinking was done;
1 
for it was a problem which engaged his attention even as a very young man.
It is one of the main themes of the Soziallehren and is also the subject of 
a number of his shorter essays, such as Grundprobleme der Ethik, the famous
answer he wrote to Wilhelm Herrmann's Ethik in 1902j Atheistische Ethik, and
Glaube und Ethos der hebraischen Propheten. (The first two of these shorter
2 
essays are included in Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, the third in Bd. IV).
3 
Even Per Histcrismus contains frequent references to the question.
Troeltsch never made the mistake of identifying religion and moral- 
ity absolutely with each other, or of supposing that the main function of 
religion was to provide a supernatural sanction for ethics. His position 
always was that religion was a separate and independent interest of life, 
arising out of a purely religious longing in the human atoul for redemption 
and fellowship with God, and capable of being satisfied in no other way 
but through God. Historically religion originates quite independently 
of ethics, and far from merely serving the purpose of putting a super- 
natural sanction upon whatever customs or social values may be viewed 
by society as moral, the higher religions create an ethic of their
Of. "Die SelbstSndigkeit der Religion," in Zeitschrift fflr Theologie und 
Kirche, 1895-96.
2 0ne wonders why when Troeltsch's thought on the Question of religion and 
etnics ifc such a valuable part of his contribution, so little nas
been written upon it. Of the recent literature upon Troeltsch. only 
Karl Fellner's Das ffberweltliohe Gut, deals with the subject directly,
3
The problem of the relation between the religious ethic and the secular is 
treated by Troeltsoh.in,Politische Ethik,und Christentum, 1901; but 
owing to the specialised imlu'ry uf Uia'l uisuuayluu 11 has seemed
wiser to base the above on the more general essays.
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own whose goods are those which center around fellowship with God and doing 
His Will* It is only secondarily that religion puts a supernatural sanc­ 
tion upon group mores, and that only where these happen to fall together 
with its own ends* It was an error for which Troeltsch never could for­ 
give Kant that the latter never recognised religion's independence of
2morality. This independence of religion was first set forth by Troeltsch
in his article published under that title, (Die Selbstandigkeit der
Religion) in 1895-96, and as late as 1919, we find him writing that he
3 still maintained it*
Since Troeltsch consistently maintained the independence of re­ 
ligion even against ethics, we must now seek to define his position with 
reference to the particular subject of the relation of the historical 
norms, which are ethical, to the distinctly religious or theological 
norms* In the discussion of the derivation of the historical norms, we 
have found that the norms appear as the absolute values inherent in the 
historical object, which the philosopher of history recognises as such 
through an act of intuition* With the emergence of the values indicated 
by the norms, the investigator believes himself to be in the presence of 
absolute and ultimate values* Now these absolute and ultimate values have 
their Ground, Source and Goal in God, in Whose presence the investigator
Troeltsch, "Die Selbstandigkeit der Religion," Zeitschrift fur Theologie 
and Kirohe, 1895-6, Heft 5, pp. 392-8.
^Troeltsch, "Das Historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie," in Kantstu- 
dien, Bd. IX, 1904, pp. 44-45, and Psyohologie und Erkenntnistheorie 
in der Religionswissenschaft, pp. 34-35, etc.
Troeltsch, "Zur Religionsphilosophie," (a review of Otto's Das Heilige), 
Kantstudien, 1919, Bd. XXIII, p. 66.
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feels himself to stand, when he discerns them* It is the idea of God 
behind these values -which is the important element to Troeltsch. Yet the 
relation of God to the values which the norms bear needs further defini­ 
tion and clarification. This we do not find in Der Historismus, which is 
chiefly occupied with the more immediate questions of the method of philo­ 
sophy of history. The essay, Grundprobleme der Bthik, furnished addition­ 
al light on the question; for in it Troeltsch defines quite carefully the 
relation of religion and ethics to each other, with particular reference 
to the Christian ethic.
It will not be necessary for our present purpose to go into all 
the details of Troeltsch1 s critique of Hermann's Ethik, which Troeltsch
o
characterises as "Luther's ethics translated into the spirit of Kant,*1 
but merely to define Troeltsch*s own position. Troeltsch defines ethics
as the discipline (Lehre) dealing with the ultimate purposes and ends of
g human life. As such it contains a number of implications which have to
do with the philosophy of history, metaphysics, and religion. There is 
no way to establish normative values in ethics except through a belief in 
the dominance of the ideal over the real, — a presupposition which cannot 
be established without entering into the problems of religion.
As in all his other studies, Troeltsch1 s view of ethics was 
greatly influenced by his historical interest. He agreed with Herrmann 
in accepting the Kantian view of ethics, but only so far as the subjective 
side is concerned. There are, according to him, certain goods of a purely
Der Historismus, pp. 183-184. 
^Troeltsch, "Grundprobleme der Ethik," Gesaromelte Sohriften, Bd. II, p. 603.
SIbid., pp. 552-553.
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subjeotive or personal character which can be deduced on a basis of ration­ 
al necessity from the nature of the categorical imperative itself* But 
there are other, objective values which arise empirically out of history, 
and whose necessary character must be deduced from their historical setting. 
History, however, confronts us with two classes of objective goods; those 
which relate only to hhe life of man in this finite world; and those of 
a more ultimate nature which relate not only to manf s destiny in the present 
world, but also in the world to come. The latter sort constitute an ethic 
sub specie aeternitatis, and it is with this class that the Christian 
ethic — and, indeed, any religious ethic — is chiefly concerned. Thus 
there are really two sets of goods, those sub specie aeternitatis, and 
those sub specie temporis, which sometimes conflict with each other. 
This competition is particularly strong in the modern world, inhere the ends 
of the state, the economic order, the arts, and the sciences have largely 
emancipated themselves from the domination of the other-worldly ethic, 
and are claiming a validity in their own right.
When this conflict between the two sets of values takes place, 
it is a problem to reconcile them with each other. Historically religion 
has taken three attitudes towards this issue, and each of these still has 
its modern champions. The first solution is for the religious ethic to 
stand aside in hostility to the cultural values, and to take a monastic 
attitude of withdrawal from them. This is the attitude which the ascetic 
wing of the Catholic church has often taken. The second possibility is the 
course which has usually been followed by Protestantism. This is to view 
the cultural goods as merely ends and interests which are permitted to
^roeltsch, "Grundprobleme der Ethik, "Gesammelte Sehriften, Bd. II, p. 623.
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the religious man so long as they do not directly and glaringly conflict 
with the exclusively religious ends. The third attitude is for the re­ 
ligious ethic to dominate these cultural values entirely, as the Catholic 
Church tried to do in the Middle Ages* Now none of these ways entirely 
solves the problem, according to Troeltsch. He saw that both kinds of 
ethics had real worth, for it must be remembered that ax a religious man, 
he had deep appreciation of other-worldly aims, but as a child of the 
modern world, he realized that the cultural goods also were both a po­ 
tential and actual source of the enrichment of life* Hence it seemed to 
him necessary to achieve a synthesis in which both these cultural goods and 
the strictly Christian goods could attain their highest expression. This 
could never happen, according to Troeltsch if one or the other set com­ 
pletely dominated the other; nor would the most fruitful synthesis be 
reached if religion ignored or showed itself completely hostile to the 
cultural goods. He criticises Herrmann for not adequately recognising 
the seriousness of the conflict between the two groups in the modern 
world, and for imagining that by equating the Kantian ethic with that 
of Jesus the matter would be settled*
The Christian ethic does not coincide with the Kantian except 
in the fact that both emphasise the necessity for free moral action which 
springs from pure and single motives* There the identity ends. The 
^hristian ethic has as its chief good the Kingdom of God, whose realisa­ 
tion is largely eschatological in the teaching of Jesus. The Kantian 
ethic resembles the Stoic more nearly than the Christian, and to insist 
on the equation of the two is to mistake quite completely the other-
^Troeltsoh, "Grundprobleme der Ethik," Gesammelte Sphriften, Bd. II, 
pp. 266-639*
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worldly summum bonum of the Christian ethic. Now the Kantian system deals 
only with the subjective side of ethics, the question of motivation? but 
the Christian ethic, which centers in the Kingdom of God must be concerned 
with the objective goods, and it is here that the tension between it and 
the cultural goods, which arise independently of it, comes to be. Hence 
the question of subjective motivation does not get at the root of the 
conflict*
The solution of this conflict, Troeltsch thinks, must come 
from the side of the Christian ethic, but it must be neither hostility 
to the temporal ends of culture, nor dominance of them, nor mere tolera­ 
tion of them when they do not conflict with its own. The Christian ethic 
is not a denial of the world, but its aims transcend the world. It can 
never reach a complete adjustment with the temporal ends, but must always 
be in some degree of tension with them. Ethics itself has two roots 
or poles, about one of which the temporal ends are focussed, and about 
the other, the eternal goals. The religious ethic must recognise the rel­ 
ative independence of the cultural aims, but must also realise that they 
are not ultimate, like its own purposes. The religious ethic, which is 
concerned with the ultimate ends, meaning, and destiny of human life, 
must seek to incorporate these cultural goods into itself by discerning 
the ultimate values into which they may lead, and by giving a goal and
meaning of its own to them. It must also supplement them by satisfying
2 with its own eternal values the needs that they leave unsatisfied.
This adjustment of the two sets of ends will never be easy nor
Troeltsch, "Grundprobleme der Ethik," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p. 669. 
2Ibid., pp. 660-663.
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oomplete, but out of the very tension the greatest good of both will be 
achieved. To quote Troeltsch's own words:
"There must always be a mediation between the two poles, which can 
never be brought completely together. The true moral life oscillates 
between the one pole and the other.,..* The Christian ethic must 
allow ungrudgingly to science the necessary freedom and flexibility of 
science, even when that threatens the religious ethic itself, for other­ 
wise science has no meaning, and cannot serve even the ends of religion. 
It must allow and tolerate the joy which art finds in sense, without 
which even sacred art is impossible; and must make the best of the fact 
that only unusual peaks of achievement beget art which has spiritual and 
religious significance, while the chief province of art will always be 
the glorification of sense. Here it (the religious ethic) will have to 
admire what it resists, and will be able to conquer the whole impulse 
only when its first elan is exhausted. Only by toleration and allowing 
these ends to exhaust themselves can it hope to win in this conflict. 
It is right here that the ethical problems are most delicate, profound, 
and difficult." *
Troeltsch's scheme of ethics is thus a scale of values ranging 
from the lower to the higher, with conflicts occurring between them, but
with religion, whose primary concern is the highest and most ultimate
to
of these values, struggling to relate them all to the ultimates, and/in­ 
corporate the most significant parts of them all into the eternal ends 
of its own scale. In brief, it is the function of religion in relation 
to ethics to sort out the ultimate and absolute values by revealing their 
relationship to the Divine Ground of all values, God. Only so far as the
values of culture can be related to the working of the Divine Will and
2 ends are they really coincident with religious values. Th$s statement
leads us directly back to the relation of the historical norms to the 
theological ones* Only those historical norms that embody these absolute 
values and commands of ethics, those whose character is most ultimate, 
and those which a-re most nearly connected with the purposes and require-
xroeltsch, "Grundprobleme der Ethik," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, 
pp. 661-662 (Quotation somewhat abbreviated).
2Ibid., p. 671.
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swnts of God as He reveals Himself to nail in history, are identical with 
the theological norms. Troeltsch himself does not state this so clearly 
and explicitly as one could wish, but it is plainly his intention. In­ 
deed, it is one of the the defects of his statement of the theory of norms 
that he does not emphasise a gradation among them on some such basis as 
that just indicated*
Having defined the relation between ethics and religion as it 
bears upon the subject of the norms, we now come to the second question: 
where Troeltsch would look to find the revelation in history which the 
distinctly theological norms indicate* Part of the question has been 
answered already in the foregoing discussion, Wherever Troeltsch saw an 
ultimate value or meaning embodied in the life of any historical entity, 
he would find the Divine activity, the Divine Spirit revealing Himself and 
His Will to men. Now, of course, this presupposes one qualification for 
the investigator personally. The observer who wishes to find the norms 
in theology must not only have the general qualifications which belong 
to the philosopher of history, such as competence in the field and 
fine ethical perception, but he must also be a man of the finest re­ 
ligious caliber. No one can understand the nature of religion who is 
not religious himself. That this is an indispensable qualification as 
Troeltsch states, needs no proof; for one needs only to turn to the numerous 
attempts of outsiders to write on religious subjects to appreciate that 
unless the investigator has some real understanding of the nature of re­ 
ligion from his own personal experience, he goes far astray in his con­ 
clusions*
Troeltsch, "Religionsphilosophie," in Diei Philosophie im Beginn des 
gwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, edited by Wilhelm Windelband, p, 141 .
The ethical values which the norms carry indicate the rational 
aspects of history from which the norms arise. There is, however, another 
group of historical phenomena in which the distinctly theological norms 
may be discerned. These are the contingent elements, which cannot be 
accounted for upon any rational basis, but whose presence is an undoubted 
fact in history in general, and in the history of religion particularly* 
Troeltsch's idea of contingency is stated in his article, "Contingency" 
in the Hastings Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. This essay is also 
printed in Gernan in his Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II. The gist of this 
theory is that not all of the elements of history which bear on religion 
can be accounted for on a strictly rational basis. Some are quite be­ 
yond the grasp of reason, or the capacity of logic and science to explain. 
Many of the factual combinations of history fall into the class of these 
contingent elements. To it belong those aspects which are concerned with 
the original, the irreproducible, and the new in historical combinations. 
It also includes the facts which come into being through the action of 
freewill apart from natural law. This category of the contingent des­ 
cribes mny of the non-rational aspects of history which are of vital 
importance to religion. These contingent elements are one of the factors 
which make history so complex, and so incapable of complete rationalisation, 
Both the rational and the contingent phases have their place in religion, 
and are of interest to it, but their relation to each other sometimes 
presents conflicts and antinomies which cannot be reconciled in any 
logical fashion.
The religious significance of the principle of contingency is
Troeltsch, "Die Bedeutung des Begriffes der Kontingenz," Gesammelte 
Schriften, Bd. II, p. 778.
-91-
that it is the category into which the manifold activity and freedom of 
the world in God fall; and includes the creative freedom of God Himself 
in working out His purposes in the world* It accounts for those aspects 
of history for which no reason can be given except that they are the Will 
of God, Now this concept is of high importance in the formation of the 
theological norms; for it is exactly in these inexplicable and super- 
rational elements that the manifestations of the Will of God, and His 
self-revealing activity in the world are to be sought. The normative 
aspects of the philosophy of history are sometimes to be found incarnated 
in single personalities. This is even more true of the theological norms, 
for the higher religions rest very largely upon the contributions of 
certain outstanding personalities, those of their founders and others 
who apprehend and embody in their lives the Divine revelation which 
they have apprehended with a clearness and fullness unknown to their 
fellows.
The Hebrew prophets are a case in point. No one can say why 
an Isaiah or a Jeremiah should have appeared just at the moment he did. 
Such personalities are contingent elements in religious history; but 
the normative significance of these personalities for religion is ines­ 
timable. The whole peculiar character of the Hebrew people is another 
of these irreproducible, contingent facts, with which the theological 
norms are particularly concerned. All that the investigator can do is 
to say that these contingent appearances have their ground in the Divine 
Will, In addition to single personalities which embody norms for re­ 
ligion, there are also some periods of history which are a source of norms 
for the other, less creative times - such religiously dynamic eras as the
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rise of the primitive Church and the Reformation are examples. No one 
can give a complete psychological or historical reason for the religious 
fertility of these classic periods, but it is one of the contingent 
facts of religious history*
To the class of contingent elements in the religious history 
of mankind belong also the inner facts of religious experience, communion 
with God through prayer and the devotional life. These facts of the 
devotional life are also some of those with which the norms are concerned, 
particularly in their living expression in the life of the modern Christian 
community, for through them revelation in its continuing work is to be 
discovered* This source is purely a concern of the theological investi­ 
gator, for ordinarily it would lie quite outside the consideration of 
the philosopher of history,
In his discussion of the meaningful and value elements in the 
norms Troeltsch covers the rational sources for the theological norms; and
in the stress he lays upon the contingent elements he provides for the
o 
suprarational aspects of the problem. He is fully aware of the difficulty
of combining the two into a unified whole, but the theory of norms is 
his attempt to do so. Certainly he tried to construct the theory in such 
a way that both the rational and the super rational elements should have 
their place. He has been criticised for being too rational. Paul
Tillich complains that he always sought the Divine in the meaningful or
2 rational elements to the exclusion of the contingent. On the other
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp, 266-278»
2"Die Bedeutung des Begriffes der Kontingenz," Gesammelte Sohriften, Bd, II, 
p. 778
Paul Tillich, "Ernst Troeltsch, Versuch einer geistigen Wttrdigung," 
Kantstudien, Bd, XXIX, 1924, pp, 352-353.
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hand Rickert complains of Troeltsch1 s lack of appreciation of the rational 
for its own sake, and Emil Spiess, the Roman Catholic theologian, accuses
him of having a religion of feeling, which with its emphasis on value,
2is scarcely distinguishable from the American religion of pragmatism.
This difference of opinion about Troeltsch*s position on the 
relation of the rational and supesrational elements indicates merely that 
he tried to cover both, and did not solve the difficulty of reconciling 
their differences. It seems to the present writer fair to say that on the 
whole Troeltsch inclined to the rational side in his younger days. The 
Hegelian trend in his philosophy is very marked in the twin essays, Die 
Selbstflndigkeit der Religion and Geschichte und Metaphysik, and the Kantian 
influence of the period from 1903 on to the virtual close of his theologi­ 
cal activity in 1915. On the other hand, Der Historismus shows certain in­ 
dications of inclining towards intuitionalism. Before giving any final 
judgment as to which of these elements formed the chief source of the 
norms, it will be necessary to see the working of his entire theory.
Before turning to the derivation of the theological norms, 
it will be necessary to define Iroeltsch»s conception of revela­ 
tion, and its relation to the norms themselves. The peculiar function of 
the theological norms is to discern where revelation is to be found.
Troeltsch defines revelation as the Divine self-disclosure to the human
« 
soul. Although the material universe does and can reveal God, its sig-
Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 1921 
edition, pp. 410-411.
f>
Emil Spiess, Die Religionstheorie von Ernst Troeltsoh, p. 571-
Troeltsch, Article, "Offenbarung," in Die Religion in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart 1910 Edition*
-94-
nificanoe as a vehicle of revelation is very minor compared to history, 
where it is chiefly to be found* Revelation is never found detached from 
some bearer, some personality or means by which the Divine reveals Himself 
to the human. Now the chief sources of the norms in theology, which have 
been discussed, are, of course, the places where the Divine revelation 
is to be apprehended. Revelation in Troeltsch 1 s opinion, is not confined 
entirely to Christianity. We must grant that other religions, too, con­ 
tain a real revelation of God, therefore we must also concede that their 
character is supernatural. Most of his life, however, Troeltsch believed 
that the Christian revelation is the crown and culmination of all revela­ 
tion. Jesus is the highest revelation of God in human history. Yet, 
granting as he does the reality of the revelation contained in the other 
higher religions of the world, he would not necessarily confine the quest 
for the religious norm to the history of Christianity and Judaism. When 
the Christian theologian has established the norms for his own religion, 
he would have also to go on to compare the norms with those of other re­ 
ligions, just as the investigator in the philosophy of history must com­ 
pare the norms of his own aggregate with those of other groups before he 
can fully understand it. Thus the whole field of the history of religion 
must be considered before a full estimate of Christianity can be reached.
Troeltsch, Article, "Offenbarung," in Die Religion in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart 1910 edition.
CHAPTBR V 
THE DETERMINATION OF THB THEOLOGICAL NORMS
The discussion of the foregoing chapters indicated the method 
of the determination of norms in the philosophy of history, and showed 
the relation of the historical norms to the theological ones. The present 
chapter will endeavor to describe the determination of the theological 
norms, and their validation. The method of the determination of the 
theological norms would "be the Same for any of the great religions of 
the world; but since Troeltsch was a Christian theologian, who worked 
in the field of his own religion, it would appear to be the most logical 
scheme to treat first of the derivation of the norms within the sphere 
of Christianity, then of their application in the determination of the 
normative essence of that religion at the present time, and finally 
to carry them over into the wider sphere of the other great religions 
of the world in the question of the finality of Christianity. A 
further ground for this procedure is to be found in the fact that 
Christianity is the one of all the great religions of the world which 
has been the most deeply influenced by the scientific criticism of other 
aspects of the civilisation of which it is a part.
At the time when Troeltsch first began to develop his theories
*
of the norms in Christianity, the idea of defining the essence of that re- 
ligion has been made a popular theological objective by the publication 
of Adolf von Harnack's famous little book, pas wesen des Qhristentums, 
(English translation entitled, "what is Christianity?). The method which 
Harnack used in finding the essence of Christianity was the historical.
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The main thesis of his book is that the essence of Christianity, that is 
to say the permanent and vital element which continues all through the 
variant historical forms which that religion has taken during its long 
history, is to be found solely in the message of Jesus. On the other
hand, Alfred Loisy, the leading French Roman Catholic modernist of that time,
•a, /• 
in his book, L'evangilt et L'eglise, maintained the counter-position that
the original gospel of Jesus could not be regarded as the essence of
Christianity. The gospel, according to Loisy, was from its
very beginning a complex affair, whose varied character can be discerned
only through the history of the Church. The essence of Christianity is
consequently to be found in the totality of the living Church and its
activities*
In the midst of this discussion of the essence of Christianity, 
Troeltsch was formulating his own historical method. His solution to 
the problem of the essence of Christianity led him to the formulation of 
the concept of norms in the field of theology. According to Troeltsch, 
both Loisy and von Harnack had over-simplified the problem of the essence 
of Christianity by supposing that any one element in such a complex his­ 
torical phenomenon could be singled out as the essence of the whole. He 
wrote the essay, "Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums»?M as a review of 
Harnack*s book for Die ohristliche Welt in 1903, but like so many of 
Troeltsch 1 s "book reviews," it was a point of departure for the forma­ 
tion of his own position. In this article, he agrees with Harnack that 
the historical method is the correct one for the discovery of the es-
"Was heisst »Wesen des Christentums 1 ? 11 is now included in Volume II
of Troeltsch1 s Gesammelte Sohriften. Another essay in that Volume, 
entitled, "Wesen der Religion und Religionswissenschaft," also 
treats the same problem.
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sence of Christianity; but finds that von Harnack's conclusion that the 
essence was to be found in the preaching of Jesus alone is unsatisfactory 
because it ignores so much that is really valuable and enriching in the 
subsequent history of the Church. While granting Loisy's objection that 
Harnack's position was too simple, Troeltsch saw in Loisy's own answer, 
that the Church constitutes the essence of Christianity, nothing but a 
remnant of Roman Catholic dogmatism.
Neither of these answers takes account of the difficulty of 
the problem, nor does justice to all the historical facts involved in 
the question. Christianity is really; a succession of historical indivi- 
dualisations of the Christian ideal. It presents as particular and some­ 
times competing interpretations of its own ideal the preaching of Jesus, 
the message of Paul, the Primitive Church, the Roman Catholic Church,
Eastern Orthodoxy, protestantism Old and New, and the peculiar variation
2 
of them both represented in the mystical sects such as the Quakers. No
simple formula can be found to cover the essence of this succession of 
manifestations which comprise Christian history, unless it is to be an 
abstraction devoid of all meaning. Nor is it easy to point to some con­ 
tinuous element that runs through all these historical forms. It there­ 
fore becomes necessary to determine the essence of Christianity for each
epoch by itself, in order that each separate form may be examined for its
2 own inherent ideal. All of these manifestations, even the preaching of
Jesus, are conditioned by the historical factors of the contemporary
^Troeltsch, "Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentume '?" Gesammelte Schriften, 
Bd. II, p. 402.
2 Cf. Troeltsch's own divisions in Die Soziallehren.
2 "Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums 1 ?" Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p. 596
-98-
situation of which they are a part. It is necessary to disentangle the 
ultimate elements of the inherent ideal of each epoch from the extraneous 
and transitory elements with which it is intermingled. Each separate form 
is a peculiar 'embodiment of the Christian ideal; and as such, con­ 
tains its own norms. "Every epoch is immediate to God," as Troeltsch liked 
to put it, using a quotation from Ranke.
The essence of Christianity for any of its individual historic forms 
is nothing more or less than the determination of its norms for that period.
Its characteristics therefore are those of the particular group of norms ~t
would be the same for any religion as for Christianity, though it is a 
peculiarity of that religion that it has shown such amazing capacity for 
assuming various historical manifestations without losing sight of its 
essential and inherent ideal* Troeltsch*s own Soziallehren is an effort 
to determine the essence of Christianity for the various periods down to 
the eighteenth century, when the his^trical development of the Christian 
heritage was turned into very different channels by influences reacting with 
it from other currents of thought such as the natural sciences and the 
historical criticism begun in the period of the Enlightenment. His 
Glaubenslehre is his determination of the essence for contemporary Protes­ 
tantism, supplemented by special studies of various trends that caused 
the change, most of which are collected in the fourth volume of his 
Gesammelte Schriften.
it is interesting to note that Wilhelm Herrmann, whose approach to theology 
was -wrydifferent from Troeltsch1 s own in KB many respects, agrees with 
him that the Enlightenment did profoundly modify Christianity, even 
though he thinks Troeltsch somewhat overestimates its effect. Cf. Wil­ 
helm Herrman, "Lage und Aufgabe der evangelischen Dogmatik," Zeit- 
scnrift fftr Theologie und Kirohe, 1907, p. 6 -
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Like the general norms of the philosophy of history, the norms 
which constitute the essence of Christianity are intrinsic, inherent in 
their OTOI object. According to Troeltsch, it is a mistake to take over 
some external canon such as miracle, or supernaturalism, and endea-or to 
judge the object by it. Like the general historical object, each Christian 
'complex must yield its own norms, although in the latter case, 
the task of the investigator is somewhat easier, because there is more 
historical continuity in the object. One of the main purposes of the de­ 
termination of the norms for each period is to seek the continuing stream 
of revelation in its new form of embodiment in the present, A second is 
to apprehend new revelation which is being communicated to the present 
Christian community as it meets problems which may never have emerged 
before in all the history of the Church? for it must be constantly kept in
mind that to Troeltsch, revelation was a dynamic force which is ever
2present in the Christian body throughout all its history,
Now the peculiarly Christian norms have one characteristic which 
sets them apart from the norms of philosophy of history. They have a 
center of reference by which they are judged in order that it may be clear­ 
ly seen whether they be true indicators of revelation. This is the classic
period of Christianity, the New Testament, in which era the Christian ideal
g found its freshest and strongest incarnation, Troeltsch does not stress
the importance of the New Testament period for any dogmatic purpose of 
extracting from it some supernatural canon for the whole historical 
analysis, but simply because historically it is impossible to do otherwise
"Proeltsch, "Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums 1 ? 11 , Gesammelte Schriften. 
Bd. II, p. 433.
2Ibid., p. 432. 
3Ibid., p. 413,
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than recognise the vigor of that creative era which was so close to 
Jesus Himself* On the other hand, it is not possible, historically 
speaking, to use this epoch as an absolute standard, for it itself is 
not a unity, and even in it, the Christian ideal meets us in various 
forms* Also in that period, many implications of the Christian ideal 
are recognisable only as buds whose full flowering comes with the lapse 
of time. Indeed, in that early period comes the very important his­ 
torical transition from Jesus as a living personality to the Christ 
of faith.
Like the norms of philosophy of history, the theological norms 
measure the past and present of the individual form upon its inherent 
ideal; but the theological norms have a doubL reference, to the immediate 
past of the object, and to the classical New Testament era. They consti­ 
tute an immanent critique of the past and present, by which the permanent 
and normative elements which are really in line with the Christian
ideal may be differentiated from whatever accretions and incidental fac-
2 tors of the contemporary situation are mingled with the essence. One
purpose of determining the present-day essence of Christianity is to 
provide a convincing and authoritative statement of what Christianity 
really is and thus to provide an effective apologetic for the guidance 
of the Church in meeting the problems which arise within its own ranks, 
and to aid it in its proclamation of the gospel to the world*
The second purpose of the determination of the norms looks to 
the future, for just as the historical norms serve as the basis around
HProeltseh, "Was heisst '"Wesen des Christentums*?", Gesammelte Sehriften, 
Bd. II, p. 414-
2Ibid., pp. 407, 432 ff.
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which to build a future cultural synthesis which shall more fully express 
the ideal of the group, so the theological norms are directive trends by 
which the future of the Christian religion should be guided so that it 
may better incarnate the Christian ideal towards which it is striving. 
The very determination of the essence for the present is a creative 
act, for it is a means of shaping •$» essence for the future along the 
lines which the norms indicate. Troeltsch puts it thus, "The determina­ 
tion of the essence is the formation of the essence." ("Wesensbestimmung 
ist Wesensgestaltung**) The future is directed by this discernment of 
the vital elements of the historic stream of the Christian heritage com­ 
bined with the best religious insight of the present. It is this creative 
religious direction of the future from the norms which is a movement in
the direction of the ideal, the indications of that which ought to be in
2that which is (Seinsollendes im Sein).
This ideal in whose direction the present moves is not a mere 
abstraction. It is the ideal implicit in the various forms •» 
which Christianity has taken in the past, not only of the particular form 
whose essence is being determined, but of all the historical essences 
as well, combined with the highest that the present is able to add to
JZ
that heritage, and measured upon the New Testament period. The present 
is a component of the vital trends of the past, and whatever new aspects
i
of revelation the present apprehends or rediscovers. The determination 
of the essence is the effort to pass on the best to the future in the
TTroeltsch, "Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums 1 ?", Gesammelte Sohriften, 
Bd. II, p. 431.
2Ibid., p. 426* 
3Ibid., p. 428 -
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hope that in it the whole of the Christian ideal will be incarnated 
with a fullness and beauty not achieved in either the past or the
present. The apprehension of the norms is an act of creative intuition
According to Troeltsch,
on the part of the investigator, /the Reformers themselves had in mind 
such a combination of historical and living religious insight when they 
appealed to the Spirit speaking to their hearts from the Scriptures.
As in the determination of the norms of the philosophy of 
history, it is clear that Troeltsch puts great stress on the important 
part which the personality of the investigator plays in the derivation 
of the theological norms• He admits frankly that a certain amount of 
subjectivism is a necessary accompaniment of the process; but denies 
that the subjectivism, is complete or dangerous. It is not a matter of 
arbitrary and individual eccentricity. The investigator must be a man 
thoroughly trained in methods of historical research, and most important
of all, he must have the finest and truest ethical and religious percep-
2 
tion before he is competent to undertake such an important task. The
determination of the essence of Christianity is not an undertaking for 
every man; it, like the philosophy of history is, and must always re­ 
main the work of a few outstanding experts. Granted a thoroughly quali­ 
fied theologian, the objectivity of the norms will be insured by his 
complete willingness to abandon himself to the evidence of the object, 
and by the self-evidencing quality of the norms themselves. Also, as in 
the general historical analysis, the experts can check upon each other. 
"Whatever margin of subjectivity remains is an asset rather than
Troeltsch, "Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums*?", Gesammelte Sohriften, 
Bd. II, pp. 431-432.
2Ibid., p. 408-
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a liability; for it is a personal appropriation of the historical reve­ 
lation, and also of the present-day religious life of the Christian com­ 
munity of which the investigator is a part, and for whom he speaks, 
Troeltsch is conscious that this does indeed put the weight of authority 
upon the investigator in this representative capacity; but urges that 
since external authorities have been shattered, we must learn to be our 
own authorities* Says Troeltsch, "We must learn to have authority within 
ourselves rather than outside,us, to trust ourselves more to the creative
power of religion, which gives a living answer to the questions of the
gpresent." (Wir mussen lernen, die Autoritat mehr in uns, als ausser uns
zu haben, u&ii.mehr der schBpferischen und Gegenwartsfragen beantwortenden 
Kraft der Religion anzuvertrauen).
The validity of the norms rests upon their own objective, self- 
evidencing quality, and also upon the creative act of religious intuition 
of the investigator, upon his appropriation of the past and present wit­ 
nessed by the Spirit, UJhich is the living Revelation at work in the in­ 
dividual heart and in the fellowship of the Christian body. As a philoso­ 
pher, Troeltsch was not content to allow the validity of the norms to 
rest upon this purely historical and religious basis. He sought to give 
the norms a more philosophic validation through his theory of the religious 
apriori. He does not state in the essay, "Was heisst *Wesen des Christen- 
turns 1 ?" that the norms receive their validity on philosophic grounds from 
the religious a priori, but he states it in numerous other connections, 
notably in the article, "Wesen der Religion und Religionswissenschaft," 
(Gesammelte Sphriften, Bd. II, pp. 494, 495). It was really to insure
Troeltsch, "Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums 1 ?", Gesammelte Sphriften, 
Bd. II, p. 435.
2Ibid., p. 457.
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a philosophic validity for the norms that he developed the theory of the 
religious a priori, a full account of which is given in two of his other 
essays, Psychologic und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissensohaft, 
1905, and Zur Frage des religiBsen Apriori, 1909 (The latter essay is 
included in the second volume of his collected works). Following out 
the general lines for the a prioris of practical reason in ethics and 
aesthetics which Kant had laid down, Troeltsch postulates along with 
these two a third and special a priori for religion.
In order to understand the religious _a priori by which he 
hoped to gain philosophic validity for his norms, it will be necessary 
to go somewhat extensively into Troeltsch's whole theory of religious 
knowledge. The reason he felt compelled to make this philosophic at­ 
tempt to validate the norms was that he held that theology itself was 
no science, (Wissensehaft), in the strict sense of the word* It was 
merely the effort to interpret the knowledge supplied to the believer by 
religious faith in the light of the knowledge gained from secular branches 
of learning so far as they bear on religious matters. Theology is there­ 
fore largely a confession of personal faith rather than a science. Now 
Troeltsch, who had a far more tender conscience than most theologians 
about drawing the line between scientific proof and faith, was not con­ 
tent with merely theological validity for his norms. He had to have
support 
philosophic/as well. He therefore worked out the ingenious, though
somewhat artificial, concept of the religious a priori.
Until 1904 we hear nothing of the religious a priori; but it 
must be recalled that it was about that time that Troeltsch embraced
Troeltsch, Article, "Dogmatik," in Die Religion in Gesohichte und 
Gegenwart, 1910 edition.
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the modified Kantianism of Rickert and Windelband. In the light of this 
conversion, he worked out a new system of religious epistemology, of which 
the religious a priori was an outstanding feature. Another contributing 
stimulus to the development of this religious epistemology was the psycho­ 
logical study of religion made by William James, which is embodied in 
his Varieties of Religious Experience, Troeltsch felt the need for some 
means of sorting out the normative content of the religious experience 
from the purely psychological data which William James, George Albert 
Coe and the other American psychologists were assembling. The religious 
a priori was to serve this purpose of differentiating the normative and 
valid content of religious experience from the purely factual and inci­ 
dental psychological elements with which it was intermingled.
The function of the psychology of religion is a purely descrip­ 
tive one, according to Troeltsch. It cannot pass upon the truth and validity
of the data it collects. That task must be left to religious epistemology,
2 
a branch of philosophy of religion* On the other hand, theology offers
to philosophy of religion a body of normative truth from the theologian's 
own religion. Now against the general background of the data furnished
by the history and psychology of religion, the normative claims to truth
2 
of one's own religion must also be tested. How is the normative truth of
religion ultimately to be decided? Having renounced the claim to a special 
kind of supernaturalisra for Christianity, Troeltsch seeks to answer the 
question by the religious a priori.
Troeltsch, Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft, 
p. U. ~
2Ibid., p. 17.
Troeltsch, "Religionsphilosophie," in Die Philosophie im Beginn des 
gwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, Festschrift fur Kuno Fischer, edited lay 
Wilhelm Windelband.
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His earliest description of the religious a priori is that it is 
a form in the mind of the religious subject. He does not mean this in a 
psychological sense, but in an epistemological one. The mere presence 
of this form in the epistemological subject is under no circumstances to 
be identified with the possession of religion; for this form must receive 
its content through the contact with the revelation and self-communication 
of the Divinity. Psychologically, the apprehension of revelation is ac­ 
companied by emotional excitation varying from mild mystical states such
6
as those of prayer and contemplation to its extremes, vision and ecstasy.
The function of the religious a priori is to sort out of these psychological 
accompaniments the kernel of rational necessity, the valid and true element. 
This is nothing else but the human reason meeting the Divine Cosmic Reason.
"It is the courageous venture of thinking, as- Hegel says, to dare to
2 
trust one's self to the reason's own self-knowledge," Troeltsch says.
This self-recognition of the reason in the Divine reason behind the Cosmos 
takes place through the religious a priori, which is actualised through 
its contact with the religious object. The material which accompanies 
this action of the form in the subject is of two sorts: in the direct, 
personal religious experience of the subject, it is the function of the 
religious a priori to distinguish the immediacy of the Divine activity 
from the purely irrational, factual and empirical elements which accompany 
it, that is, to differentiate the universal, necessary and rational ele­ 
ments from the incidentals with which they are surrounded. Also, in the 
historical data of religion with which the investigator works, it is the
Troeltsch, Psyohologie und Brkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissensohaft, 
pp. 43-47•
2Ibid., p. 29 •
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religious M, priori which distinguishes the rational and valid content of 
the religious experience from the historical, empirical and irrational 
phenomena in which that valid part is imbedded,
Troeltsch does not mean to imply that the religious a priori 
functions like the Kantian a priori of pure reason, which would make valid 
religious knowledge the same as scientific knowledge. He conceived the 
religious a priori after the analogy of the Kantian ethical and aesthetic 
a prioris. Like them, it is not an affair of logic, but a means of dis­ 
tinguishing the rationally necessary and valid elements of the religious
2 
experience according to its own laws and its own nature. According to
Troeltsch, Kant really intended his a prioris of practical reason to func­ 
tion in this manner, but made the mistake of losing sight of the fact that
as forms in the subject, they can function only through the psychological
2 
and historical content with concrete reality. Like the a priori of pure
reason, these other a prioris of practical reason have a logic of their 
own, which works on the psychological data, but this logic is by no means 
the same as epistemological logic. The synthetic function it exercises 
is not a scientific affair, but the product of a free and unified person­ 
ality built upon the rational and necessary element discerned in the re-
4 ligious experience itself* Since the religious a priori is not concerned
with the logic of ordinary scientific knowledge, and its distinction of 
the rational and necessary elements in the religious experience is not a
Troeltsch, Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft, 
p. 45.
g Troeltsch, "Zur Frage des religi5sen Apriori," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.
II, p, 758.
^Troeltsch, Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der fteligionswissenschaft, 
p. 44.
A
"Zur Fra$e des religiBsen Apriori," Gesammelte Schriften, p, 758-
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strict connection of cause and effect, the distinction it draws be­ 
tween the rational, necessary, and valid elements, and the factual, in­ 
cidental and irrational elements is a continual struggle to win by fol­ 
lowing its own laws the rational and valid from the irrational. This 
must be a deed and a decision of the free personality. Its results can 
only be approximate, never exact and precise.
It is plain from the foregoing that one idea which dominated 
Troeltsch in his construction of the religious a priori is that it guar­ 
antees to religion an independent place among the constituents of reason. 
A second motive is to provide an epistemological function by which to 
distinguish the valid from the invalid, the true from the purely factual, 
and the rational from the irrational in the religious experience itself. 
He had a third interest also, which was first pointed out by Robert Jelke, 
who has done the most constructive work of any of the numerous investi­ 
gators of the subject in revealing what Troeltsch1 s real intentions were. 
In his brochure, Das religiBse Apriori,(pp. 41, 42), Jelke shows that 
Troeltsch meant the concept to assure the metaphysical reality of the 
Religious Object. This view of Jelke*s is undoubtedly correct; for it 
agrees well with Troeltsch1 s analysis of religious experience not only 
in the essays which deal with the religious a priori, but also with 
the subjective aspects of his analysis of religion as an experience be­ 
longing to a transcendent realm of ideas superior to sense knowledge in 
Die Selbstandigkeit der Religion. 2 Although at the time of the writing 
of Die Selbstandigkeit der Religion, Troeltsch sought to establish the 
reality of the religious Object along realistic lines, the religious EI
Troeltsch, Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie, p. 33*
Troeltsch, "Die Selbstandigkeit der Religion," Zeitschrift fur Theologie 
und Kirche. 1895-96, Heft 5, pp. 391, 392.
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priori is plainly his attempt to do the same in so far as that is possible 
within the bounds of Kantian Idealism*
In the essay, Wesen der Religion und Religionswissenschaft, he 
says that all an investigation of religious experience can hope to ac­ 
complish is to establish the religious judgments as necessary to reason, 
(page 494)• He continues, "The theory of knowledge can reach nothing 
more than a demonstration of the validity and the interconnection of 
the contents of consciousness, and the subordination of all other ele­ 
ments to those which are thus recognised as valid; but it knows no exis­ 
tential proof as such. The only existential proof possible to it is the 
demonstration of a valid rational necessity, which is reached in all 
realms, scientific, historical, ethical, aesthetic, and religious, ac­ 
cording to their various regulative principles; the demonstration of the 
validity of the religious idea in particular must not be confused with 
proofs for the validity of the knowledge of other single objects, since 
the latter rests only upon the demonstration of its causal connection with 
other objects* The religious Object is by no means one object side by 
side with others. The most important question is, therefore, that of 
the content and nature of the religious a priori. It lies in the
absolute substantial relation.' (Substanabeziehung) which is effectedf
through the nature of reason, by means of which all reality, and par­ 
ticularly all values are brought into contact with an Absolute Substance 
in which they have their origin and norm. This, of course, postulates 
that the religious a priori must be referred to this connection with 
the other a prioris, from which alone is derived the inner unity and the 
firm basis in the common substance, the ground of all the separate a prioris."
1 
Troeltsch, "Religion und Religionswissenschaft," Gesammelte Schriften,
Bd. II, pp. 494-495 .
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Now just how this unity of all the various a prioris comes about, 
Troeltsch has not defined clearly. He appears to believe that the re­ 
ligious ideas are more or less true according to the degree in which they
harmonise or fail to harmonise with the other a prioris, of which the ethi-
It is the task of a rigntly" oriented psychology to bring
oal is the most important* /In this provision he attempts to make room synthesis. 
for varying grades of truth in the different forms of religion, according 
to the degree in which they conform to this standard in their historical 
and psychological manifestations. The intention of this unity of the 
a prioris is to give this rational necessity to all the contributing fac­ 
tors so that the whole will correspond with the Great Cosmic Reason that 
lies behind all reality, which according to his own statement in the 
quotation just given is the nearest episteiaological approach to a demon­ 
stration of the existence of the Object from which these absolutes of 
reason originate*
He presupposes an idealistic metaphysic which is a combination 
of Kant f s noumenal realities and Schleiermacher*s cosmic Reason. This 
comes out quite definitely in his distinction between the intelligible 
and the empirical ego. This intelligible ego, he says, does not exist 
side by side with the empirical ego of sense experience and psychology, 
nor yet in it, but quite above and superior to it. Troeltsch believes 
that Kant did not draw this distinction between the intelligible and the 
empirical ego clearly enough} hence could give no clear means for providing
for direct contact with the Divine in this realm of the transcendent
2 
ego, which is superior to time, space, and sense experience.
1 
Ibid., p. 495-
Troeltsch, Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft, 
pp. 40-42.
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The intelligible ego, which is above all these limitations of the psycho­ 
logical ego, is totally rational and able to distinguish by its own laws 
the rational element, that is, the Divine in the religious experience* 
Otherwise there would be no way of safeguarding the religious experience 
against the ordinary laws of cause and effect that condition the empirical 
ego* So far as one can understand Troeltsch, this intelligible ego is 
the seat of the religious a priori. Moreover, the meaning of Troeltsch1 s 
remark about the monadology behind this noumenal metaphysical construction
of K«nt f s, together with his reference to the identity of his own con-
g 
struction with Leibnis 1 , (except for any preestablished harmony), seems
to be that this intelligible ego is akin to, or even a tiny fragment of 
the Cosmic Reason, which makes the reception of revelation possible. If 
this interpretation be correct, then it is a speculation about a divine 
spark in the human soul. This view seems to fit with Troeltsch's state­ 
ment that everything is truly religious in so far as it is absolutely
g 
rational, and his idea that the Absolute of reason and God are identical.
On the frail thread of the religious a priori, Troeltsch would 
then hang the weight of the validation of the normative and valid content 
of religion, and, in a measure, the reality of the Religious Object. 
The pros and cons of Troeltsch 1 s theory of the religious a priori have
been vigorously debated for more than a quarter of a century, since he
4 
first proposed the idea. So much has been said and written on the sub-
Troeltsch, "Zur Frage des religiosen Apriori," Gesammelte Schriften, 
Bd. II, p. 759.
2Ibid., p. 764- 
Troeltsch, Psychologic und Erkenntnistheorie, p. 46.
For a list of the literature on the subject of Troeltsch1 s a priori, 
see bibliography. The list is too long to give here.
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ject that it is very difficult to say anything new that has not been 
stated in some form or other. Even the material of the controversy is 
too extensive to discuss in any detail; therefore we shall confine our 
discussion to those criticisms which seem to be particularly apropos 
in the whole literature. Our criticism will logically fall under two 
heads: first the value of Troeltsch f s own concept of the religious 
a priori, and secondly the value of the whole idea of the religious a priori 
as a method of validation for religious experience.
So far as one reads the literature on the subject of Troeltsch's 
idea of the religious a priori, no one appears to have adopted the theory 
in just the form that he stated it, even those to whom the general idea of a 
religious a priori appeals. Undoubtedly the reason for this IB that his 
statement of his ideas on the question is very obscure; hence it is difficult 
to tell even after considerable study of the subject just what he means by the 
religious a priori. Jelke is the one of all those who have written on the 
subject who gives the clearest interpretation of Troeltsch's ideas; but one 
cannot but feel that Jelke understands Troeltsch's religious a priori belter 
than Troeltsch himself. Even so competent a theologian as Ferdinand Kattenbusch 
confesses that he is not sure he understands Troeltsch's theory of the religious
<-!
<;
a priori. One suspects also that Troeltsch f s reluctance to discuss the religious 
a priori was due to a half-conscious feeling that his ideas on the subject ' 
were none too well defined. He wrote the essay, Zur Frage des religiosen 
l&riori.onl'/ because the trenchant criticisms of Paul Spiess, a student of 
Hermann's, had forced
^Theniost favorable of the critics of Troeltsch's construction of the religious 
a priori is G. Ritzert (Die Religionsphilosophie Ernst Troeltschs.pp.58ff ]. 
Ritzert thinks Troeltsch stated the problem correctly and agrees with his trans­ 
cendental psychology, but prefers Otto's more realistic metaphysical framework
2L^he concent. , . , 





A concept which is so obscure that even thoroughly competent 
theologians do not understand it, is certainly of little use, and can 
under no circumstances serve to perform the weighty function of valida­ 
ting and selecting the normative truth of religion, for which Troeltsoh 
designed it. One may or may not agree with Rudolf Otto's conception of 
the religious a priori, but at least one can understand its workings.
Otto has also done us the service of giving us the definite category
p of the holy through which his religious a priori functions, Troeltsch
does not give us any particular category through which his a priori works,
though one must agree with Jelke against Sttskind that it is not a pure
3 form without any content. The content is plainly, as Jelke states the
essence of religion, distinguishable in all its variant forms, which, of 
course, means its rational element, the Presence of the Absolute in the 
soul.
It is just in this emphasis on the fact that the true essence 
of religion is to be found in its rational aspects that one difficulty 
with Troeltsch's construction of the religious a priori seems to lie. We 
must grant that he uses the term "rational" in a broader sense than logical 
or scientific knowledge, as he expressly states in answer to the objection 
raised by Paul Spiess that his theory would equate the truth of religion 
with scientific knowledge. He uses it in the sense of both theoretical
Troeltsch, wZur frage des religiB sen Apriori, 11 Gesammelte Sohrifteii, 
Bd. II, p. 754 •
gOtto, Daa Heilige, llth edition, pp. 143-144-
3R. Jelke, Das Religiose Apriori, pp. 29-31. S, Suskind, "Zur Theologie 
Troeltsch, "Theologisohe Rundschau, 1914, p, 55*
^Troeltsch, "Wesen der Religion und Religionswissenschaft," Gesammelte 
Schriften, p. 494 .
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and atheoretical validity. The implication of Troeltsoh1 s whole con­ 
struction is certainly that valid religion is a highly rational affair, 
for he goes on to say in this context, "Hi/hen I term it, (the religious 
a priori), rational in all cases, this word •rational 1 has its fine 
shades of meaning: it indicates the character of the ordering, evalua­ 
tion and reduction of all concrete reality, which comes from universal
2 
validity; it can thus be very different in science, ethics, religion and art."
At times Troeltsch did emphasise the importance of the contingent 
elements in religion, as we have seen in his essay on the subject of con­ 
tingency, but one cannot but conclude that he really ignores them to a very 
large extent in the whole working of the theory of the religious a priori, 
and that by and large, we are to find the valid and normative elements in 
the harmonious, ordered and rational aspects of the religious experience. 
Now, undoubtedly these rational concepts are present in, and vital to 
relitkious experience, but it is open to grave question whether they are 
the profoundest and richest aspects of religion. Certainly Otto is right 
in stressing the mysterious side of religion which is not irrational, but 
superrational. To relate the rational and superrational sides of religion 
to each other is a very difficult problem. Troeltsch, in his review of
Otto's Das Heilige, finds that Otto fails to solve the question of their
2 
relation to each other, but Troeltsch himself does no better. The
difference is that Otto lays more stress on the superrational aspects,
TTroeltsch, "Zur Frage des Religibsen Apriori, M Gesammelte Schriften, 
Bd. II, pp. 762, 763-
2Ibid., p. 762.
Troeltsch, "Zur Religionsphilosophie," (Aus Anlass des Buchez von 
Rudolf Otto), Rantstudien, 1919, p. 73.
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while Troeltsch prefers the rational sides. Neither one relates the two 
to each other satisfactorily. Perhaps that cannot be done. The effort 
to relate these two sides of religion reminds one of trying to combine 
a Greek temple and a Gothic cathedral. Both the temple and the cathedral 
are expressions of religion. The Greek temple embodies its rational 
sides, but the Gothic cathedral is a profounder expression of religion, 
because it has caught the religious aspirations which transcend reason. 
Yet these two forms of religious architecture cannot be synthesised. 
So also with Otto and Troeltsch in their effort to combine the rational 
and super rational aspects of religion. Neither one succeeds, because 
they are both trying to combine the Greek temple and the Gothic cathedral. 
If we must choose, however, it would seem that Otto's religious instinct 
is sounder in inclining more to the superrational elements in his system.
A further problem in Troeltsch1 s construction of the religious 
a priori lies in his effort to adhere closely to the Kantian metaphysic. 
Several critics have pointed out the weakness that comes through this 
combination. The Roman Catholics, Baron von Hugel and Emil Spiess both 
find fault with Troeltsch1 s allegiance to Kantian idealism. Spiess* 
criticism, to be sure, is entirely motivated by his strong adherence to 
Ron», for all through his book, (which, aside from this Catholic prejudice 
contains many very valuable and illuminating comments on Troeltsch and his 
position), he gives one the impression that if Troeltsch had only turned 
to St. Thomas Aquinas, all his philosophical problems would have been
Priedrich von Hugel, Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion, 
First Series, 1921, p. 189.ttmil Spies's, Die Religionstheorie von 
Ernst Troeltsch, p. 571'
-116-
solved. Baron von Hugel's criticism is more impartial. He does not 
propose a naive return to the pre-Kantian realism, but suggests that 
critical realism would be the remedy. Even some Protestant critics 
feel that Troeltsoh's choice of Kantian idealism for the basis of his 
religious epistemology was not a happy one. Jelke thinks that Troeltsch 
really broke with Kant in the direction of realism in his effort to find
a firm and sure ground for the reality of God. Professor Baillie, in
expresses the opinion 
his book, The Interpretation of Religion, also / that Troeltsch* s
construction goes so far beyond the bounds of Kant's that it really re-
2 quires a different metaphysical structure, on several grounds* The
first is Troeltsch' s assertion of the independence of religion from 
ethics in the postulation of a special religious a priori. The second 
is Troeltsch 1 s insistence that the a priori/ of practical reason, like 
that of theoretical reason, must receive its content from experience. 
The third point is Troeltsch1 s opinion that the categories Kant laid 
down are not a closed list, but must be supplemented by the growing body 
of experience and scientific knowledge. Although Professor Baillie 
agrees with Troeltsch against Kant on the two latter points, he feels 
that the first is such a decisive break with Kant that Troeltsch needed 
some other metaphysical structure to carry out his religious epistemology 
consistently.
On the other hand, Professor D. C. Macintosh, in an article 
entitled "Troeltsch' s Theory of Religious Knowledge," (American Journal
, Das religiose Apriori, p. 27. 
2John M. Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion, pp. 236-242,,
glbid., p. 243*
-117-
of Theology, 1919, pp. 285 ff.), thinks that Troeltsch limits the useful­ 
ness of his whole religious epistemology by adhering to the Kantian notion 
of a prioris at all.
Since our chief interest is the question of the norms in theology 
and their validation, our criticism of Troeltsch«s metaphysical structure 
must be from that standpoint. Kantian idealism presents the theologian 
with only two alternatives. Either one can go the way of the Ritsch- 
lians, and, ruling out all metaphysics from theology, make an exclusive 
supernaturalism in the sphere of practical reason the basis of the truth 
of religion, as we find it exemplified par excellence in the theology of 
Wilhelm Herrmann. (AS Professor Baillie observes, the Ritschlians are 
better Kantians than Troeltsch.) The only other possibility is to follow 
out the line of Schleiermacher and risk the dangers of extreme subjectivism
and even pantheism which that trend incurs. After all. it was really Kant
g who drove Schleiermacher into the arms of Spinoza.
Now Troeltsch rightly saw that theology does not do well to 
exclude metaphysic. Harnack to the contrary notwithstanding, it seems 
very doubtful whether the Christian church would have won such a decisive 
victory over its rivals in the ancient world if it had not made the strong 
alliance it did with Greek philosophy. In this modern world, theology 
still needs philosophy. AS Troeltsch remarked about the Ritschlians, 
if theology refuses all external support, it is like the sybil who had
a dozen books of wisdom, but burned six of them because she felt that
3 
they were so wonderful that it was enough to have the remaining six.
1 Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion, p. 243.
2 Troeltsch, in the final section of his essay, "Bnpirismus und Platonismus 
inker Religionsphilosophis", Gesammelte schriften, Bd. II, p. 384, concedes 
the point Just mentioned.
3 " 
Troeltsch, "Die selbstandigkeit der Religion," in zeitschrift fur Theology
und Kirche, Heft 5. p. 436.
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Troeltsch, being unwilling to use supernaturalism as a proof of the 
truth of religion, and being also a bitter foe of pantheism, would have 
strengthened his position greatly, had he been willing to break with 
Kantian Idealism altogether. As it is, he departs from Kantianism just 
enough to miss the benefits that it can bring, but does not go far enough 
in the direction of realism to free himself from its subjectivism. In spite 
of the strong Hegelian cast of his early metaphysic before he turned to 
Kantianism proper in 1903, one feels that he would have been able to work 
out a more convincing religious epistemology if he had kept on along the 
lines he lays down in Die Selbstandigkeit der Religion, which shows a 
decided trend towards realism. If one wishes to lay aside supernaturalism 
as the ultimate basis of religious truth, one can never find the way out 
of the subjectivism of Idealism to any means of establishing the religious 
realities outside the subject. One suspects that if Troeltsch had been 
born in a different country, he would have found the courage to break 
with Kant, but in Germany, where the Kantian influence is so strong, 
even philosophic consistency could not induce him to be independent of 
the greatest of all German philosophers.
The criticism of Troeltsch 1 s philosophic structure and its 
Kantian basis raises the question of the value of any form of the re­ 
ligious a priori as a validation of religious knowledge. Undoubtedly 
the most convincing interpretation of that concept is Otto's; but there 
are all shades of opinion as to its nature between the intuitional ex­ 
planation which he gives to it, and the rational construction of Troeltsch.
Emil Spiess also finds Troeltsch 1 s earliest metaphysic more promising,
but again, one suspects a Catholic predilection. My own view agrees 
but for reasons of philosophic consistency rather than following 
Spiess. Cf. Spiess, Die Religionstheorie von Ernst Troeltsch, p. 579,
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Dr. Gerhard Heinzelmann in an article called "Zum Stand der Frage naoh 
dem religiBsen Apriori," in Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1931, 
Heft 5«-6, gives a survey of the chief theories about it, and Rudolf
K6hler, in a pamphlet entitled Per Begriff a priori in der modernen
.of 
Re 1igionsphilosophie, also collects several interpretations/it. Its
advocates number in their ranks besides Otto and Troeltsch, Georg Simmel, 
Erich Schaeder, Jelke, Reinhold Seeberg, Kalweit, and Anders Nyrgen. 
Everyone of these construes the religious a priori in some different 
fashion, ranging from a kind of inborn faculty which makes religious ex­ 
perience possible to a category for the reception and clarification of 
religious experience. With some as in Otto's theory, it is a psychological 
faculty, with others it is an epistemological affair more or less after 
the pattern of Troeltsch 1 s, but never exactly like it. Tfl/hen a term is 
used to mean six or seven different things to as many different people, 
it becomes meaningless. All of these speculative theories, however, 
either wish to find in the religious a priori some resemblance of the 
human spirit to the Divine which makes religion possible from the sub­ 
jective side, or some formula for saying that religious truth is self- 
evidencing. Troeltsch, who always inclined to '-cosmic designs, seems to 
have wanted to do both these things at once.
Heinzelmann himself doubts whether the expression, religious
a, priori, is a useful one, and whether there really is such a thing as
2 the philosopher gf religion, 
a religious a priori at all, as does also/Heinrich Scholz. Neithor
Heinzelmann, "Zum Stand der Frage nach dem religiOsen Apriori," 
Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1931, Heft 5-6.
2Ibid., pp. 336-338.
8H. Scholz, Religionsphilpsophie, Berlin 1922, pp. 242-246.
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could deny that religious knowledge is self-evidencing; but both find
that it is something entirely received through revelation, not anything
/either an 
made possible by any inborn facultyof vabufaavxa- psychological oi/epistemo-
logical description. The present writer shares their position*
Troeltsch himself does not really gain anything by his elaborate 
construction of the religious a priori. His simple theological valida­ 
tion through -the testimonium Spiritus Sanoti is a way of saying self- 
authenticating. That is all that one can say of the new norms that spring 
from new or supposedly new revelation which the theologiaa, or the modern 
church apprehends. For the others, which are a part of the Christian 
heritage there is the check with other periods and particularly the classic 
age of the New Testament. Of the new norms, t&S€$$g$G£!S?93r , one can only 
say that they are revelation intuitionally perceived, and that the in­ 
vestigator is morally convinced by his own religious experience of 
their validity.
There has been much controversy in modern times about the wid- 
dom and the possibility of bringing philosophy and theology together, 
Troeltsch was right in maintaining that they cannot be entirely in­ 
dependent and mutually exclusive. However, there are one or two canons 
about combining them which Troeltsch disregarded in his validation of 
the norms through the religious a priori. One such rule in making theo­ 
logical and philosophical combinations is that in the translation of a 
theological concept into the realm of philosophy it shall not be made 
to mean something entirely different. Now as a theologian, Troeltsch 
says that the norms are recognised as such by a creative act of religious 
intuition and personal decision on the part of the investigator. As a 
philosopher of religion, he presents us with this complicated and rational
-121- 
concept of the religious a priori. The two do not mean the same thing
at all.
If as a philosopher, Troeltsch had to have a religious a priori, 
he should have defined it not as a form in the epistemological subject, 
but as a self -evidencing quality in the object, as he does later on in 
his work on the historical norms in Der Historismus . Then the two things 
would have meant the same thing in both realms. This construction of the 
a priori would also have provided a place for the contingent elements 
which are not capable of complete rationalisation, which Troeltsch 1 s 
"Kantian" religious a priori would seem to reject, if it is really a 
"means of separating the rational from the irrational," as he tells us.
Professor D. C. Macintosh in his article, Troeltsoh's Theory 
of Religious Knowledge, suggests a way of handling the religious a priori 
which would have preserved a number of the interests that Troeltsch 
really had at heart in his theory. This analysis deals with the matter 
from the standpoint of the religious subject. (The reference of the 
question to the religious Object has just been indicated above). He 
would base the construction upon criticial intuitionalism, making the 
a priori a relative rather than an absolute affair. The religious a
priori would then be the accretion of the work of the religious Object
o
upon the religious subject. However, one cannot but wonder whether
the term a priori is a good one for a process so plainly a posteriori. 
Regardless of the terminology, it is clear that this formulation of 
Prof. Macintosh's is a far ra -re accurate description of the method by 
which the normative in religion is discerned on the basis of Troeltsch's
bridge between the -two interpretations e,of the religious a priori is found in 
Empirismus und Platonismus in der Religionsphilosophie, where we find 
Troeltsch receding from Kantian rationalism., and moving in the direction of a 
Bergsonian intuitionalism.
TT9urnal fff Theologv - 1919 » P- 289 »
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theory than his own account of it. It fits more completely with the 
"decision" of the investigator. If the investigator must decide about 
the norms, there is no reason to suppose that the subject discerns them 
a priori* The faculty through which they are discerned is clearly
•i. 
built up through contact with the religious Object, as Macintosh suggests.
Troeltsoh in his statement of the qualifications of the religious 
investigator is careful to say that he must be a man of profound religious 
insight. Now if Troeltsch really means that the religious a priori is a 
form in the subject, the religious component of the reason, why should it 
require profound religious insight to discern the norms? Should he not 
be able to perceive them almost automatically? The very suggestion of 
this need for religious insight seems to imply that the capacity for 
making these religious judgments is the kind of accretion from contact 
with the Religious Object which Professor Macintosh suggests.
Troeltsch makes clear that religious insight differs in various 
individuals. He states that the determination of the normative essence 
of Christianity will always remain the work of a few unusuel persons. 
He concedes that investigators may even misapprehend revelation. If 
Troeltsch 1 s formulation be consistently carried out, it is somewhat 
difficult to see why these misapprehensions should occur. If the 
a priori is really the reason apprehending itself, why is the possibility 
of error so large? The description Macintosh gives of the origin of 
the capacity for religious judgments accounts much more satisfactorily 
both for misapprehension of revelation, and for differences in individual 
capacity to apprehend it*
All in all, the religious a priori as Troeltsch develops it is
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the weakest part of his whole theological and philosophic structure* 
Fortunately the theory of norms does not stand or fall with the religious 
a priori* The norms that are already a part of the historical heritage 
reveal their absolute character by their superiority to time and change, 
and endure through the variant forms of historic expression in which 
they have been embodied* The new norms stand on the same basis as sci­ 
entific hypotheses* Their verification as bona fide absolutes can come 
only through the lapse of time, or through demonstration that they are 
unmistakeably in line with the historic continuum of revelation, or 
their correspondence with the spirit and intention of Jesus*
Troeltsch himself suggests a similar idea of the a priori in validating 
new forms in fiber Masstg.be gur Beurteilung historischer Dinge, 1916, 
p» 138 except that he will hear nothing of analogy to scientifio 
hypotheses*
CHAPTER VI
TROELTSCH'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE NORMATIVE
OF CHRISTIANITY
Having surveyed in the previous chapter the method of the de­ 
rivation and validation of the theological norms which constitute the 
essence of Christianity for any given period, we now come to Troeltsch*s 
own determination of that essence for its modern, Protestant ' - 
form. . This entails, as one would expect from his view of the nature 
of the essence, a discussion of his whole theological system. This chap­ 
ter will deal with the main outlines of his doctrinal structure, - those 
elements which he considers normative for the modern Protestant Church, 
with the exception of his Christology, which has such profound normative 
significance that it seems best to treat it in a chapter by itself.
Troeltsoh tells us in the little autobiographical sketch en­
titled Meine Bttcher, in the beginning of Volume IV of his collected
2 
works, that he could never make up his mind to write a Dogma tik, but that
his positive theological convictions were embodied in the various ar­ 
ticles on doctrinal subjects that he wrote for the encyclopaedia, Die 
Religion in Geschiohte und Gegenwart, edited by Schiele, (1910 edition), 
Fortunately we do have a connected statement of his theology in the 
Glaubenslehre which was posthumously published in 1925, from notes taken 
from his lectures on the subject delivered at Heidelberg during the aca­ 
demic year 1911-1912. Although the Glaubenslehre was compiled in this manner,
This sketch was first published in Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in 
Selbstdarstellungen, Bd. II, Leipzig, 1923.
TTroeltsch, Gesammelte Sohriften, Bd. IV, p. 13*
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it is an accurate presentation of his theological systemj for it gives
the same impression of his thought as his other writings on theological 
subjects in the Gesammelte Sohriften, and especially in the above men­ 
tioned articles in Die Religion in Geschiohte und Gagenwart. These articles 
include: Eschatologie, Dogmatik, Erlb'sung, G laube , ( dogmati s ch ) , Glaube 
und Geschiohte, Gesetz, Gnade, Prinzip, (Religiose), Offenbarung, Theodizee, 
and some minor ones|? (Eschatology, Dogmatics, Redemption, Faith, (doctrinal). 
Faith and History, Law, Grace, Principle, (religious). Revelation, Theodicy.)*
We have spoken in the previous chapter of Troeltschf s view of
(Wissenschaft) 
the nature of theology. He did not regard it as a strict science,/ but ra­
ther as the knowledge given bjf religious faith criticised and systema- 
tised in the light of the best knowledge furnished by the sciences so far 
as the latter relates to religious questions. Since this combination is 
largely a personal matter, he considered theology a confession of personal 
faith, whose function was to provide a normative statement of the present- 
day essence of Christianity for the guidance of the Christian community. 
Although theology cannot escape the subjective element entirely, it has two 
guarantees of objectivity: the historical elements by which the individual 
theologian can check his own norms, and the fact that the normative positions 
he defines represent the religious consciousness of the present Christian
Troeltsch's statements about the nature of theology are not entirely con­ 
sistent. In his article on Dogmatik, he declares that it is too sub­ 
jective to be really normative, that it is rather for the admonition, 
(Beratung) of the Christian community; but in several other places, for 
example, in "Was Jbsisst 'Wesen des Christentums 1 ?" (Gesammelte Sohriften, 
II, 425-432, and in "Religionsphilosophie," in the Festschrift fur Kuno 
Fischer, p. 127, he speaks of theology as normative for the Christian 
community. On the whole, it seems clear that a&xksaacbc in his earlier 




Troeltsch's theology, like all his scholarly work, is thoroughly 
dominated by the historical viewpoint as opposed to the older dogmatic 
standpoint. His system centers about two foci, the historical elements in"S
the Christian doctrinal heritage, and the religious consciousness of the
present-day Christian community. This accords with his concept of revela-
2 tion as a living reality in the modern church as well as in history. In
making this division of his subject, he consciously follows Schleiermacher, 
by whom he was deeply influenced. So far as the present Christian con­ 
sciousness is concerned, Troeltsoh improves upon the method of Schleiermacher; 
for his greater awareness of the importance of history saves him from the 
extreme subjectivity which vitiates Schleiermacher*s system at so many 
points. Troeltsch states that his reason for analysing the Christian con­ 
sciousness in his theology is that one must begin with the revelation of
God as the Christian community apprehends it, since it is impossible to
2 analyse God, the Object of faith. Also in the consciousness of the modern
Christian community, historical trends of the Christian heritage *re fo- 
cussed and appropriated into a living synthesis with the present apprehen­ 
sion of revelation, Troeltsch 1 s whole emphasis in this approach is upon 
the present as a creation of the past, which, by enriching the historical 
heritage, builds a future that shall be a better and fuller attainment of 
the ideal which they seek to incarnate and perpetuate.
Troeltsch defines Christianity as followss "The Christian faith
Troeltsch, Article, "Dogmatik," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegen- 
wart, 1910 edition, section 3. •—————————
2Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 19-20. 
3Ibid., p. 128-
-127-
is the belief in the second birth and exaltation through the knowledge of
God in Christ of man, the creature, who has been estranged from God in 
the world; but who, through this redemption is united in fellowship with 
God and with the redeemed community in the Kingdom of God." (Der christ- 
lich-religidse Glaube ist der fflaube an die Wieder-und Hflhergeburt der 
in dctr Welt gottentfremden Kreatur durch die Erkenntnis Gottes in Christo 
und damit ihre Vereisigung mit Gott und unter sich zum Gottesreich.)
This definition states what Troeltsch considers to be the in-
2 herent ideal of Christianity, the Prinzip, as he calls it. This Prinzip
is the abstract formulation of the motivating force in Christianity which 
all the individual!sations are striving to incarnate. It is the principle 
of continuity which underlies all the variegated historical forms* Each 
age strives to embody the Prinzip in whatever symbolism is at its command, 
and through whatever forms of thought are most understandable to itself. 
The Prinzip represents the coromon element of all the essences of Christianity 
of the various ages and forms of its entire history. The formulation of 
this inherent ideal is an act of historical and religious intuition as a 
result of the study of the totality of the manifestations which comprise 
the material of the history of Christianity.
The divisions of systematic theology follow logically from the 
formulation of the Christian principle. These are the historical doc­ 
trines and present-day religious and metaphysical beliefs. The histori­ 
cal doctrines or norms, deal with the Old Testament, Jesus, the develop-
Troeltsch, "Die Dogmatik der religionsgeschichtlichen Schule," Gegammelte 
Schriften, Bd. II, p. 512. ——————
2Cf. Troeltsch's article, "Prinzip, (religiBses)," in Die Religion in 
Geschiohte und Gegenwart, 1910.
jnent subsequent to Bis advent in the New Testament, and the growing doc­ 
trinal heritage of the Christian Church, The present day norms have to 
do with the appropriation of redemption through Jesus and the Christian 
community's apprehension of revelation in the present time. This appro­ 
priation centers about four leading ideas: God, man, the world, and the 
relation of all three to each other in redemption and fellowship in the 
Kingdom of God. Around these foci, Troeltsch constructs the normative 
essence of modern Protestant Christianity.
The historical aspects of the Christian heritage have vital and 
important significance in determining the norms which constitute the 
present day essence of Christianity, because, containing as they do the 
original revelation of Jesus, and its classic appropriation in the New 
Testament era, and the subsequent development of the Church through out 
the ages, they are the forces which have moulded the present and made it 
what it is to a very large extent. The first of the historical factors 
which shaped the present is the Old Testament period, which Troeltsch 
considers, — as indeed he does all the historical elements —• from the 
point of view of its significance for the present.
.- The Old Testament development is important not only because 
it prepared the way for Jesus, but because it in itself contains certain 
very fundamental truths concerning the nature of God and His Will for 
fflan, which were revealed to the prophets and the other great religious 
souls in the course of Hebrew history. These truths are still vital and 
living for the modern Church, as they have been through Christian history. 
They are still normative elements in the Christian heritage. Jesus built
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 73,
-129-
upon the religion of the Old Testament* When He came, He did not have 
to begin by proclaiming monotheism as a basic fact about the nature of 
God. Due to the work of the Hebrew prophets, the acceptance of the one­ 
ness of God was axiomatic in the Jewish heritage when Jesus came. Not 
only had the unity of God been revealed through the Prophets, but they 
had also interpreted His Will in ethical terms. A third contribution of 
the history of Israel to the Christian heritage is the great succession 
of religious personalities, the prophets, the psalmists, and others, who, 
as bearers of revelation and forerunners of Jesus, have always occupied 
a position of normative significance in Christianity, and still continue 
to do so* Of course, not all of the history of the Hebrews can be re­ 
garded as normative, for some of the work of the prophets was lost or 
hindered from full development by the legalism and narrow nationalism with 
which later Judaism became entangled. The three contributions, monotheism, 
the interpretation of the Will of God in ethical terms, and the great 
succession of religious personalities, who were the vehicles of revelation, 
and forerunners of Jesus, still hold normative significance for modern, 
as for historic Christianity. Without these historical forerunners of 
Jesus, it would be impossible to understand Him.
The second historical norm is the personality of Jesus, the crown, 
culmination, and center of the entire Jewish-Christian revelation. The 
importance of Jesus for the Christian faith is such that it will be dis­ 
cussed in a separate chapter. Here it must suffice to say that the norm­ 
ative position of Jesus is not comparable even to that of the founders of 
other religions, for not only is He the originator of the Weltanschauung
^roeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 97-100.
-ISO- 
contained in the Christian revelation of God, but He is the center and 
the mediator of the redemption. The very essence of the modern Christian's 
appropriation of salvation is that it is power emanating from Jexus, which 
lifts him out of himself and up to God. In spite of all historic diffi­ 
culties, Troeltsch believes that we can recognise the main outlines of 
Jesus 1 life and teachings in the gospels so that faith can continue to 
find in Him the secure historic basis for salvation now, as in the past* 
The third historical period which is important in determining the 
norms of present-day Christianity is the subsequent history of the Church, 
Jesus Himself cannot be fully understood historically except in the light 
of the development which preceded Him in the prophetic tradition, and also 
through the succession of Christian personalities whom He inspired, - a 
succession beginning with Paul, and extending down to our own time. These 
great figures of the Church have a normative significance for the Christian 
community. In fact, the whole of church history has a living interest for 
the present in so far as it is the continuation of revelation. The purely
factual side of this development belongs to the province of Church History,
2 
but the religious evaluation of it is the task of systematic theology,
Troeltsch1 s division of Christian history is famous. He gives 
his reasons for it in detail in his Soziallehren, (1912), but it also under­ 
lies his Glaubenslehre, The divisions arej the Christianity of the primitive 
Christian oommunityj the Christianity of the Greek Catholic Church, which 
reflects the spirit of a moribund antiquity; the Christianity of the Roman 
Catholic Church which mirrors the mind of the Middle Ages; the Christianity
Troeltsch, Article, "Glaube und Geschichte," in Die Religion in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, section. 5.
2Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 118-121,
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of old Protestantism, -which is a Janus, with one face looking back to 
the Middle Ages, the other ahead into the rising laodern world; New Pro­ 
testantism, the child of the modern worldj and side by side with Old and 
New Protestantism, that peculiar offshoot of them both, the mystical sects.
Of this long and heterogeneous development, not all is of norma- 
tiTe significance for the modern church. The normative is to be sought 
in the appearance of great religious personalities such as Paul, Augustine, 
and the Reformers, who are continuers and bearers of revelation. They, 
as interpreters of Jesus and living representatives of the continuing reve­ 
lation in the Church, are the authoritative figures in the whole religious 
development of Christianity subsequent to Jesus, There are also certain 
creative religious epochs which exert a directive influence over the 
Christian body today. The Reformation is one such era, at least for Protes­ 
tantism, which, of course, Troeltsch has particularly in mind in his deter­ 
mination of the essence of present-day Christianity. (There would be no 
object in determining the essence of modern Roman Catholic Christianity; 
for that is, or at least gives itself out to be, quite untouched by all the 
currents of modern thought which have so profoundly modified Protestantism,)
The formula by which the Church has historically expressed its 
belief in continuing and living revelation in its own midst is the doctrine 
of the Trinity. The early Church found a symbol for this idea in the 
Messianic hope; but when this expectation of the speedy return of Christ 
was disappointed, it formulated the idea through the doctrine of the Trinity. 
This doctrine combines the historical and religious elements in the theology
Gf, Troeltsch1 s essay "Der Modernismus," Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II for 
a discussion of the unalterable position of the Catholic church on 
modern problems.
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of the Church. In its modern sense, the Trinity expresses the essential 
revelation of God to His historical revelation, incarnated in Christ and 
continuing through the work of the Holy Spirit in our hearts. Troeltsch 
understands the Trinity as a purely economic expression. The separation of 
theology from the Neoplatonic cosmological speculation out of which the 
doctrine originally arose makes it unnecessary as an expression of the unity 
of substance among the three members of the Godhead. The significance of 
the doctrine as an expression for the combination of the religious and his­ 
torical elements in Christianity remains unimpaired by the fall of the 
Neo-platonic philosophy which underlay the original formulation; and under­ 
stood in this economic sense, it is permanently valuable to the modern Church.
The doctrine of the Trinity is, according to Troeltsch, the bridge 
between the historical and the present elements of Christianity. The first 
of these present-day elements is the doctrine of God. With it, Troeltsch 
comes to the second of the sources of the norms, the analysis of the re­ 
ligious consciousness of the present-day Christian community. Troeltsch 
approaches the discussion of the doctrine of God in a humble spirit. He 
follows the method of Sohleiermacher in making the Christian community's 
apprehension of God the basis of his statement of the idea of God, because 
God is too great to be comprehended by the human mind, and our knowledge 
of Him is only the "small spark from His great light in our own souls." 
He admits the subjectivism inherent in such a process; but believes it is 
inevitable, since we have no other way of knowing Him immediately except 
through the experience of Him in our own hearts* The only guarantee that
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 122-126.
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we have that our apprehension of God corresponds to the reality of His 
nature is the faith that He is revealing Himself to us*
By its very nature, then, our conception of God must be drawn 
principally from our immediate experience of Him, Even the historic 
elements in the doctrine of His nature cannot substitute for this im­ 
mediacy of the perception of His character. They can indeed guide and 
mould our present experience; but not replace it. Of course, our concep­ 
tion of God has been greatly influenced by the conception of Him handed 
down from the Prophets and Jesus, but our idea is a synthesis of the his­ 
torical heritage involved in the doctrine, and our own immediate experi­ 
ence of Him in our lives. The chief present-day factors which contribute 
to the doctrine of God in the consciousness of the Christian community
are the modern view of the world and the personal struggle to understand
2 the meaning of life. The essence of the whole Christian conception of
God is that it is an ethical theism.
The outstanding characteristics of the Christian theism is that 
it conceives of God in the personal terms of Will and Essence, (Wesen). 
By essence Troeltsch means that God not only manifests Himself as a Will 
that executes its own purposes and ends in human history; but also that as 
Essence, He is the immanent, indwelling Spirit Who makes known in the hearts 
of men His holy purposes and His gracious offer of fellowship with Himself 
to do His Will, As Essence, He also creates in the souls of men the Know­ 
ledge of the good, which He wills, and the desire to follow the good. It 
is this combiration of the belief in God as Will with the idea of Him as
^roeltsoh, Glaubenslehre, pp. 131 ff, 
2Ibid., p. 138.
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Essenoe which distinguishes the Christian conception of the Will of God 
from the Mohammedan and Jewish ideas of it* In Mohammedanism, God is 
thought of in the terms of Will, but that Will is arbitrary; and in 
Judaism, the interpretation of God's Will as fellowship with Himself 
is confined to the Chosen People, This characteristic combination of 
God as Will and Essence also differentiates the Christian concept from 
that of polytheism, where the Will of God appears to the religious sub­ 
ject as parcelled out among the various forces of nature instead of 
absolute and unified. This is also a differentiation between Christi­ 
anity and all forms of pantheism and monism, which submerge the life of 
the individual in the Divine All. This separation of God and man which 
Christian theism preserves causes inner logical conflicts in the idea 
of God as Will; but it is necessary to the true essence of religion to 
preserve human freedom and individuality so that the submission to God 
may be a voluntary act, and also in order that the human personality, when 
it has been exalted into fellowship with God through this surrender, may 
be relatively a creative and free sharer in the purposes of the Divine.
That we should conceive of God in the terms of Will is an in­ 
herent necessity of the personal interpretation of His character. The 
analogy to human personality which it involves does not apply to the 
lower aspects of personality as we know it, but to its very highest and 
best qualities, willj purpose, intelligence and all the finer ethical 
attributes. The Will of God as we apprehend it is inseparable from the 
idea of purpose, of teleology. The chief scene of the working of God's 
purposes is to be sought in history rather than in the physical universe,
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 139-142.
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though that, too, is grounded in the Will of God. God is not to be 
identified with the world, whose Creator He is, but His Will is mani­ 
fested in the world, and in history, through the realisation of His purposes 
His Will isnojjtrational in the sense of being the ultimate ground of all 
things, the reasons for which we cannot discover. The Will of God is a 
free, creative agent, which has brought into being all that exists. We 
cannot answer the question why anything should exist at all except by say­ 
ing that it is the Will of God. "That is the Reason of all reasons, the 
law of all laws. Man's reason cannot answer the why or the wherefore of
it." 2
Since the Will of God is the Ground of all things, this propo­ 
sition holds true for the individual unit as well as for the sum-total of 
things. For this reason, history, which abounds in the individual and 
irreproducible, is the chief scene of the activity of the free, creative 
Will of God. History is dynamic instead of static, hence it is the prin­ 
cipal vehicle of the living, continuing revelation of God. This is not too 
narrow and anthropocentric a view of revelation; for besides the activity 
of God in history by which He makes Himself known to us, there may be 
other spiritual realms in which He is revealing Himself, but of which we 
know nothing. History is the vehicle of revelation which concerns us, 
for through it, we come to know God.
Though the Will of God is free, creative, and the ground of all 
things, Troeltsch does not interpret it as arbitrariness. It is saved from
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 148-151. 
2Ibid., p. 151.
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arbitrariness by its combination with the thought of God as Essence. 
Through this concept, God's purpose for man appears as the exaltation 
into fellowship with Himself. Not only does His purpose for men include 
His self-disclosure, but also the will to good, for the good and the Will 
of God are identical. The Will of God is the Moral law within the human 
heart. It is the immanence of God in the soul. All who surrender to this 
inner urge to good, which God Himself creates, enter fellowship with Him 
in His Kingdom. Jesus * ideal of the Kingdom of God means the complete 
sovereignty of God in men. On the one hand, that purpose is highly in­ 
dividual; for it is the relation of the individual soul to God the Father, 
On the other hand, it is a universal ideal in its command of love to one's 
fellowmen. This purpose of God, the realisation of His Kingdom, which 
is made known to us chiefly through Jesus 1 revelation, is an idea that 
is entirely unique to the Christian religion.
This idea of the loving Will of God with its good purpose in
the realisation of the Kingdom of God is the heart of the theistic con-
2ception. It entirely transcends reason; for no one can give any rational
explanation of why the Will of God should have set such an aim for itself; 
since it is subject to no law or compulsion. Theism can be understood only 
through the conception of the Will of God, as beyond all reason. His­ 
torically, this combined idea of God as Will and Essence has caused much 
logical conflict in the attempts of various theologians to give a consistent 
statement of the doctrine. Usually theologians have inclined to one side 
or the other, instead of stressing both aspects. Calvin emphasised the 
Will element to the exclusion of the Essence. Other interpreters have
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 153-155. 
2Ibid., pp. 161-162.
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stressed the Essence without proper consideration of the Will. Neither 
one is complete without the other. God is Will, but He is not arbitrary. 
God as Essence is immanent in the hearts of men, and manifests Himself by 
His love to themj but He is not bound by any law, even that of love. In 
the combination of these two aspects of His nature lies the peculiar genius 
of Christian theism. The two ideas are united in the concept of freedom, 
or of the Spirit. The Spirit is the indwelling God in man, through Whom 
he is exalted into unity of will with God, and shares the Divine freedom 
through perfect obedience to, and accord with His Will.
The subjective appropriation of this conception of God rests 
upon a personal decision. To some extent this decision is influenced by 
the possibility of combining this idea of God with the picture of the 
universe which philosophy and science furnish to the modern man. The 
objections to it from this source are four: First, some maintain that it is 
unworthy to conceive of God in this anthropomorphic form. Second, others 
assert that this theistic interpretation leaves us with a permanent philoso­ 
phic dualism. Third, some others are of the opinion that the idea of plural­ 
ity of ends contains in it the impossibility of any teleological view of the 
world. Fourth, still others assert that the idea of God in connection with 
freedom turns out to be an assumption that can neither be rationally estab­ 
lished nor deduced*
To the first of these objections Troeltsch grants that the theis­ 
tic conception necessarily entails a certain element of anthropomorphism; 
but that this is no real objection if the anthropomorphism be conceived 
on the analogy of the higher rather than the lower aspects of personality.
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 162-165.
-138-
If we are unwilling to think of God in personal terms at all, the only 
other alternative is to conceive Him as an Eternal Absolute without any 
attributes of any kind. The latter idea of Him would obliterate all dis­ 
tinctions between good and evil. Even though the theistic view involves
logical conflicts and antinomies, we must prefer these to the attribute-
2 less Eternal Absolute, which has no predicates at all.
The second objection is that of those who incline to the kind 
of unity which monism and pantheism afford. To this difficulty Troeltsch 
retorts that even monism and pantheism do not escape the dualism between 
good and evil. The evil must be explained as illusion, which necessi­ 
tates some answer to the problem of how that illusion came into being. 
The nature of true religion demands the recognition of that dualism which 
in fact exists in the world. If this dualism is not admitted, there is 
no need for salvation of any kind, even the type that pantheism affords. 
The Christian salvation offers redemption from the lower to the higher by 
the unity of the will of the creature with the Will of God. Pantheism 
also recognises a certain dualism by its offer of salvation to the creature 
through the absorption of his individuality in the Pure Being of God. 
The pantheistic dualism is that between illusion and reality; in Christian­ 
ity it is that between good and evil. Both presuppose an irrational ele­ 
ment. The difference is that the pantheistic irrational is the dualism
2 between illusion and Being; the Christian is the creative Will of God,
Troeltsch often did speak of the identity of the Absolute of philosophy 
with the Christian God; but it must be remembered that he consistently 
maintains that the Absolute in the sense he uses the term is the philo­ 
sophic Absolute only in the sense of being the Ground and Originator 
of all the ideal values. He never uses Absolute in a monistic or mathe­ 
matical sense of the attributeless All.
2Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 165-169. 
3Ibid., pp. 169-172.
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The third type of objection to the idea of God as Will and Es­ 
sence is that it tends to make God finite; therefore cannot be carried 
out to a logical conclusion. The objection is twofold. One side of it 
concerns the implication that such a supposition makes God incomplete in 
His own Being without the fulfilment of His purposes, which is equivalent 
to denying His self-sufficiency and superiority to change. The other 
side of the difficulty is that the very assumption of God's purpose for 
man is 3n anthropocentric notion, because it makes man and his welfare 
the object of great solicitude on the part of God, To the first half of 
the difficulty, Troeltsch answers that all thought of the Being of God 
leads in some way to an idea of the necessary connection of His purposes 
with His Being, even the Spinozistic theory, in which the amor intellectualis 
becomes His purpose. The Christian idea makes redemption the purpose of 
God for man; and redemption is the heart of all religion. The reply fco 
the second half of the difficulty is that just the fact that God has the 
purpose of redemption for man in view is not absolutely anthropecentriq. 
There is no reason to suppose that redemption is the only purpose God has 
in the universe. Moreover, even the aim of man's redemption does not 
mean that God is concerned with his welfare and prosperity on a purely eudae- 
monistic plane. Redemption is entirely a religious matter, the exaltation 
of the creature above the realm of nature and sense into fellowship with 
his Creator,
The fourth possible question about the theistic conception con­ 
cerns the combination of the idea of the Will of God with freedom of the 
creature. This is a completely supsrrational postulate of theism; but it
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 176-180.
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is very essential to the true character of religion. Since God Himself
•wills its existence, all creation exists through His Will, He wills to 
exalt men into fellowship with Himself so that they become partakers of 
His freedom. Religiously, this doctrine is expressed in regeneration of 
the creature, and second birth. Applied to the world at large, it allows 
for the appearance of new things through the continuous creative activity 
of God, This conception conflicts with the changelessness that is so dear 
to pantheism; and it also clashes with the effort of science to carry out 
the law of cause and effect rigidly throughout the universe. The com­ 
plete application of the law of cause and effect to all realms of life 
would postulate that science is in a position to explain the ultimates of 
the universe, which, as a matter of fact, it cannot do. It, like religion, 
must bow before the mystery of the creation and the ceaseless activity of 
God without being able to explain the one or the other. The appearance of 
new elements is irrational, but their existence can be denied only if one 
assumes that all change is illusion. In human life, each individual is 
irreproducible, and in religion, the converted man is a new creature. 
The idea of the creation as an unceasing process gives an account of 
the irrational in the universe, though it does not explain it.
The concept of God as Will and Essence does not exhaust the 
Christian doctrine of His Mature, God's Will and Essence are directed 
towards holiness, which leads to the next norm of present-day Christian 
theism. Like the doctrine of the Will of God, His Holiness is also a part 
of the heritage of Christian tradition which comes down to us from Jesus 
and the Prophets, The holiness of God occupies a central position in the
^roeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 181-182
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teaohing of Jesus. Under it are subsumed such attributes of the Being of 
God as His perfection, His Being as the Ground of the moral law, and His 
character as the Author of the moral order of the world and of moral free­ 
dom* These aspects of His Holiness imply His coinplete opposition to all 
forms of sin and evil. In its eschatological form, God f s irreconcilable 
hostility to evil is expressed in the doctrine of the Last Judgment; for
the essence of the Holy Will of God is that it demands holiness of man,
g 
and judges him according to the measure in which he meets this demand.
The above-mentioned characteristics are the chief ones contained 
in the idea of the holiness of God. The present appropriation of these 
elements needs further elaboration, for according to Troeltsch, the modern 
world presents some peculiar arid perplexing difficulties to the Christian 
belief in the Holiness of God. The Holiness of God, it must be emphasised, 
is the real heart of Jesus 1 own idea of God, — not His love, as the current 
modern idea would lead us to believe. The very application of the word good­ 
ness or holiness to the Being of God offers some difficulty. We cannot 
transfer all ethical virtues wholesale to His Being; that would be sense­ 
less anthropomorphism in the case of virtues like bravery, which plainly 
belong only to men in their struggles. Even goodness, perfection, or har­ 
mony, when applied to God, can mean only the inner unity or consistency of 
His Being with itself, not the obedience to the moral law, which is the es- 
sense of the term in reference to men. "When we say that God is good, we 
mean only that His Will is manifested in the moral law, not that He is 
bound by it. What the relation of God»s goodness or holiness to His own
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 184.
Cf. also the brief article *Gericht Gottes," in Die Religion in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, 1910 edition.
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Being is, we do not know, for it is beyond the reach of our comprehension,*" 
The use of such terms as goodness and holiness in Christian theism serves 
only to express our understanding of Him through the idea of Moral Will 
instead of through simplicity of substance,
God as Holy Will demands holiness of men. This is an entirely 
personal demand, for which each human being is responsible. The individual 
has the freedom to answer or to refuse to comply with God's demand for 
holiness. If he chooses to oppose the Will of God, he must bear the respon­ 
sibility for his course. The Biblical formulation of this truth is the 
notion of rewards and punishments.
This formulation Troeltsch finds inadequate for the needs of 
the modern world; for it is too plainly in contradiction to the experience 
of life, Howard does not always follow good conduct, nor does punishment 
invariably overtake evil-doers. For the doctrine of rewards and punish­ 
ment, Troeltsch would substitute the idea of a moral world order, for this 
is a concept not only more understandable in the modern world, but truer
to the teachings of Jesus, in which the theme of rewards and punishments
2is not the heart of the question. Even the faith in a moral world order
raises difficulties for Christian faith. It raises the question of man's 
relation to the physical world, and the problem of happiness in relation 
to moral action. Even granting that the Christian holiness must express 
itself in obedience to the Will of God, and in love to God and man without 
reference to the good or ill consequences that follow from it, still the
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 200-201.
o
Troeltsch 1 s complete moralisation of the Holiness of God, has been criticised
by Wttnsch, (Evangelische Wirtschaftsethik p. 172), who believes that 
Otto has given^us the true interpretation of the term holy in his Das 
Heilige, However, it is really Troeltsch rather than Otto, who follows 
traoTETonal Christian usage here. If Troeltsch moralises the term too 
completely, the question can also be raised whether Otto has not separated 
it/thoroughly from its moral connotation* 
too
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Christian ideal cannot be entirely indifferent to the physical world, 
•which, if the words of Jesus, "Thy Will be done on earth as it is in 
heaven, 11 be taken literally, has also a place in the Divine economy* 
The Christian ideal of moral action cannot be entirely spiritual, because 
we are placed in a world that is a combination of the material and the 
spiritual. To say anything of the relation of the two to each other is 
something of an adventure of faith, but in the long run, and in the majority 
of cases, we have the right to believe, Troeltsch thinks, that goodness 
does result in happiness, though it is not always true in individual in­ 
stances. Goodness does not save from disease, accidents, or natural catas- 
trophies. The good cannot expect miraculous exemption from the working 
of natural law. This focus of the matter is largely modern, though Jesus 
Himself taught that being overtaken by accidents or calamities due to the 
operation of natural forces was not to be interpreted in the terms of re­ 
quital for bad conduct. The important fact for us to recognise is that 
the Divine demand for holiness presents itself to us, and that it must 
be answered, regardless of whether happiness follows or not. All that 
we can do is to cherish the faith that in the end, the good will triumph, 
and that an ultimate harmony between natural and spiritual good will be 
reached.
The problem of the relation of goodness to man*s destiny in the 
world has implications that reach over into' the next essential character­ 
istic of the Christian idea of God, His love. God is loving, according 
to the Christian belief, yet His love has nothing to do with eudamonism, — 
a marked contrast to the interpretation of the love of the gods in the
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 205-212 Of, also his articles "Gesetz"
and "Theodizee" in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 1910 
edition•
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higher polytheistic religions. Also, Christianity alone of all the great 
religions of the world, reveals God as loving and gracious. This char­ 
acteristic of the God of Christianity is so far beyond the grasp of sci­ 
ence and philosophy that all the questions they raise concerning it re­ 
late only to the preconditions of such a belief, not to the certainty 
itself, which is purely religious in character. The love of God, according 
to Troeltsch, cannot be fully understood through analogies drawn from human 
love, - even from father or mother love, - which has to do with human 
senses and affections. The love of God is a unique form unknown in hu­ 
man relationships. It is the love of the Creator for His creatures. All 
figures drawn from human love are only figures when used of the love of 
God, The relation of love between God, the Creator, and men, His crea­ 
tures, can be best understood in the terms of a unity of spirit and will 
between them, which expresses itself in devotion to certain objective 
values which are recognised as the Will of God,
The problems which arise for Christians in connection with the 
belief in the love of God center around two facts of experience: first 
that it seldom happens that the goal of this relationship of love is fully 
reached by man, — an observation that used to be formulated in the doc­ 
trine of predestination, ~ and secondly, the practical difficulties 
which the facts of life present to the belief in a loving God in a world 
filled with suffering and brutality, the question of the so-called theo­ 
dicy* These are both practical rather than theoretical problems.
Trfceltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 212-215.
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Although the central element in the doctrine of God is really 
His Holiness, it is in the light of the belief in His love that all the 
rest of His nature is to be interpreted. The very fact of creation is it­ 
self an expression of God's love. The demand for holiness that He makes 
upon men is an expression of His loving Will for them? for He desires 
fellowship with them; and also. He not only makes this demand of them, 
but through His forgiving love and grace, He creates in them the capacity 
for goodness. His love for His creatures wins them back to Himself, 
If they will but surrender to Him in faith, He exalts them into fellow­ 
ship with Himself, and condescends to allow them to share in His pur-
2 poses. The idea of the love of God is the key to the whole of Christian
theism, through which all the rest of God's character is to be understood, 
and through which the ultimate meaning of creation is illuminated*
If the love of God is outgoing and gracious, as Christian theism 
asserts, the practical difficulty that this relationship of love to God 
seems so seldom to be realised among men must be met. Predestination is 
the older way of formulating this fact; but according to Troeltsch, that 
doctrinp views the matter from the wrong side. The limitation of those 
who share in the fellowship is not on the part of God, Who wills to save 
only the elect and damns the rest of mankind. It is rather that this ex­ 
altation into fellowship with God through His grace and forgiving love is 
a free offer, which each man can either accept or reject. Even when this 
fact of freedom has been considered, there still remains the serious dif­ 
ficulty of the many individuals who suffer from limitations of a spiritual 
or mental character which leave them no capacity or ability to desire to
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 213.
., p, 221, also the article, "Gnade," in Die Religion in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, 1910 edition.
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accept this offer of salvation* Primitive men, who are but little removed 
from the animal level, so far as we can see, are a case in point. There 
are also those who through mental or physical handicaps, disease, accident, 
or other misfortune, have had their higher capacities so impaired that it 
is impossible to conceive of their being able to attain to any higher 
spiritual level at all. These considerations cause us to wonder whether 
salvation is intended for all. This is the modern form in which the pro­ 
blem of predestination presents itself. In the face of the facts, 
froeltsch believes that we must still say with Calvin that God is not ob­ 
liged to offer salvation to every creature. Hard as this saying may seem, 
it contains a genuinely religious note in its appreciation of the fact 
that men may not question the Will of God,
Troeltsch refuses to take any way out of the difficulty of pre­ 
destination such as the belief in reincarnation, which he thinks is too
2 highly speculative to treat seriously. He does not follow those who would
postpone the salvation of these retarded personalities to the next world. 
He maintains that if they are to develop in the next world, they must bring 
with them some capacity for that development which, so far as we can see, 
they do not in fact display. He is willing to rest the matter in the doc­ 
trine of predestination» The limitation of grace is only one according 
to capacity, not the arbitrary one the older form of the doctrine presup­ 
posed* The elect according to Troeltsch*s idea, would be only from the 
group of those who have the capacity to accept or reject God's offer of 
fellowship with Himself, This is quite a different statement of the doc-
Troeltsch, Article, "Predestination," in Die Religion in Geschiohte und 
Gegenwart, 1910 edition *
2Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 231, Evidently Troeltsch felt a certain sym­ 
pathy with the idea of reincarnation, for in his article on Eschatology 
in Schiele's Encyclopaedia, he seems to play with the notion himself, 
Cf, Eschatologie, Section 4 .
trine from that of the older, deterministic statements.
The second problem, that of the theodicy, is, like predestination, 
a problem common to all ages. From the time of Job the contradiction be­ 
tween the idea of a loving God Who rules the world and the facts of ex­ 
perience have been felt by religious people; but the problem does have some 
distinctly modern emphases, due to our conceptions of the working of natural 
law. The traditional doctrine of the Church solved the problem through 
the idea of the fall of man as the root of all the misery and suffering 
incidental to the struggle for existence, and even explained the origin 
of disease and death by this means. Combined with Greek philosophy, the 
Church sometimes explained the whole problem on the basis of a dualism be­ 
tween spirit and matter. Neither of these solutions is possible in the modern 
world. Troeltsch's view is that even the best that one can say about the 
problem of suffering is merely a matter of individual opinion.
We are in a world that may be suited to some final, spiritual 
goal of mankind, but which certainly is indifferent even to the spiritual 
concerns of the individuals involved at many points. The universe is 
plainly an unfinished product, with the struggle incidental to such a con­ 
dition displayed in its many conflicts and imperfections. On the one hand 
is the harsh world of nature, and on the other, the spiritual struggle of 
man; but we can only believe that the Divine purpose underlies both, and 
that the spiritual life is deepened through the conflict between the two 
forces. Furthermore, Troeltsoh believes that God Himself suffers with 
His creatures in their efforts to realise His ends. His love is so great 
that its deepest meaning is known through His suffering with men in their 
suffering.
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 228, 232
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As a consequence of His love, God's creatures are important to 
Him as sharers in His purposes, and in their struggles He is concerned. 
This idea presents great theoretical difficulties; but it is an essential 
of theism, for without it, the existence of the creatures as separate in­ 
dividuals yet united to God through their oneness of purpose with Him would 
have no meaning. The theoretical problems lie along the line of believ­ 
ing that God is in any way dependent upon His creatures for the realisation 
of His purposes, and of thinking of Him as growing with their growth. Prac­ 
tically, however, the idea of men as coworkers with God, is of enormous 
religious importance. This conclusion leads Troeltsch into the discussion 
of the relation of God to the world, and to men, the second of the great 
normative ideas of present-day Christianity.
Of course, it is impossible to consider the idea of God without 
reference to the world and to men, but the discussion of the subject has 
hitherto been focussed about the idea of God, In the consideration of man 
and the world, the view point shifts from the concept of God to the Christian 
idea of the world as it reflects God. The relation of the world to God 
falls into three divisions: creation; providence, or world-governance, as 
Troeltsch prefers to call it; and miracle. The Christian beliefs about 
the world are not to be confused with scientific hypotheses about its origin. 
Religious beliefs about the nature of the world must not conflict with the 
teachings of science; they must be broad enough so that they can be held 
to be true, whatever scientific hypothesis about the world and its origin 
has the fore at the time. A doctrinal construction which affords room for 
both is entirely possible, because the Christian.view is not an explanation
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 235-239 •
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of the world, but a religious attitude towards it. Naturally, Troeltsch^ 
position makes no effort to save the Biblical cosmology. He is content 
to leave the question of how the world came into being entirely in the 
hands of science.
That the world is the creation of God has always been a promin­ 
ent ideal in the teaching of the Prophets and Jesus. The doctrine of crea­ 
tion includes both the ideas of God's transcendence and His immanence. Logi­ 
cally it is difficult to combine these two elements; but the combination is 
one of those antinomies which reason cannot resolve, but which are vital 
to the religious life* In the prophetic conception, God is largely trans­ 
cendent in His relation to the world which He has created, but in the teach­ 
ing of Jesus, His immanence also comes to the fore. The world is not to be 
regarded as an ultimate in itself; but behind it does lie the mystery of 
the Divine, and it does reveal the character of God and His Will. God is 
not identical with the world, but He is active in it. The fact that the 
Christian conception of the relation of God to the world contains the an­ 
tinomy of immanence and transcendence explains why at some periods the 
transcendence has been emphasised to the exclusion of the immanence and 
vice versa. At present the tendency is to stress the immanence, because 
of the vast size of the universe as astronomy reveals it, and because of 
the concept of the working of natural law throughout the whole of it*
The working of natural law throughout this vast universe, which 
science formulates in abstract terms, means in religious language the con­ 
tinued creative activity of God in the cosmos. In the midst of all this 
modern emphasis on the immanence of God, Troeltsch points to the necessity.
Troeltsoh, Glaubenslehre, pp. 240-241 •
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of keeping the transcendent aspect of the nature of God in sight; for 
though science leads us to think God as in the world, we must never make 
the mistake of identifying Him with the world* The world is but one ex­ 
pression of God and His creative activity.
The idea of God as Creator of the universe accounts for its 
origin. The continued presence of God in His world, and His guidance of 
it, is expressed by the doctrine of providence, (Vorsehung) or world- 
governance, (Weltregierung), as Troeltsch prefers to term it. The latter 
conception, which is also a part of the theistic heritage of Christendom, 
refers to the belief in the ultimate triumph of God f s good purposes, under 
which the religious teleology in reference to the world is comprehended, 
This thought is expressed in the Old Testament by the faith in the final 
triumph of Israel and the establishment of the Messianic Kingdom. In the 
New Testament it is the expectation of the coming of the Kingdom of God, 
at which time the redeemed individuals will share in the ultimate victory 
of the Will of God, and in His love. The ideal is not one of the material 
happiness or the well-being of men in the world, but of moral triumph. The 
latter view has been rendered all the more necessary by the modern concep­ 
tion of natural law, which makes it all but impossible to believe in arbi­ 
trary interventions on the part of God to change or guide individual des- 
tin^es. The world-governance of God can be thought of only in connection 
with the triumph of God's purposes as a whole, and the sharing of the 
redeemed individuals in that end.
Furthermore, like the doctrine of creation, the conception of 
providence is a purely religious one, not a scientific explanation of how
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 247-252.
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or when this triumph of the Will of God will take place. Like creation,
providence is a continuous activity of God, and is separated from creation
*»+• 
only conceptually, not temporally. The time of the ultimate consummation
is not revealed to men. Applied to men, the meaning of this ultimate vic­ 
tory of the Will of God is redemption, although there are doubtless other 
spiritual ends included in God's plan in the universe, of which humanity 
has no knowledge. The ultimate triumph of God's Will to redemption is to 
be understood as the profoundest meaning of His love. The doctrine of 
creation views the world as coming from God, that of providence sees it 
as directed towards Him, but both are really but different aspects of the 
same religious idea, the place of the world inrGod's love.
The doctrine of God's world-governance is the religious answer 
to the question, "Has the world any meaning?" The answer is one of faith: 
that the meaning of the world is to be found in fellowship with God. No 
support for such a belief can be drawn from science. It is outside the 
realm *f science to deal with ultimate purposes and ends. We can only ac­ 
cept the answer of faith that somehow the world as a whole is directed to­ 
wards the ends of God. This is the religious view of the world as a whole, 
under which the destinies of individuals fall only in so far as they con­ 
cern the destiny to fellowship with God. For the rest, individual destin­ 
ies are too intricately bound up with natural causes and the continuity of 
natural processes to ascribe them to God directly. We cannot know the why
and the how of God's world-governance, nor see its connection with ends
2outside our own destiny of fellowship with God.
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 252~257-
2 
Ibid., pp. 257-266 -
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The third of the doctrines which concern God's relation to the 
•world is His dealing with the individual soul, which Troeltsch treats under 
the heading of miracle. It includes prayer, individual experience of God, 
and the facts of personal religious experience. Later on, Troeltsch admitted 
that his use of the word miracle to cover this group of facts was quite un­ 
warranted; and even at this time, he says in his explanation of the term
2 
that the immediacy of God's working would be a better expression," He does
not mean miracle in the older sense of a supernatural intervention which 
sets aside the operation of natural lawj he means a purely religious event 
that has nothing to do with natural law or its operation. It is the mys­ 
tery of God's dealing with the individual human soul. The doctrine of prov­ 
idence describes His relation to the world as a whole, but this doctrine 
of "miracle*1 or immediacy relates to the individual soul, or the indivi­ 
dual happening in the totality of His world-governance. It comprehends 
the factual, contingent side of the religious life, the immediate presence 
and working of God in the soul, for which no logical reason can be given, 
and the ordinary laws of cause and effect cannot account,
Troeltsch admits that miracles in the older sense of the word can­ 
not be entirely denied even on scientific ground, but only rendered very 
improbable, Catholicism still revels in miracles; but from the very first, 
Protestantism admitted only those contained in the Bible. Now our growing 
knowledge of the physical universe has pushed this old-time view of miracle 
still farther into the background. Even the Biblical miracles have been 
subjected to such rigid historical criticism that much of their miraculous 
character has been questioned or swept away. Whether miracles in the older
Troeltsch, Christian Thought, pp. 9-10.
gTroeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 267*
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sense happened or not is unimportant religiously. It is the miracles of 
personal communion with God that are vital to faith. The term immediacy 
which he takes over from Kutter expresses what Troeltsch means much better 
than the word miracle. (Troeltsch 1 s retention of the word miracle at all 
in this connection is an attempt to pour new wine into old wineskins; a 
departure all the more surprising in the light of his usual frank and even 
daring brushing aside of all tradition which had lost meaning for him,)
The belief in the immediate contact of the individual soul 
with God presented no problem until the advent of modern science. However, 
even today, to see the activity of God in the totality of things and not 
in any of the individual events of units is to have a very one-sided Christian 
world-view. It is to overlook the facts of religious experience known at 
first hand by every religious man. These lie beyond the power of science 
to explain. They are not rational, but contingent elements of religious 
experience. The religious man cannot tell how God brings about that com­ 
munion of the soul with Himself through which he becomes a new creature; 
but he knows it to be a fact of his own experience. Science is not con­ 
cerned with immediate religious experience. It explains only those medi­ 
ate elements which are capable of complete rationalisation. Within the 
framework of these rational elements which can be reduced to exact 
formulisation by science, and side by side with them are the immediate 
contingent facts of religious experience which do not conflict with sci­ 
ence because they do not come within its ken. Religious experience, 
by which the individual soul meets God and is changed according to His 
Will, is a concrete, contingent fact for which no other explanation can 
be given except that it is the Will of God.
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 270-278
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From the discussion of the world in its relation to God, Troeltsch 
proceeds to the subject of the Christian view of man, Man is a part of 
the world, which the Christian views as coining from God, and directed to­ 
wards Him. The Christian doctrine of man is that he is God's creature, 
like the rest of the world, hence separate from God, yet destined to 
fellowship with Him. This religious anthropology, as Troeltsch calls 
these propositions about the nature, origin, and destiny of roan, has 
nothing to do with such sciences as anthropology and psychology, for it 
deals with a group of religious attitudes about man and his relation to 
God which are quite outside the sphere of the sciences. This religious 
anthropology treats of the infinite worth of the human soul, its likeness to 
God, (Gottesebenbildlichkeit), sin, the barrier which stands in the way 
of man's fellowship with God, and the religious interpretation of human 
history*
Although man is a part of nature like other creatures, he mani­ 
fests certain differences from the physical world and from other creatures 
which give him a relative independence of nature, and entitle him to a de­ 
gree to be called the lord of creation. Religion, which is a way of over­ 
coming the world, heightens these differences, and increases man's spiritual 
freedom from nature. In considering man, religious anthropology therefore 
treats him as a religiously and ethically self-conscious being. It is 
this religious and ethical freedom and self-consciousness in the human 
personality to which Troeltsch refers when he speaks of the soul, in con­ 
tradistinction to any psychological explanation of the higher self-con­ 
sciousness, and to any materialistic theories of the soul such as spiritualists
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 279-281.
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hold. Man in his religious anthropology has also nothing but the ethical 
interpretations in common with the Biblical anthropology contained in 
the stories of the creation and fall of man, which he rejects on scienti­ 
fic grounds.
Regardless of how science may explain the physical origin of man, 
whether by special creation, or by the evolution of the higher from the 
lower orders of life, the religious view of the physical side of man's 
life is iiiat it is the basis and the precondition of the higher intellectual 
and spiritual attainments of man, which God created to serve these higher 
ends. The origin of the higher life is not clear from the explanations of 
science. The teaching of the Church on the relation of the spiritual to 
the physical is a mixture of theories built upon the stories of the crea­ 
tion and the fall of man, Pauline ideas of the opposition between the flesh
_ ., . .. , __ . . .. , .relation of the and the spirit, and Platonic speculations about tneApsycne, the nous and
the pneuma to one another, — all of which are equally meaningless in the 
modern world. The substitution of some more satisfactory theory of the 
interrelation of tha two has not yet come about. Troeltsch thinks that 
no mere psycho-physical parallelism is sufficient to describe the relation 
between the higher and the lower sides of life. The higher development 
of the personality depends very much upon the lower; for mental and psy­ 
chological abnormalities often have a purely physical origin. The im­ 
portant point for religion is, however, that granted that the physical 
preconditions are normal enough not to produce these mental disturbances, 
the human personality, in its struggle for character, does tend to free 
itself from the lower side of its nature.
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 282-284*
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, . The soul, this higher personality which tends to free itself 
from nature, Troeltsch names the intelligible ego. In the intelligible 
which is not inborn, but created by the ethical struggle, lies the capacity 
for sharing in the Divine life of fellowship with God. The satisfaction of 
this urge to be freed from the lower nature can be found only in religion. 
The incoming of the Divine grace bestows freedom, and through the willing 
surrender to the Will of God, transforms the man into a new creature. It 
is this higher personality, the intelligible ego, which is the scene of 
the operation of the Divine, It is the Divine activity which confers upon 
the soul its infinite worth,
"When the soul submits freely to God and lives in fellowship 
with Him, it develops towards that perfection of personality which is 
likeness to Him, (Gottesebenbildlichkeit), The original Church doctrine 
pictured this likeness to God as having existed in the Garden of Eden be­ 
fore the fall of Adam, There is no historical evidence for believing that 
this state of perfection ever existed; but the ideal remains a vital part 
of the doctrine of man. In its Christian form, this ideal is the effort 
to attain a personality like that of Jesus,
The realisation of this ideal, which is possible only through 
fellowship with God, presupposes the capacity for infinite development of 
the human personality so that the process, though it begins in the earthly 
life, can be consummated only in the life hereafter, in full unity with 
God beyond all the bonds and limitations of human life. Between the be­ 
ginning of the development in the surrender of the soul to God and its 
completion in full unity with Him after death, lies the ethical struggle
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 285-295.
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towards holiness like unto that of God, and the fight against sin which 
is the barrier to that holiness.
Sin as a theological concept is not only an ethical matter, but 
a religious one as well. Troeltsch follows the traditional division of 
the doctrine of sin, and discusses it as original and actual. Original 
sin in its modern interpretation, includes, according to his view, the 
weaknesses, limitations, frailties, resistances to the Divine Will, and 
barriers to fellowship with God which are inherent in human nature itself, 
and in man's position as a part of the world of nature. Although the 
traditional teaching about the origin of sin through the fall of man has
x"
dropped away, the doctrine of original sin itself remains to describe a 
group of facts with which we still must reckon. More serious from the 
religious standpoint, however, is the fact of actual sin, the conscious 
opposition on the part of the individual to the "Will of God, and His call 
to goodness. Actual sin may take the passive form of ignoring God*s grace 
and love, or the active form of denying, rejecting, and opposing His Will. 
This view of sin is peculiar to Christianity, and follows as a direct 
corollary from the Christian belief in a personal God and the freedom of 
man. Although the idea of sin is not pleasing to the modern world, we 
need to remind ourselves that the doctrine is a vital part of Christianity, 
without which our understanding of God is entirely incomplete and in­ 
adequate. The preaching of the Prophets was largely a call to repentance. 
The Psalmists write with passionate intensity of their individual con­ 
sciousness of sin. Jesus regarded sin as opposition to the Kingdom of 
God, and allegiance to evil* It was this absolute and determined op-
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 295-300.
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position to the good which Kant had in mind when he formulated his idea 
of radical evil, (das radikale Bfise). Sin is a matter of the will, but 
its heinousness from a religious standpoint can be comprehended only 
in its contrast to the goodness and love of God, Sin therefore is any 
want of trust in God and the disposition to follow one*s own selfish 
concerns regardless of the good and of the ^ivine call to self-surrender. 
The Biblical account ascribes the entrance of sin into the world to Adam's 
disobedience; but psychologically sin is a concomitant of freedom, and an 
incident of the ethical struggle.
As the self develops ethically, it is confronted with the choice 
of following the call of God and yielding to Him, or of pursuing the 
selfish concerns of the ego as a part of nature and the present world. 
The pursuit of the purely eudamonistic interests of the natural man is 
opposition to God. This may not be conscious opposition; it may be 
merely inertia or indifference, or the choice of interests which are 
partially good, or the desire for self-expression. Following the line 
of the least resistance by yielding to the desires of the natural man 
belongs in the category of original sin, but it may lead to actual sin, 
the active and positive disobedience to the ^ivine Will. Sin in the 
psychological sense is common to all men, though in varying degrees, 
according to the extent to which they consciously resist the Will of 
God. Besides original and actual sin, Troeltsch distinguishes a third 
type, social sin. By social sin he means the sort whose consequences 
are inherited, and thus pass on into the life of the group, or the race,
Closely related to the idea of sin is that of guilt. Guilt is 
the consciousness of being estranged from God and the good through sin.
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In this consciousness of guilt lies a latent desire for a better relation­ 
ship to God, and for the power to do good. When God seeks man, he flees 
before Him because of this consciousness of guilt and sense of unworthi- 
ness. It is through the sense of guilt that the enormity of sin is com­ 
prehended by the soul, and the desire for repentance is born. Conscious­ 
ness of guilt is a feeling peculiar to theistic religion; for it is the 
feeling of alienation from the personal seeking God, The consciousness of 
guilt, the painful sense of God's wrath against us as sinners, and despair 
over our estrangement from Him is, according to Troeltsch, the one real 
punishment for sin, though punishment in this sense must be carefully dis­ 
tinguished from the results and consequences of sin, which may harm others 
as well as ourselves.
The Christian views the world on the one hand as the striving 
towards the realisation of its ideal of likeness to God, and on the other, as 
the opposition to this ideal in the presence of sin.. The scene of the 
struggle between the two is history. Even to interpret history in the 
terms of an ethical and spiritual struggle is an achievement of religious 
faith. Yet a philosophy of history of this kind is a very ancient part 
of the Jewish-Christian heritage. The Old Testament pictured the struggle 
of the two and the final triumph of the good in the ideal of the Messianic 
Kingdom. In the teaching of Jesus it is the coming of the Kingdom of God. 
The Catholic Church identified the triumph of the Will of God with the 
universal dominance of the ^hurch. Protestantism, it is true, did not 
equate the Kingdom of God with the universal dominance of the Church, but 
it preserved the other symbolic ideas of the triumph of the good quite
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 300-317•
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unchanged. Nowadays these symbols can be accepted only as mythical 
pictures in a philosophy of history which looks forward to the ultimate 
triumph of the Will of God.
For us as modern Christians there are many questions as to 
the legitimacy of this philosophy of history. Historical science does 
not touch the inner struggle of the spirit against the flesh in its in­ 
vestigations. Even the history of religions concerns itself only with 
the outer fringes of these more intimate struggles of the soulj and 
leaves us to guess at the inner recesses of the life of the spirit. 
History as a science knows neither beginning nor end, and even the pre­ 
sence of progress in history is hard to demonstrate. The belief in the 
triumph of the good, the spiritual forces, against the bad and the ma­ 
terial is purely a matter of faith. The belief in progress itself is 
but a disguised religious faith. An instance of this semi-religious be­ 
lief in progress is afforded by those Christian socialists who believe 
that the Kingdom of God will be realised on earth through a combination 
of the Christian ideal of universal brotherhood and the increased appli­ 
cation of scientific improvements in technique to our way of living. Al­ 
though there is some historical justification for the belief in progress 
towards the Kingdom of God, Troeltsch is of the opinion that the final 
consummation of the triumph of the Will of God is an eschatological event, 
reserved for the life after death. The Kingdom of God will probably never 
be realised completely on earth, for mortal life is and will always be no­ 
thing but a continuous struggle. "When one set of difficulties is overcome, 
a new set takes their place. There is also the probability that our world 
will end sometime, or that climatic conditions will alter in such a manner
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as to make the continuance of human life impossible. Furthermore, the 
earthly triumph of the Kingdom of God would, according to Troeltsch, 
be contingent upon the triumph of the European-American civilisation, 
with which Christianity is inextricably bound up, and we cannot know 
whether Western civilisation is destined to continue. Most important 
of all, the religious ideal itself demands a goal beyond the bounds of 
earthly life, where the triumph of the good would be synonymous with
the complete union of the souls with God, an end attainable only in the
1 
life hereafter.
The fourth essential or normative trend in the determination 
of the essence of present-day Protestant Christianity is the doctrine 
of redemption, which brings together the doctrines of God, man and the 
world in their religious relation to each other. The final section of 
the Glaubenslehre treats this subject, and in more compact form, the same 
ideas are expressed in the articles on the grace of God and on redemption 
in the first edition of Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. The 
latter part of this section in the Glaubenslehre is fragmentary, so that 
in the main, we shall follow the account of the ideas in the above-men­ 
tioned articles from Troeltsch 1 s own hand, with supplementary reference to 
the Glaubenslehre where that seems desirable.
No doctrine of the Christian Church has been more variously inter­ 
preted at different periods than that of redemption; yet it is a contin­ 
uous and vital element through its whole history. Its central idea of God
as forgiving Grace is, as Troeltsch rightly says, the highest and tender-
g est revelation known to the human race. Redemption in some form is found in
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 317-32{* Cf. also article on "Esch&tology" in 
Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
2Troeltsch, Article, "Gfcade Gottes," section 2, in Die Religion in Ge 
schichte und Gegenwart, 1910 edition. " "~~~——
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all the higher religions except Mohammedanism and legalistic Judaism, 
"but it is the peculiar genius of Christian theism that it formulates the 
idea in personal terms corresponding to its conception of God as loving 
and forgiving Grace. The difference of the Christian doctrine of redemp­ 
tion from that of all the other higher religions is not only in the more 
personal formulation of the idea, but also in the profundity and power of 
its conception. Historically, redemption has been variously interpreted. 
In the teaching of the Old Testament Prophets, it was the restoration of 
Israel and the Messianic Kingdom, According to Jesus, it is complete 
surrender to God, and membership in the Kingdom of Heaven. Both temporal 
and eschatological elements apjfc ar in Jesus f conception, with the pre­ 
dominance of the one or the other depending upon what interpretation is 
given to the moot question of Jesus 1 Messianic self-consciousness, Paul's 
idea of redemption centers in the death of Christ, but the culmination of 
the process is eschatological. The Catholic Church refers it to the death 
of Christ, the merit of which is in the custody of the Church, and is 
mediated to the individual through the sacraments. Protestantism refused 
to recognise the Church as the ark of salvation; and. referred redemption 
solely to the death of Christ, In the period of the Enlightenment, the 
whole idea of redemption was uncongenial to the rationalistic trend of 
the age. The life of Christ was emphasised as an example and pattern of 
goodness for our instruction; but his death was not felt to be significant. 
Schleiermacher restored the idea of redemption to its rightful place in 
Christian thinking by making the assurance of forgiveness as it is revealed 
to us through the impression of the figure of Christ central in his doc­ 
trinal system*
Troeltsch, Article, "ErlBsung," sections 1, 2, in Die Religion in Ge- 
sohichte und Gegenwart, 1910 edition.
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The idea of redemption needs rethinking before it can be under­ 
stood by the modern world, according to Troeltsch, The death of Christ, 
he thinks, cannot be.regarded as a vicarious sacrifice; for such an idea 
does violence to modern ethical thinking* it is untenable in the light 
of the historical understanding of Jesus; and finally it ascribes a 
legalistic character to God, Who is pictured as demanding this satisfaction. 
To retaim such a theory of the death of Christ is to attribute to God a 
character which is not only highly anthropomorphic, but also quite in­ 
compatible with His revelation of Himself as forgiving Grace and Love. 
Even Schleiermacher's formulation of the doctrine is not adequate for the 
modern church, thinks Troeltsch,
Troeltsch 1 s own idea of redemption is focussed about the experi­ 
ence from the side of man, the subject, and from God, the Object, From 
the standpoint of man, redemption meais the perfection or the sanctifi- 
cation of his personality through the freedom and increased moral power 
which results from his submission to the Will of God, and acceptance of 
the Divine forgiveness and grace. He is then exalted into fellowship with 
God, and through this fellowship of love, he is able to conquer the lower 
desires for self-assertion and material well-being. From the standpoint 
of God, Who takes the initiative in redemption through the offer of His 
grace, redemption means the return of His creative Will to itself, enriched 
by the redeemed Will of the sould who have submitted to Him. Redemption is 
the natural corollary to the idea of God's loving and creative Will to 
holiness.
God is the real Redeemer, according to Troeltsch 1 s theory; for
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 329.
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it is His Grace which takes the initiative and assures the soul of for­ 
giveness through the revelation of His own character as Redeeming Love, 
The most important vehicle of God»s revelation of His character as a 
gracious and forgiving God, is Jesus. The revelation of God through Jesus 
begets faith in the heart of man. Faith gives knowledge of what are the 
true values of life, and through the power of God's love, it gives the 
strength and the will to live for these higher ends. The content of redemp­ 
tion is as follows: It is redemption from the suffering incidental to life, 
and release from the sense of guilt through the assurance of Divine for­ 
giveness. Of course, the believer is not released from the suffering in­ 
cidental to life, but he is given a new attitude of triumph over it which 
enables him to accept it as necessary to the unfinished nature of the world 
in which he lives, and to accept it patiently and without rebellion as a 
means of purification and discipline to the soul in its effort to free it­ 
self from the bonds of the lower self. The final release from this kind 
of suffering is to be found only in the world to come. Redemption also 
means release from the oppression of guilt through the assurance of God's 
forgiveness of his sins. Through the assurance of God«s forgiveness and 
His offer of fellowship with Himself, the soul is filled with joy so that 
all things are made new, and from this increased power to live for the 
higher ends of God results. The present redemption is a series of inner 
transformations towards God, the world, and one's fellowmen. The final 
redemption comes after death,
The final redemption, which takes place beyond the grave, is the 
complete overcoming of all barriers and obstructions which prevent the 
union of the soul with God. Troeltsch believes that after death the soul
*Troeltsch, Article, "ErlOsung," sections 5, 6, in Die Religion in Ge- 
sohichte und Ge^enwart, 1910 edition.
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undergoes a period of development or purification until the union of its 
will with that of God is complete, when it loses its individuality and 
is merged into His Being, Troeltsch admits himself that this idea of 
the fusion of the soul with God is a pantheistio strain in his theology.
He combats pantheism at every other point in his doctrinal system, but
2 succumbs to it here in this eschatological form,
The discussion of the place of Jesus in Troeltsch 1 s outline of 
the doctrine of redemption will be reserved for the next chapter, which 
is to be entirely devoted to Troeltsoh's Christology,
The last constituent of Troeltsch1 s determination of the norma­ 
tive essence of Christianity is the Christian doctrine of the Kingdom of 
God. The section which deals with this subject in the Glaubenslehre is 
unfortunately very fragmentary. The Kingdom of God is the correlate of 
redemption; for when the individual is assured of forgiveness and admitted 
to fellowship with God, he becomes a sharer in the Divine purposes, and 
a coworker towards their realisation. He unites with other redeemed in­ 
dividuals for the same end. In this fellowship, the bond of unity is the 
common recognition of the authority and greatness of God, The purpose of 
the fellowship is worship of God, and the strengthening of their own 
faith through that means. The urge towards religious fellowship has al­ 
ways been prominent in Christianity. It is the root of the Church, but 
the Church should be distinguished from the Kingdom of God, since the 
latter is a fellowship confined to the redeemed.
The necessity for providing for the increase of the fellowship,
Troeltsch, Article, "Eschatologie" in Die Religion in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, 1910 edition.
2Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 362-363
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the desire for stated services of worship, and the attempt to propagate 
the gospel in the world led to the foundation of the church as an in­ 
stitution for the furtherance of the Kingdom of God. The real founder 
of the church as an institution is Paul, though the circle of the religious 
fellowship goes back to Jesus. Jesus was content to work through the syna­ 
gogue; hence it was only when Paul wrenched Christianity loose from Judaism 
that the church as such began under the latter*s direction. Even in his 
day, when the churches were separate organisations, the sacraments had be­ 
gun to be observed, and the teaching and missionary work of spreading the 
Gospel was well under way so that the later church had only to build on 
the foundation that the greatest of the Apostles laid. The Catholic 
Church developed its elaborate organisation with the priesthood and its 
emphasis on the supernatural character of the sacraments.
The Reformation changed the theory of the function of the Church 
very materially. It severed the connection of salvation with the priest­ 
hood and greatly simplified the sacraments; but left to the church its 
essential character as a fellowship for the propagation of the gospel 
through the preaching of the word, and the celebration of the sacraments 
as means of grace. Even through the existence of many particular churches, 
Protestantism has never lost the ideal of the church as a religious fellow­ 
ship. In modern times the ideal of the Kingdom of God has come to replace 
that of the church as a divine institution. The churches regard themselves 
as the means for the spread of that ideal, and around it they focus all 
their educational and missionary activity, as well as their preaching and 
worship.
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 365-37g«
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Around the central historical elements in the Christian heri­ 
tage, the development in the Old Testament, Jesus, and the history of 
the Church, and around the present experience of the Christian fellowship 
centering in the doctrines of God, man, the world, and redemption, Troeltsch 
constructs the normative essence of present-day Protestant Christianity* 
The main effort of his construction is to grapple with the problems which 
confront the Christian faith from the fields of science and history* 
Our chief concern is with the historical emphasis, not only because 
Troeltsch himself believed it to be the more important, but because around 
it the problem of the norms is chiefly centered. So far as his outline 
of the Christian faith in relation to scientific questions is concerned, 
he achieved his aim of constructing his system along such broad lines that 
there would be no conflict between the religious attitudes that the 
Christian gospel includes, and the results of science. The scientific 
Weltanschauung has changed greatly since 1911 when Troeltsch wrote the 
lectures that make up his Glaubenslehre, but very little of what he says 
in relation to scientific questions would have to be altered by theologians 
of the present. He rightly emphasised the fact that science and religion 
belong to different realms, and by laying stress on the essentially re­ 
ligious character of the affirmations T«hich Christianity makes about God, 
man, and the world, he avoided the mistakes of those theologians who mix 
science and religion together in their systems.
The essential problem with which Troeltsch wrestles in his deter­ 
mination of the essence of Christianity is the one which dominated all his 
work, the problem of the relation between the merely historical and the 
normative. The treatment of the historical elements and the question raised
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for Christian faith by historical criticism are honestly and fairly met 
in Troeltsch1 s system. Also the questions that confront the modern mind 
in the effort to build for itself a Christian Weltanschauung .are to be 
given a thoughtful and thoroughly Christian answer. The criticisms which 
have been made of Troeltsch 1 s dogmatic construction in his life-time 
centered largely about three points: his neglect of supernaturalism, his 
Christology, and his doctrine of redemption. The last two points will be 
discussed in the next chapter, and the question of supernaturalism will 
be taken up in more detail in the chapter on the finality of Christianity 
to which it really belongs. Here it must suffice to say that Troeltsch 
does not deny supernaturalism either to Christianity or the other higher 
religions of the world. What he refused to do, was to lay the whole 
weight of Christianity 1 s clai.a to absolute validity and truth upon its 
claim to exclusive supernaturalism, (cf. article "Offenbarung" in Die 
Religion in Geschichte und Gagenwart, section 3), The present writer 
finds herself unable to agree with those, who like Theodor Kaftan,
The criticisms of the/ approach of Troeltsch and the theological approach 
used by him and other members of the rej.igionsgesohichtliche Schule 
which are of most importance are those ^f Traub, Haring, J. Kaftan, 
T. Kaftan, Metger, Hunziger, Ihmels, and Prof. H. R. Mackintosh. For 
a list of these, see bibliography. Very few recent criticisms of 
Troeltsch1 s theology have appeared, partly due to the fact that the 
Glaubenslehre appeared posthumously and partly to the preoccupation 
oT~present theologians with Barthianism. Karl Barth in his Dogmatik, 
(p. 115)* comments that Troeltsch's Glaubenslehre is shhr wissenschaftlich- 
aber nicht sachlichj and certainly from Barth*s point of view Troeltsch 1 s 
theology would be Tacking in content. However, Troeltsch would no 
doubt have been unable to distinguish Barth»s Dogmatik from an Er 
bauungsschrift. The two start from such different presuppositions 
about the nature of theology that Earth's criticism does not touch 
the real nature of the task as Troeltsch saw it. Another ctiticism 
of Troeltsch*s Glaubenslehre is that of Friedrich Wieneke, who says 
in his monograph, Die ^ntwicklung des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs 
bei Ernst Troeltscli, (p« 50), that nothing in the system could lay 
claim to the universal validity, (Allgemeingultigkeit)« This seems 
to me a very sweeping and hasty generalisation, which applies only 
to a few doctrines such as the idea of immortality and the Christology.
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appear to think that Troeltsch loses all hope of gaining normative ele­ 
ments for his dogmatic construction by an a priori exclusion of the super-
1 But apart from this, 
natural character of revelation^ Acan we say that his construction of the
essence of Christianity is really normative?
Troeltsch 1 s theological method is in the main that of Schleier- 
macher, for he takes as his point of departure the analysis of the present- 
day Christian consciousness* Troeltsch, however, avoids some of Schleier- 
macher f s mistakes. His system is less subjective, for Troeltsch had two 
advantages over Schleiermacher that helped to counteract the latter T s ex­ 
treme subjectivism. First of all, the increase in the knowledge of both 
the method and the results of historical criticism developed in the cen­ 
tury that intervenes between the lives of the two men gave Troeltsch far 
greater understanding of the nature of the historical questions involved 
than Schleiermacher could have had in his day. Then, too, Troeltsch1 s 
own devotion to history gave him a far keener feeling for the need for 
objectivity in religion than Sch^iermacher as a child of the Romantic
Movement could be expeeted to have, Schleiermacher f s low estimate of the
2 Old Testament is notorious; but Troeltsoh lays particular stress upon the
normative importance of the Prophets, the Psalmists, and the other great 
figures who prepared the way for Jesus, and still exert a marked influence 
over the modern church. Also, except in his doctrine of immortality, there 
is no tendency towards pantheism in Troeltsch such as marred Schleiermacher's 
earlier system. Troeltsch is a thorough-going theist, who, although he 
maintains the immanence of God, is equally decided about the transcendent 
aspects of His nature.
T. Kaftan, Ernst Troeltsch, eine kritisohe Zeitstudie, 1912«
9
Schleiermacher, Per ohristliche Glaube, Zweiter Teil, paragraph 132.
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Of course, Troeltsch does not escape subjectivism completely in
his system; but he does not claim to do so. He says in his article on 
Dogmatik that theology is not a strict science, that it partakes of the 
nature of a personal confession, but that it is saved from complete sub­ 
jectivity by its check with the historical elements of revelation and its 
capacity as representative of the feelings and consciousness of the 
Christian community. It is therefore in the measure within which it 
does these two things that we must decide whether Troeltsch has really given 
us a normative statement of Christianity or not.
Theodor Kaftan denies that Troeltsch 1 s teaching is sufficiently
in line with that of the Apostles and the New Testament to give him the
j> 
right to call himself a Christian theologian. Kaftan justifies this
statement by pointing out that Troeltsch*s method is really that of philo­ 
sophy of religion instead of theology, for in his construction, the accent 
falls on the scientific procedure instead of the positive and absolute 
revelation with which he is dealing. There are some individual points in 
which Kaftan's criticism is quite justified, but one can hardly say that it 
is true of the system as a whole. Troeltsch 1 s system does not differ on the 
whole from that of most liberal theologians, except that it emphasises the 
historical element more. However, the construction does contain some wholly 
original and individual aberrations which have no claim to erection to a 
normative position either on the basis of being in line with the historic 
Christianity, or of being representative of the consciousness of the modern church.
The most conspicuous example is the doctrine of immortality, which has 
been the subject of criticism by T. Kaftan, Professor Mackintosh,"
^Troeltsch, Article "Dogmatik", section 4, in Die Religion in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart •
p T. Kaftan, Ernst Troeltsch, eine kritische Zeitstudie, pp. 55 ff.
3lbid., p. 65 •
4Hnr. Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, p. 235.
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and even R. S. Sleigh, whose book, The Sufficienty of Christianity is in the 
main very favorable to Troeltsch, The Christian Church has always believed 
in the survival of the soul after death. Certainly no orthodox Christian 
tradition, or general present-day Christian opinion in support of Troeltsch 1 s
view could be produced. As Professor Mackintosh correctly says, it is a
2Neoplatonic and Oriental speculation* ' This concession of Troeltsch 1 s to
the pantheism, which he so vigorously combats in every other place, is very 
hard to understand from the point of view of philosophic consistency. If 
wemre to strenuously eschew all that savours of pantheism in this world, 
as Troeltsch would persuade us, why postpone it to the next world, where 
after a period of probation the soul finally becomes merged in the being 
of God after all? There is no reason for Troeltsch1 s idea, so far as 
making concessions to science goes. Science has not yet contributed any­ 
thing decisive one way or the other on the possibility of the survival of 
the human personality after death, Troeltsch 1 s philosophic picture of 
human souls as entities separate from God seems to be a kind of Leibnizian 
monadology. From that point of departure, it would surely be more con­ 
sistent philosophically to maintain the individuality of the monads through­ 
out eternity, as well as here and now.
Unlike some of Troeltsch 1 s errors, this one seems not to have been 
one of the head, but of the heart. What really underlies this curious no­ 
tion is a sincere, though misguided religious feeling, Troeltsch believed 
that after the souls have remained as separate individualities in the presence 
of God until they come into complete unity -.torith His Will, their
1R. S. Sleigh, Op• jit., p. 228.
2Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, p. 235 .
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love for Him would be so great that it would burst even the barriers of 
their individualities, and merge their being completely with His.
Troeltsch 1 s doctrine of God is very rich, and quite in line with 
Christian tradition without doing violence to modern feeling at any point. 
Only one minor point, which he does not especially emphasise, might be open 
to question. He seems to believe that God is a growing Being, Who develops 
with His own purposes. In that suggestion, one sees the fine Italian hand 
of William James and the finite God of pragmatism. However, Troeltsch does 
not lay particular weight on that matter, and of course, some of the mystics 
have verged upon the idea that they are necessary to God, and that they 
increase His greatness as they carry out His purposes. Troeltsch himself
points this out, quoting Angelus Silesius 1 saying, "Ohne mich bist du
2nichts." We cannot say that this idea is simply an individual aberration.
All that we can maintain is that it is scarcely in line with the most 
orthodox tradition of the Church, and that it is somewhat of a question 
whether this extreme mystical strain in the Church doctrine has a right 
to apposition as normative.
Troeltsch 1 s interpretation of the Trinity is not the conventional 
one; but it is one that does preserve a real interest in the Christian 
heritage, the continuing revelation of God in Jesus as the Word, and in 
the work of the Spirit in the church* so cbvt Even though the substantial 
speculation that underlay the original formulation of the doctrine is 
not retained in Troeltsch 1 s statement, his idea has the possibility of
Troeltsch, Article, "Eschatologie, w section 4, in Die Religion in 
Geschiohte und Gegenwart*
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 238*
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usefulness in modern Christian thinking.
Troeltsch 1 s combination of God as Will and Essence is a very 
thoughtful and valuable solution to the problem of immanence and trans­ 
cendence in the Christian concept of God. He himself points to the logi­ 
cal conflicts that these two elements cause, but he has given us a helpful 
contribution towards our theological thinking on this point.
Only one or two points in connection with the other doctrines call 
for comment. Kaftan finds that Troeltsch has an inadequate understanding
of the doctrine of original sin, which he thinks does not do justice to the
g
moral aspects of the question. The present writer is unable to agree with
this criticism* On the contrary, it seems that Troeltsch has given us a 
statement of original sin which preserves the underlying truth of that his­ 
toric doctrine, without its mythological appendages. It is hard to see 
how unless we go back to accepting the Genesis account of the Fall of Man, 
we can state the doctrine of original sin otherwise than as Troeltsch does. 
The moral aspects of the problem of sin receive sufficient consideration 
under his treatment of actual sin, where they would seem rightly to belong,
Troeltsch 1 s restatement of predestination is also one eminently 
worthy of the consideration of modern Christians. It does justice to the
Even Barth bestows a grudging commendation on the important position
which Troeltsch gives to the Trinity, Of, Earth's Dogmatik, p. 129, 
On the other hand Wieneke finds that Troeltsch has only two persons 
in his Godhead, since according to this critic, he makes no adequate 
distinction between Christ and the Spirit, It would seem that Wieneke 
has not rightly understood Troeltsch, for he makes quite plain that 
he interprets the Spirit as the continuing Word of revelation in the 
hearts of the Christian community as individuals and as a group. 
Of. Wieneke, Die Entwicklung des philosophischen Qottesbegriff bei 
Ernst Troeltsoh, pp. *b-4&*
T. Kaftan, Ernst Troeltsoh, eine kritische Zeitstudie, p. 63.
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fact which underlay the older doctrine, that "many are called, but few 
are chosen", yet it avoids the arbitrary limitation of the elect on the 
part of God which marred the older doctrine.
Troeltsch f s idea that the personalities who preceded Jesus, 
the Prophets, the Psalmists and the other great religious leaders of 
Israel, and the succession of the great leaders in the Church who were 
inspired by Jesus should have normative significance for Modern Christian­ 
ity is a very interesting suggestion towards the solution of the problem of 
authority. He merely throws it out as a suggestion, however, without de­ 
veloping it through a careful analysis of wherein the normative signifi­ 
cance of these personalities lies. He mentions Paul, Augustine, Luther, 
Schleiermacher, and other great figures down to our own time as among those 
entitled to a normative position in the Church as bearers of revelation; 
but before the Church could admit these leaders to normative significance, 
it would be necessary to analyse each one of them very carefully in order 
to define just how far each of them is an incarnation of the Christian 
ideal. It would be necessary to distinguish the permanent Christian con­ 
tributions of each of them from the purely human frailties and the in­ 
cidental contemporary ideas with which their normative importance is 
intermingled. This task would be very difficult, and would have to be the 
work of experts on the period to which each of these persons belonged be­ 
fore the Church would be justified in admitting them to normative importance.
The fact that this task would be difficult does not mean that it 
could not be accomplished. Troeltsch's own Soziallehren attempted an analysis 
of this kind focussed about the social aspects of the Church's teaching. 
True, Troeltsch's own presentation of the various leaders, particularly 
Luther, caused much controversy. Various criticisms have been made of
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Troeltsch*s idea of Luther, notable among them those of Kaftan, Holl 
and even the Frenchman, Emil Vermeil. This fact illustrates the dif­ 
ficulties inherent in the process, and the subjectivism to which it 
is apt to fall a prey. Particularly in the case of Luther, who was such 
an inconsistent and many-sided personality anyhow, the task of getting a 
normative interpretation which should serve the church would be almost 
impossible; for in Luther one can find almost anything. However, in spite 
of the difficulties involved, the suggestion is a fruitful one. The work 
of Many experts over a long period would doubtless be needed before a 
normative presentation of the various personalities could be obtained; 
but it is not impossible* Every now and then someone produces a book on 
some personality that is a classic. Sabatier f s St. Francis of Assisi is 
an illustration. If each of the great personalities were carefully 
studied, some such classic presentation of their normative significance 
eventually could be made. If we are not to place the whole weight of 
authority upon Jesus, this kind of analysis would be the alternative. 
Perhaps Troeltsch 1 s own work on ^alvin is the nearest approximation to 
such a classic or normative presentation of any personality which he made.
Except for the doctrine of immortality which Troeltsch advocates, 
there is little in his system of theology so far as the construction given 
in the present chapter is concerned which is not entitled to be called a 
normative statement of Christian doctrine. Most of the doctrines outlined 
here are sufficiently in line either with the historical teaching of the 
Church, or the present thought of the Christian body to be taken as norma-
Kaftan, Ernst Troeltsch, eine kriteche Zeitstudie, pp. 46ff., Karl Holl, 
Gesammalte Aufsatze zur Kirchengeschichte, Bd. I, and Emil Vermeil, 
La Pense"e Religieuse de Ernst Troeltsch, Section II.
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tive. Troeltsch's doctrinal structure, does, however, have two very 
serious drawbacks, His doctrine of redemption does not give sufficient 
prominence to the redemptive work of Jesus, and his ^hristology is 
quite out of line with the historic tradition of the Christian Church, 
These two criticisms will be developed in detail in the next chapter, 
where the whole subject of his Christology is to be discussed.
CHAPTER VII 
THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF JESUS
The preceding chapter outlined Troeltsch 1 s construction of the 
normative essence of Christianity. The sources of the norms are twos the 
historical elements which have come down from the past, and at; present mould; tihe 
life of the Christian community3 and the religious consciousness of the 
Christian "body today. Of the historical figures who have created the 
Christian heritage, it goes without saying that Jesus Christ, the Founder 
of Christianity, the chief revelation of the character of God, and the 
Mediator of the redemption it promises, is by far the most important. In 
Troeltsch 1 s system, Jesus is the supreme norm for the essence of Christianity 
in all ages, and iii all its forms. The Prophets and other bearers of revela­ 
tion in the Old Testament are chiefly significant as the forerunners who 
prepare the way for Jesus, in "Whom their work culminates. The personalities 
of the Christian Church are of normative importance in so far as they are 
incarnations of the spirit and message of Jesus, Although Troeltsch, in 
contradistinction to the Ritschlians, was unwilling to see in Jesus the 
sole norm for Christianity, he does make him the supreme norm. It will be
the purpose of the present chapter to discuss the normative position of
\
Jesus, as Troeltsch conceives it. This will necessitate a survey of Troeltsch 1 s 
whole thought on the subject of Christology*
Troeltsch wrote comparatively little on the subject of Christology, 
The only important single source of his idea of the place of Christ is the 
little lecture, Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu fur den Glauben, 
1911, There are some references to the subject in essays like "Die Zukunfts- 
mogliohkeiten des Christentums" in Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, and a section 
in the Glaubenslehre, which is largely a repetition of Die Bedeutung der
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Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, The Soziallehren contains a sketch of the message 
of Jesus, in the chapter called "Das Evangelium," and a few passages in Die 
Absolutheit des Christentums also deal with Jesus' person and teachings. 
Troeltsch deals with Jesus chiefly as an historical figure. He 
does not exclude soteriology from his Christology, but it is certainly not 
the most prominent feature of his thought of Jesus. Troeltsch is very de­ 
cided about the historicity of Jesus, He is convinced that in spite of all 
the differences of the New Testament critics among themselves in regard to 
the details of Jesus' life and teachings, we can recognise the main events 
of Hits life, and the essentials of Has teaching from the gospel records. 
He considers it a "critical monstrosity" to raise the question of whether 
Jesus ever lived, and regards it as a great exaggeration of the historic 
difficulties in the case to imagine that we cannot recognise the main out­ 
lines of Jesus' life and teachings. To doubt the historical existence 
of Jesus would mean to commit the historical tour de force of doubting the
unassailable authenticity of the Pauline letters, as well as sweeping aside
2 the corroborating evidence of all the rest of the New Testament records.
It is the work of historians and Biblical critics to establish 
the facts of Jesus' lifej but the theologian must interpret these in the
light of their significance for faith. "Faith can interpret facts, but it
3 cannot establish them," declares Troeltsch repeatedly. It is true that
we are dependent on the narratives of the Christian community itself for
Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu fur den Glauben,
pp. 2-4,The same idea is carried out in Troeltsch's criticism of 
Arthur Drews 1 attempt to deny the historic existence of Jesus. Of. 
"Aus der religifisen Bewegung der Gagenwart," Gesammelte Schriften, 
Bd. II, pp. 38 ff.
^Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 108, 109•
3Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu fur den Glauben, p. 33
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the life of Jesus and the beginnings of the Church, and that it is only 
laterron as Christianity began to spread over the Roman empire that we 
have extra-Christian accounts of it of a fragmentary character. We have 
the letters of Paul, the authenticity of which no one can doubt. The 
Synoptic accounts were compiled from verbal traditions, but although we 
cannot be certain of the details, we can be sure that in the main the re­ 
ports given of Jesus 1 sayings and doings are accurate. Also the book of 
Acts is a reliable document. For these reasons, Troeltsch is convinced 
that we are in a position to know the main facts of Jesus* life and the 
general outlines of His teaching,
The fact that we can discern the main events of Jesus* earthly 
life does not solve all problems for faith. There are some very important 
questions relating to Jesus* own belief about the nature of his Messianic 
mission, which we cannot disentangle from the opinions of the early com­ 
munity, and of the gospel writers themselves. Also we are confronted even 
in the letters of Paul with the important transition from the historic 
Jesus of the Synoptics to the preexistent Christ of the Pauline Churches. 
This change, according to Troeltsch, is to be accounted for as a natural 
development in the thought of the Christian community, just as the Buddhistic 
community soon exalted its head to a position of divinity. Troeltsch thinks 
that in the case of the early church it is altogether unnecessary to re­ 
sort to some explanation of a mystery cult, to whose hero Paul attached 
the name of Jesus, and whose rites he transferred to the Christian Church. 
In the first place, we do not know of any cult that would fit the facts in 
the case as the Pauline epistles give them to us; and secondly, the worship 
of the Christian community retained too much of the distinctive character
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 109-110.
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of Jewish monotheism to make such an assumption of the adoption of a 
pagan cult at all probable.
In spite of all the miraculous and legendary elements with which 
the fancy of the early Church invested the figure of its Master, we can clear­ 
ly recognise beneath and through these the unique and incomparably fascinat­ 
ing personality of Jesus himself. The imagination of the church could never 
have invented the figure of its Lord, We do not need to know all the details 
of how the early Christians transferred the Jesus, whom many of them had 
known in a peculiar fellowship of love on earth, to the position of Divine 
and Exalted Christ, but we can know that this process took place because of 
the great fellowship of love that they had enjoyed with him, and the extra­ 
ordinary working of his personality upon them which assured them that he was
2 
alive even after his crucifixion, and that he was the promised Messiah,
It is not necessary for the understanding of Jesus as Troeltsch 
conceives him to enter into an extended discussion of Christ's teaching, 
Troeltsch was not primarily a New Testament critic. Suffice it to say that 
he considered that the absolute element in Jesus' thought centered about
the idea of the Kingdom of God, the complete rule of God, which begins on
2 
earth, but is to be ultimately realised only as an eschatological ideal.
In the emphasis which Jesus placed on the worth of the individual soul lay 
the key to the idea of a universal community of love, and also to a highly 
personal and individualistic relation between the soul and God. The idea 
of the Kingdom of God led to an ethic rooted in the self-consecration of
_____________ ^^ f -___,,_._- - !•__!•-T_ —— _. . - V - - 
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Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 110-111,
2Ibid., pp. 112-113.
3Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, p. 100.
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the individuals concerned to the preparation for the coming of the Kingdom 
of God which would bring with it the end of the world and the judgment. 
Its dominant motive is found in the doing of the Will of God in purity 
and singleness of heart, and in the entire surrender of the whole per­ 
sonality to the Will of God. The summum bonum of this ethic and its re­ 
ward are both found in fellowship with God and membership in His Kingdom. 
Jesus used the elements of the teachings of the Old Testament which he 
found ready to his hand, so far as they suited his own ideal and purpose; 
but the main and essential root of his teaching was his own unique and 
profound fellowship with God.
Troeltsch, who views Jesus chiefly from the historic viewpoint, 
did not hold any doctrine of the Incarnation. He conceives of Jesus 1
unique relationship to God in terms of unity of will, rather than of es-
2sence. He interprets the work of Christ under the three traditional of­ 
fices @l Prophet, Priest and King, of which the kingly function is the
3 
most important. He does not understand any of these three titles in a
sense which would include any implication of cosmic significance, lordship 
over nature, or any other similar metaphysical interpretation such as these 
titles implied in the older theologies.
Christ's redemptive work is covered by his offices as Prophet and 
High Priest. The kingly office refers to his relation to the Christian com­ 
munity as its head. As Prophet, Christ reveals the character of God as we 
cannot find it revealed anywhere else in history. It is Christ who gives
Troeltsch, Die Soziallehren der ohristliohen Kirchen, pp. 34-38 . 
2Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 117. 
3Ibid., p. 116.
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us certainty of the gracious and forgiving character of God, and leads us 
to surrender to the initiative of the Divine Grace through which we are 
redeemed. As High Priest, Jesus is the Mediator of redemption. Accord­ 
ing to Troeltsch, the real Redeemer is God, Who deals directly with the in­ 
dividual soul, forgiving its sins, and assuring it of pardon and fellowship 
with Himself through its surrender to His Divine Grace; but Jesus is the 
instrument and mediator of this redemption because He is the greatest single 
source of our knowledge of the character of God, which begets in us the 
confidence to believe that God is gracious and ready to forgive our sins*
It is the humbling and exalting effect of the personality of Jesus which
2 
causes us to recognise God in Him. Thus the redemption which Jesus mediates
is a present experience; for it may come to us not only through the histori­ 
cal figure of Jesus in the gospels, which is conditioned by the thoughts
and feelings of His timej but also through His Spirit,, freed from history,
3 and continuing his work of revelation in the Church.
Troeltsch does not ascribe any unique redemptive significance to 
the death of Christ. He thinks the whole idea of the importance of the 
crucifixion needs reinterpretation in the light of the historical under­ 
standing of Jesus. Every age, he says, has interpreted the death of Christ 
in the way most congenial to its own thinking; hence we also have a right 
to interpret it in terms that are meaningful to us. The redemption which 
Jesus mediates comes to us chiefly from the effect of His life; it is really 
nothing more than the transfer of the power of His life to ourselves.
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 114-116.
2Troeltsch, Article, "ErlBsung," Sections 7, 8, in Die Religion in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, 1910 Edition.
3Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 347.
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Redemption is not something which was effected once for all for mankind in 
Christ's death* it is a process which God brings about anew for each soul 
through the mediation of Jesus. To interpret the death of Christ in any 
propitiatory sense which changes God f s mood towards the sinner from one 
of wrath to one of grace is to predicate to Him a character incompatible 
with His Grace and Love, which Christ Himself reveals.
Although it is impossible, according to Troeltsch, to interpret 
the death of Christ as a vicarious atonement for sin, His death still has 
a religious meaning beyond that of any ordinary martyr. It is significant 
as the epitome of the enduring conflict between the Christian ideal and 
that of the worlds it brings out in high relief the ever-present disposi­ 
tion of men to oppose, resist and harm the Divine in human life. The cru­ 
cifixion also demonstrates that sacrifice is the culmination of the Christian 
revelation of the character of Godj and sets a permanent example to the 
Christian community of vicarious and sacrificial suffering. In short, the 
secret of the abiding significance of the death of Christ is to be seen in 
its supreme revelation of the character of God, rather than in its being a 
single act which brings salvation once for all to man.
Since Troeltsch evaluates Jesus and His influence so completely 
from the standpoint of the historical facts of His life, and since he does 
not view Christ's death as the chief means of redemption, he is unwilling 
to ascribe any cosmic significance to Christ's redemptive work. He con­ 
siders the latter view historically unjustified. He is also unwilling to 
use such titles of Jesus as the Second Adam, or the Abbolute Man, or to see 
in His coming the center of human history. In such titles Troeltsch finds
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 349-350.
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nothing but survivals from the older theology which an impartial view of 
history does not support. Bvem Abelard- in the Middle Ages taught that the 
significance of Jesus was to be found in the transformation of soui rather 
than in any cosmic effect* of His mission, Troeltsch points to the 
long aeons that elapsed before history really began, the vast sweep of his­ 
tory itself with the far-flung lines of the Oriental civilisations quite 
untouched by the influence of Jesus, which influence has been so largely 
bound up with our own cultural group. In the face of these facts of his­ 
tory, it is hard to view the coming of Jesus as the center of the history of 
the world. It seems to Troeltsch a sheer piece of European egotism to 
assert that the center of our religious life is also the center of humanity. 
It is indeed, he thinks, a highly anthropocentric notion that was born in 
a day when only a small section of the globe was known, and when it was the 
general belief that a few thousand years covered the whole scope of history. 
Now ift .view of1 the vast extent of history and the enodmous size of the
universe, we can hardly imagine that the redemption of humanity on our ob-
2scure little planet is an event of cosmic significance.
For Troeltsch the real center of the work of Jesus is to be found 
in the third of the traditional offices, that of King. Christ as King is 
the oaput mysticum of the Church, the corpus mysticum. It is around the Per­ 
son of Christ that the Christian community rallies, and in Him it finds the
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 115-
^Troeltsch "Die ZukunftsmOglichkeiten des Christenturns," Gesammelte Schriften, 
Bd. II, pp. 848-849. Lucius Hopkins Miller, who gives an otherwise ac­ 
curate 'account of Troeltsch 1 s theology in his article in The Harvard Theo- 
logical Review, 1913, quotes Troeltsch as using these titles of the Second 
A3am—the Absolute Man, and the center of history in reference to Jesus. 
This usage Troeltsch expressly refused to admit, both here, in the 
Hlaubenslehre, (p. 117) and in Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, 
(pp. IS, 16). Cf. Miller's article, pp. 445-446,
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Symbol of all its ideals and aspirations. In Him it has a firm historic 
basis for its faith in God as loving and forgiving Grace. He is the 
Mediator of the redemption that it seeks,:. This idea of Christ as the 
center and Symbol of the Christian community is very important to Troeltsch. 
Over and over again he speaks of the need of all religion for vitalisation 
through religious fellowship and worship.
Now a Symbol that is to be the rallying point of the community 
must have historical reality behind it in order to inspire the lives of 
Christians as Jesus has done all through the centuries, and still does 
today. No myth, however beautiful, can have the inspiring and vitalising 
power of a reality. Nor can an ideal divorced from a personality have the 
power to produce a succession of historical personalities like those of 
the leaders of the Christian Church, This reality upon which the faith 
of the centuries has fed is the historic Jesus. Without the firm basis 
in reality that the figure of Jesus affords, Christian faith would cease 
to be a living force in the lives of all earnest souls who love the truth, 
and become merely the property of idle aesthetes and dilettantes, who lack 
moral earnestness. , For these reasons Troeltsch has no patience with 
those who push aside the historical questions that surround the facts of 
Jesus* life, and see in Jesus only a mythical symbol of the hopes and 
aspirations of countless Christians through the ages, Also, on similar
grounds, he is unable to join those of the Hegelian group who separate
g the Christian ideal or Prinzip from the person of Jesus.
As Troeltsch puts it, "Just as for him, (the Christian), God is
:Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 116-
2Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, pp. 31-52, 10.
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not just an idea or a probability, but a holy reality, so also he wants to 
rest his faith in this Symbol upon the sure basis of a real life. It is 
a matter of vital importance to him. that (Jesus), a real man thus lived, 
struggled, believed, and triumphed? and that a flood of power and cer­ 
tainty still flows from that real life to him. The Symbol is a real sym­ 
bol to' the Christian only because behind it there stands the great figure 
of a supreme prophet of religion, - a figure in whom he not only beholds 
God, but to whom he can turn for strength when he needs the security of 
a personal religious authority which he experiences immediately in his 
own life. That is the justification for Hermann's talk about the 'fact 
of Christ, 1 Only it is not a question of the individual's assurance of 
salvation being gained first of all through his certainty of Jesus, but 
of the fact that there can be no supporting and strengthening vital con­ 
tinuity for the Spirit of Christ without Jesus as a rallying point, — and 
this common bond of loyalty to Jesus must go back to a real life if it is 
to have inner power and sincerity,"
Such are the main outlines of Troeltsch's Christology. We now 
come to the answering of the question in what senses Jesus is to be re­ 
garded as normative for the faith of the Christian community. First of 
all, it must be said that Troeltsch, in contradistinction to the Ritschlians 
is unwilling to make Jesus the sole norm in Christianity, His first reason 
for this is a purely historic one. Although we can recognise the main facts 
of Jesus' life, and the outline of His teaching, we do not and cannot know 
all the details. If He is to be the sole norm and authority in our religion, 
we sho'uld have to know all these details. We can never draw the line with
Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung der Geschiohtlichkeit Jesu, pp. 32-33*
-187-
certainty between the beliefs of the Christian community and Jesus' own 
thoughts and feelings as they appear in the gospels, — particularly on 
such vital points as the subject of Jesus' Messianic self-consciousness, 
and the involved problem of eschatology. Our knowledge of Him is suf­ 
ficient to find in Him the Symbol for our faith and aspirations, but not 
to make Him the exclusive authority.
The second reason why Troeltsch is unwilling to make Jesus the 
sole norm for Christian faith is that Jesus, as a real historic figure, 
is partially conditioned by the thoughts and feelings of His own time, and 
therefore cannot be regarded as absolute upon all subjects. This contention 
of Troeltsch*s is one which must undoubtedly be admitted if we accept the 
gospel records at their face value. Otherwise we must assume that all the 
reports that indicate that Jesus accepted the popular demonology of His time 
are mere projections of the gospel writers' own beliefs upon Him. Moreover, 
there is a wide difference of opinion among good and 'sincere Christians 
as to how far we can accept Jesus' attitude towards divorce as normative 
for us today. Also, if He expected the Kingdom to come very soon after 
'Hid death, as the gospels give us some reason to believe, (unless one dis­ 
cards such a saying as that in Mark 9:1, "Behold, there are some here of 
them that stand by, who shall in no wise taste of death, till they see 
the kingdom of God come with power"), then Jesus, too, shared in the hope 
of speedy return that was not to be fulfilled. This question is a much 
debated one, of course, but it would seem to involve discarding entirely
too many passages in the gospels if we take the view that the early Christian
2 
community projected their own expectations on Jesus. " All these considera-
Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, p. 39.
^A moderate, yet representative view on the question of Jesus' own expec­ 
tations regarding the coming of the Kingdom of God is that of E. F. 
Scott, TheKingdom of God in the New Testament >
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tions make it necessary to accept Troeltsch 1 s view that we cannot regard 
all of Jesus 1 views as normative for us. He did share some of the in­ 
tellectual limitations of His time.
For Jesus, according to Troeltsch, the real absolute was to be 
found in the Kingdom of God, not in His own Person. The transfer of the 
absolute to Christ *s Person is the work of the Christian community. 
Troeltsch believes that we can expect the absolute only in the eschatological 
sense of the full realisation of the Will of God, as Jesus did. The real 
Absolute therefore lies only in God. Sleigh represents Troeltsch 1 s atti­ 
tude very accurately when he says,
*This Absolute, which Jesus placed in the Kingdom of God, was soon 
transferred to his person. Such a transference was natural, and indeed 
inevitable, on the part of the primitive Church, because then all were 
in a * naive atmosphere. 1 .... We cannot, however, continue to pretend 
that the transference was essential, nor can it be justified by saying 
that the fact of Jesus implicitly involved such a reference to his per­ 
son. It is actually, on the contrary, but one more illustration of the 
mythic and syncretistic attempts of all religions to fortify their naive 
Absolutes, when they have been shattered by coming into contact with other 
attitudes to, and interests of life, and to harden them into dogmas in 
order to preserve them from evaporation. The more unreservedly this is 
recognised, the more effectively we shall get back to the reality of 
Christ and his message, and be able to yield ourselves to his naive 
greatness, spiritual power, insight, and freedom, as in fact the highest 
and greatest spiritual realities known to, and admitted by
The final reason which Troeltsch brings forward for his unwil­ 
lingness to put the sole weight of authority on Jesus is the fact that 
He can be rightly understood only in the light of the prophetic develop­ 
ment which preceded Him, and of the great succession of personalities whom
he inspired, — through Paul, Augustine, Luther, and all the other great
g 
saints of the Church down to our own time. He is the crown and culmination
Troeltsch, Absolutheit des Christentums, pp. 100-102.
2R. S. Sleigh, The Sufficiency of Christianity, pp. 118-119.
g Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu fur den Glauben, pp. 38-40*
j
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of all the development of the Old Testament which preceded Him, and in Him 
is latent all that the succeeding centuries of Christians have discovered. 
Each generation of His followers has interpreted Him somewhat differently; 
but all have found in Him the satisfaction for their needs. It requires the 
interpretation of them all to see Him in His fulness. The great saints 
of the Church illuminate and heighten the qualities they find in Jesus through 
their reproductions of what they have caught of His Spirit. It would seem 
that in Troeltsch 1 s thought, Jesus might be compared to a beam of light, 
which, taken by itself, appears white, but when seen through the spectro­ 
scope of these other personalities, shows the colors which comprise the 
ray in their single beauty and glory.
Having dwelt upon the negative side by giving Troeltsch 1 s reasons 
for not wishing to see in Jesus the sole norm for Christianity, we now come 
to the positive side, and are ready to define in just what senses Troeltsch 
does believe that Jesus is normative for the Christian Church. Although 
Christ is not the sole norm in Troeltsch 1 s system, He is the supreme and 
the final norm. The other personalities, the Prophets and the saints, de­ 
rive their normative significance from Jesus5 for they are authoritative 
in so far as they are forerunners of Jesus, or reproducers of His Spirit* 
The test of whether they are bearers of revelation or not is really whether 
they are in line with Jesus, — even granting that their revelation is 
new in the face of the problems of their own day. The normative position 
of Jesus is permanent and ultimate, though not exclusive. Troeltsch, in 
one of the finest passages from a religious viewpoint in all his writings, 
speaks thus of the permanent significance of Jesuss
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"Any sincere religious life that transcends the bounds of a primitive 
form of worship needs, some kind of symbol, incarnation, personal embodi­
ment of realisation. . . . *EH>W communion with which religious power pours 
out to it. Fundamentally the same thing is true of the significance of 
Jesus for Christianity. He is the incarnation of religious power, illuminated 
ever anew by the centuries, whose heart-beat goes through the whole of 
Christendom, just as the vibration of a steamer's engine can be felt through 
every portion of the entire ship."
Jesus is of unique normative significance and must remain so for 
the Christian community. He it is Who guides us to God, and reveals the 
character of the Father as we find it nowhere else in history. It is He 
Who gives us certainty of God's forgiving Grace and Love, and bestows upon 
us the faith and confidence to surrender to the Father's offer of pardon 
and fellowship with Himself. In this sense, Jesus is the true norm for 
the Christian's experience of God, and of redemption. Even if our redemption 
comes about mediately through the preaching of the Word in the Church, we 
still have to go back to Jesus for the assurance that God is as the Church
proclaims Him to be; for only in Him do we find the perfect revelation of
2 
the Father that assures us.
Not only is Jesus the norm for the faith of the Church in redemption 
and in the knowledge of the character of God, but He is also the norm by 
which the Christian must measure his own religious experiences and his per­ 
sonal apprehension of the Divine revelation. If left to its own devices 
without any external standard by which to measure its own validity, indivi­ 
dual religious experience may easily run riot into all kinds of extrava­ 
gances of a mystical sort which even border on the pathological. In 
Jesus the Christian body has a criterion by which to judge whether what 
it supposes to be revelations really are of God or figments of its own 
imagination. The historic personality of Jesus must also serve as basis
^Troeltsch, "Die ZukunftsmBglichkeiten des Christentums," Gesamelte 
Schriften. Bd. II, p. 847.
2Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, pp. 114-116.
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and norm for all of the Christian's experiences of the Christ of faith. 
The Spirit is constantly at work in the Church, revealing to it the mind 
of Christ, and leading it into all truthj but the Church can be assured 
of the genuineness of these revelations only as they accord with the 
spirit of the historic Jesus of Nazareth,
Finally, Jesus is the center and the norm for the aspirations, 
ideals and activities of the Christian community. Around His Person, they 
unite in fellowship; and in worship they strive to appropriate to them­ 
selves the certainty of God and the inspiration for life that they find 
in Him, He is the pattern and the inspiration of all their efforts to
reproduce His Spirit in their lives, and to spread the ideal of the Kingdom
2 
of God in the world through preaching, education, and missionary activity.
Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung der Geschiohtlichkeit Jesu, pp, 44-45, Troeltsch 
did not "believe that direct communion with the Exalted Christ was 
possible or desirable, ((pp. <Cit., p. 30) Jesus was a historic person 
to him, to be known only historically, and through the Spirit, Who con­ 
tinues His revealing work. This point in Troeltsch*s Christology has 
been criticised by Prof. H. R. Mackintosh, (The Person of Christ, 
pp. 364-368). Two enthusiastic disciples of Troeltsch, George Edgar 
Wolfe, ("Troeltsch*s Conception of the Significance of Jesus," American 
Journal of Theology, 1916, pp. 179-204) and Sleigh, (The Sufficiency 
of Christianity, pp» 126-127), have taken up the cudgels on Troeltsch 1 s 
behalf, and seem to feel that they have settled the point at issue be­ 
tween the two theologians by pointing out that for Prof. Mackintosh also 
Christ mysticism must be grounded on the firm basis of the historic Jesus, 
(Mackintosh, <6)p. c£it., pp. 306 ff.) The difference between Troeltsch 
and Prof. Mackintosh does not seem to me so easily resolved. If I 
understand the latter*s position in contradistinction to Troeltsch*s, 
each starts from a different understanding of the figure of the historic 
Jesus, and from this difference as to the facts in the gospel records 
themselves, each logically takes the position that he does in regard to 
the Exalted Christ, The real root of their differences seems to me to 
lie in the very different interpretation that each gives to Jesus* own 
self-consciousness as the records present it. Troeltsch believes that 
Jesus put the absolute in the ideal of the Kingdom, while Prof. 
Mackintosh stresses Jesus* consciousness of His Messianic mission and 
Sonship to God,
9
Troeltsch, Die Bedentung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu fur den Glauben, p. 47; 
Of, also the section on the Church in the Glaubenslehfe"!
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No one can doubt that Troeltsch 1 s Christology, like all of his 
theological thinking, is a sincere attempt to preserve the religious rich­ 
ness of the Christian heritage, and at the same time to face honestly and 
fairly all the difficulties and problems raised for faith by historical 
criticism. Also one must keep in mind in making any estimate of Troeltsch*s 
Christology that it is a protest against the isolation of Jesus from all the 
rest of the religious development of mankind which seemed to him a decided 
limitation of the Ritschlian position. With these two points in mind, we 
shall try to make some estimate first of the merits, then of the limitations 
of Troeltsch*s Christology. The first of its virtues is that Troeltsch em­ 
phasises vigorously the absolute necessity of making the facts in the life 
of the historic Jesus the basis for the whole. No Christology can have any 
reality which does not do that. Any Christology which ignores or minimises 
the importance of the historic figure of Jesus becomes either Docetic, or 
leaves behind all reality in mere sentimentalism.
Troeltsch1 s Christology has also the merit of defining very clearly 
a number of the senses in which Jesus is and must remain normative for the 
faith of the Christian community. No one can gainsay that Jesus is norma­ 
tive for all our knowledge of the character of God, and that through Him 
alone we have certainty of the gracious and loving Nature of the Father Who 
is willing to forgive our sins, and to exalt us into fellowship with Himself. 
ThatHe is the center and symbol of all the hopes, aspirations and ideals 
of the Christian community has been proved by the experience of the Church 
throughout the ages. Although Troeltsch 1 s statement of the unique normative 
significance of Jesus does not go so far as one could desire, he does thoroughly 
recognise that the normative place of Jesus in Christianity is supreme, 
permanent and unique.
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Quite rightly, Troeltsch points out that while Jesus is the 
supreme and final norm, He is not the sole norm for Christianity. We must 
admit, if we are honest, the justice of Troeltsch 1 s contention that we cannot 
view the personality of Jesus as absolute in the sense of free from all of 
the contemporary intellectual limitations of His day and generation. Any 
one who accepts the results of Biblical criticism at all would have to 
agree with Troeltsch there, for this is surely no original idea of his. 
Furthermore, we must grant also that we cannot make Jesus the authority to 
Whom we can turn for ready-made solutions to all our problems, and in Whom 
we can find a pat answer to any and every question that arises. The vain 
efforts of the Christian socialists to attach their programs to Jesus ade­ 
quately bear out the objection of Troeltsch on this point.
A more positive aspect of Troeltseh's refusal to see in Jesus 
the sole norm for Christianity is his contribution in calling attention to 
the fact that we cannot understand Jesus taken by Himself, but only through 
the interpretation of Him which the succession of Christian personalities 
whom He inspired can furnish us. The Church has always recognised, at least 
in the orthodox line, the indispensability of the Old Testament development 
for the understanding of Jesus. The very fact that the early Church took 
over in toto the Old Testament canon demonstrates its position in this matter. 
However, at least in Protestantism, the significance of the Christian leaders 
for the understanding of their Lord has not been officially, (even though 
practically), recognised. In a very objectionable way the Catholic Church 
has recognised the importance of these master Christians through its sanction 
of the worship of the saints. Troeltsch 1 s emphasis upon the importance of the 
leaders of the Church for the adequate understanding of their Master called 
attention to the place of the succession of great figures of Christian history
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without any of the superstition and undue homage that attaches to the venera­ 
tion of the saints in Catholicism, Not only does the recognition which 
Troeltsch accords to the leaders of the Church imply a more positive evalu­ 
ation of Church history than the estimate of a man like von Harnack, who 
sees in most of it only a falling away from Jesus, and a corruption of the 
purity of His method; but it is a real contribution to our appreciation of 
Jesus. Just as the whole of a masterpiece like the Sistine Madonna is often 
appreciated best when reproduced in sectional detail, so Jesus is best 
seen in His full glory through those who incarnate certain qualities of His 
Spirit in their lives. We understand the love of Jesus more fully when we 
see it embodied in the life of St. Francis of Assisi.
Nevertheless, when all of the vir'tues of Troeltsch 1 s Christology 
have been admitted, we have to concede that it has some very serious limita­ 
tions, -- in fact more than any other part of his doctrinal construction. 
It is impossible to read Troeltsch 1 s writing without appreciating the warmth 
and sincerity of his personal devotion to Jesus; but his scientific 
Christology is a very timid and inadequate statement of the faith of his 
own heart. Nowhere else do we see that singular dualism between Troeltsch 
the philosopher and Troeltsch the Christian more clearly than here. As 
Mezger, one of Troeltsch 1 s critics, puts it, "Per christliche Theologe Troeltsch
o
Iftsst sich allzusehr imponieren von dem Religionsphilosoph Troeltsch." Even
Troeltsch admits frankly that practically the depth and power of Herrmann's 
Christology attracted him, though he was unable to share the latter»s 
theological statement of it. (*£ur Frage des religittaen Apriori," Gesammelte 
Schriften, Bd. II, p. 768). He states his devotion to Jesus in warm 
terms in various places, for example, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, 
pp« 103 ff• The passage quoted above from Die Zukunftsmftglichkeit des 
Christentums is another instance. ""
^Paul Mezger, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschiohte, p. 34.
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so friendly and appreciative an admirer of Troeltsoh as Baron von Hugel finds 
himself "warmed by the religious Troeltsch but chilled by the philosophic 
Troeltsch" with his cold and abstract terms, myth, hero and symbol. Cer­ 
tainly in his efforts to face the critical and historical difficulties in
his Christology, Troeltsch goes too far in the direction of Historismus,
o 
(the historical temper),
The objection that Troeltsch*s position makes faith too dependent
2upon history was raised during his life, principally by Herrmann. In ex­ 
treme form, this protest meets us in Gogarten's criticism, which will have 
none of Troeltsch 1 s or Harnackf s or any other historically interested theo- 
logianPs attempts to "understand" or "interpret" Jesus, or to discern what 
His religion was in order that He may be an ideal for the faith of the 
Christian community. Such an attempt is, according to Gogarten, not a 
real relationship to Jesus, for allegiance to His religion would be to a 
timeless, supBrhistorical truth which appears in history only once in Jesus
Himself. That procedure is just "an aesthetic timeless revivification of
4 the picture of Jesus, not a historical meeting with Him in time." At the
bar of Gogarten 1 s criticism many of the foremost theologians and many very 
earnest Christians of the past and present, (Herrmann as well as Troeltsch)
Priedrich von Hugel, Essays and Addresses, First Series, pp. 187-188.
^This is the one important point that Traub in his Glaube und Geschichte, 
pp. 11 ff. makes against Troeltsch. Otherwise this critique is quite 
unfair. It characterises as inconsistent and unnecessary on their own 
theories the successful defense of the historicity of Jesus made by 
Troeltsch and the religio-historical theologians against the attack of 
Drews. The real weaknesses of Troeltsch1 s Christology are not brought 
out; and the implication is that Troeltsch would have been more con­ 
sistent if he had had no Christology at all.
7
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 86 • 
4Friedrich Gogarten, Ich glaube an den dreieinigen Gott, p. 133 •
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would be found weighed in the "balance of the Dialectic theology and found 
wanting. Surely if we are to follow Gogarten and evolve a Christology 
which does not start with the historical figure of Jesus as well as we can 
"understand and interpret* it from the gospels, we should have a thoroughly 
Docetic Christology, as in fact Gogarten himself plainly does.
Troeltsch replied rather ably to the objection of Herrmnn and 
those like him who complained that his position made faith dependent on 
the research of scholars and experts. To this Troeltsch retorts that in­ 
deed to some degree the faith of the Church is dependent on the work of 
scholars and experts; but that this is no new state of affairs. In educated 
circles in the Church, this has always been so. For centuries the church 
depended upon classical philosophy and science for support for much of 
its world view and for many of its doctrines. Furthermore, Troeltsch con­ 
tends that that faith is not dependent upon the fine points of detailed and 
pedantic investigation of highly technical and unimportant points; but only 
upon the results of historical investigation with regard to the main out­ 
line of Jesus* life and teachings. The questions which historical criticism 
have raised are very real difficulties, but the Church must fight them through, 
otherwise the sure historical basis for its faith in the person of Jesus 
would be imperilled. Finally, Troeltsch was rightly confident that the
worst that criticism could do could not touch anything but the details of
2
Jesus » life and teaching*
There are far graver objections to be made to Troeltsch 1 s 
Christology. The point is not so much whether we can allow faith to be de-
Troeltsch shows in his first book, Vernunft und Qffenbarung bei Gerhard 
und Melanchthon that early Protestantism as well as Catholicism took 
over much of ̂ the philospfchy of the ancient world in support of its doctrines.
2Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung der Geschiohtlichkeit Jesu fur den Glauben, pp. 37-38.
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pendent upon the results of experts, (which we cannot avoid doing to some 
degree if we have a true Christian appreciation of the value of truth), 
but whether, Troeltsch in his anxiety to be fair to all these historical 
doubts and questions has not gone too far and reduced Jesus to a lower 
position than history in fact compels us to assign to Him, Sleigh puts 
the case too favorably to Troeltsch when he says that Troeltsch 1 s Christology 
does not sacrifice anything essential to His power for us as a revelation 
of God.
Troeltsch, it will be recalled, treats the work of Christ under 
the three traditional offices, Prophet, Priest, and King, of which the 
kingly office is the most important as he sees it. Little if any fault 
could be found with Troeltsch 1 s treatment of the work of Christ as Prophet. 
He states very well Christ's normative significance for the Christian body 
as the greatest Revealer of God, by "Whom they must measure their own reve­ 
lations, and judge their religious experience. On the other hand it ap­ 
pears to the present writer that Troeltsch gives but little content to the 
priestly function of Christ, because of the small part that he assigns to 
Him in redemption; and that although he lays great weight on the kingly 
office, his treatment of it centers too much on the Christian community, 
and too little on the Person of Christ in its kingly supremacy.
The weakness of Troeltsch 1 s interpretation of the priestly of­ 
fice of Jesus lies in the fact that he can see no special redemptive sig­ 
nificance in the death of Jesus. He does see in that event more than a
mere martyr's death; but he has nothing but scorn for the idea that the
2 
death of Christ brought redemption once for all to the human race. All
1R. S. Sleigh, The Sufficiency of Christianity, p. 214.
^Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 350, also Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit 
Jesu, pp. 17-18*
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that Troeltsch says of the crucifixion as a revelation of the character 
of God is true; but there is much more to be said for the concentration of 
redemptive power in the cross than he seems to grasp. Here we see the 
rational strain in Troeltsch 1 s temperament coining to the fore. His atti­ 
tude towards the crucifixion is one of his failings as a theologian which 
justify T. Kaftan's remark that he was a disciple of the Enlightenment. 
The significance of the cross is usually lost upon those of a rationalistic 
turn of mind; probably because it is one of the hardest of all Christian 
doctrines to formulate in rational terms. It is not accidental that there 
have been so many different and conflicting interpretations of the death 
of Christ in the history of Christian thought. They all testify to the 
fact that the cross is a great mystery of our religion which no intellectual 
or doctrinal formula has wholly succeeded in expressing. Perhaps we shall 
never get a doctrine of the crucifixion which fully and exhaustively states 
its meaning; yet it is a fact attested by the centuries that in the sight 
of the cross Christians have experienced redemption in unique and heightened 
form as nowhere else even in the life of Christ. Troeltsch does say that 
the death of Christ is a unique expression of the sacrificial and redemptive 
character of God; but only when this redemption is personally appropriated 
in the sight of the cross can the depth of its meaning be fully appreciated. 
The cross is an experience rather than a doctrine; but without that ex­ 
perience one's understanding of Jesus as High Priest remains defective, as
2
Troeltsch's does,
Troeltsch1 s Christology centers in the kingly office of Christ;
T. Kaftan, Ernst Troeltsch, eine kritische Zeitstudie, p. 60. Kaftan also 
calls attention to Troeltsch1 s lack of understanding of redemption as 
a process centering in the death of Christ, (Op. cit., pp. 63 ff).
2Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 353 •
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but his statement of it is focussed too sharply around the Christian com­ 
munity, so that it does not put sufficient emphasis on Christ f s lordship 
over the Church. Professor E. W. Lyman, of Union Theological Seminary, 
in a recent article entitled, "The Place of Christ in Modern Theology," 
in the Journal of Religion (April 1929), points out two of the most serious 
limitations of Troeltsch»s Christology. The first is the ambiguity of the 
latter ! s use of the term, Symbol, and the second is the entire relativity of 
Troeltsch1 s view of Christ. Dr. Lyman raises the question whether Troeltsch 
means by Symbol that Jesus is the incarnation of the truth and the new way
of life that we and all men need, or whether He is simply the repository
2
of all the varying aims and ideals of the centuries. In fairness to
Troeltsch we must admit that he does mean that Jesus is a real historic 
figure Who does embody this revelation of God and is Himself the pattern
and example in which the Christian community can find its ideal and rest
3
its faith. However, Dr. Lyman is entirely right in pointing out that the
use of the term symbol in Troeltsch 1 s system is unfortunate,
"When Troeltsch speaks of the Christian community and its need 
of a Symbol, he almost gives the impression that it is the real function 
of Jesus to supply this need for a Symbol, and that one of the chief sources 
of His importance is the fact that He is this Symbol, which unites the 
Christianity community. Now no one would deny that Jesus is a Symbol or better
It is just in this connection that we must acknowledge the service of the 
Barthian Christology that it emphasises the truth which has too often 
been lost from sight in recent Christological thinking that Jesus does 
confront us as Lord and make demands of us. (Cf. Brunner, Die Absolutheit 
Jesu, p. 141).
2Lyman, Op. Cit., p. 199»
7
Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung der Gesohichtlichkeit Jesu, pp. 33-34*
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an example and pattern to the Christian community from which it derives its
ideals and aspiration, and by which it measures its achievements; but He 
is also the Lord of the Christian community, for Whose sake it exists, and 
without Whom it would be nothing. In other words, the Christian community 
derives its importance from Jesus, not Jesus from the Christian community. 
Troeltsch does not sufficiently stress his Lordship in his talk about Jesus 
as a Symbol for the Christian community,
The second criticism which Dr. Lyman makes of Troeltsch is an even 
more fundamental one. Jesus is a thoroughly relative figure in Troeltsch 1 s 
system. There is some justice in Troeltsch* s contention that we cannot re­ 
gard Jesus as absolute in the sense of unlimited and unconditioned by His 
time; but when that fact has been conceded, we must go on to the conscious­ 
ness of the fact that there are a number of absolutes in Jesus also. Dr. 
Lyman lists some of the absolute values to be found in Jesus 1 life and teach­ 
ing, which are valid for us and for all time. These are: His conception of 
man's sonship to God; the supremacy of love; the power of faith; the intrin­ 
sic worth of the human soul; the conquest of evil by self-giving, suffering 
love; the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth; and His conception of a 
God Whose nature is the embodiment and expression of these ideals and with 
Whom we stand in living relationship.
Even calling attention to these individual religious and ethical 
absolutes in the Person and teaching of Jesus does not exhaust His absolute­
ness. There is still the utter uniqueness of His own relation to the Father
g which is not wholly covered by them. Surely that is the greatest absolute in
history. Troeltsch explains Jesus 1 relationship to God as a unity of will;
, Article, "The Place of Christ in Modern Theology," Journal of
2Frof .H^R^MaSkinJoih' in his Qrigjna.lity.of the Chrifetian Message calls attention 
to the historical uniqueness of Jesus' seir-uuii5ujLuuiii«s&. — The question of 
Tesus 1 self-consciousness is one of the most difficult in gospel criticism; 
Bttt at least the uniqueness of His relationship to GoHs clear, however He 
may have conceived His mission.
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but the logic of his insistence that the idea of the historical manifesta­ 
tion of God as Will must always be combined with that of Essence should not 
be followed everywhere else anct excluded from Jesus alone. It is just in 
the Person of Jesus that we see in its supreme form this very combination 
of God as Will and Essence. Troeltsch is unwilling to follow the logic 
of his own system here "because that would involve a doctrine of the Incarna­ 
tion, which he is unwilling to admit because of his prejudice against any­ 
thing that savours of the exclusive supernaturalism of the Ritschlians. 
Troeltsch confesses that he is an adherent of the Johannine Christology, 
and his doctrine of the Trinity substantiates this assertion; but it is 
hard to see how one can really hold a Johannine Christology without admitting 
the Incarnation of the Logos, the Eternal Word of God.
From another point of view it is unnecessary on the purely his­ 
torical merits of the case to make such a low estimate of the Person of 
Jesus and its absolute qualities. Although sometimes he talks of the un­ 
broken causal chain of historical connections which renders it impossible to 
set Jesus apart from the rest of history, there are other parts of his theory 
of norms that would allow for the unique position of Jesus. These are the 
contingent elements of which Troeltsch sometimes made much. Ncrw Jesus is 
surely the most contingent personality in history, the least explicable through 
ordinary laws of cause and effect. He is the greatest Einmaligkeit, Whose 
uniqueness cannot be explained on any ordinary basis. That is why the Church 
from the beginning held the doctrine of the Incarnation; because it could 
find nothing in ordinary life which did explain Jesus. Even with all our 
theories of historical connection, development, and the rest, we are still
Troeltsch, Glaubenslehre, p. 349.
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unable to explain Jesus* uniqueness on a purely historical basis. That is 
why it is historically inadequate to fit Jesus Who is so distinctly a 
historical Einmaligkeit into any laws of cause and effect. His fellowship
with God is quite in a class by itself, it is Sonship, to which even the
1 
Founders of other religions do not lay claim. Buddha, as everyone knows,
was skeptical about the existence of God, and Mohammed claimed nothing more 
than that he was the Prophet of God, But in Jesus there was such a close re­ 
lationship with God that we cannot explain it in terms of unity of Will alone, 
we must explain it in the combination of unity of Will and Essence which the 
traditional doctrine of the Incarnation formulated. In its cruder form, 
the Incarnation was stated by the Church in the virgin birth; but in the 
more refined Logos idea of the Fourth Gospel we have the uniqueness of 
Jesus explained just through the fact that in Him the Word bocomes flesh.
The question of the absoluteness of Jesus in its relation to the 
finality of Christianity belongs to another chapter. Here it will be suf­ 
ficient to confine ourselves to the purely Christian aspects of the absolute 
position of Jesus. The very fact that Jesus could inspire that great suc­ 
cession of personalities in the Church is itself a unique fact in history, 
Troeltsch himself tacitly admits the unparalleled greatness of Jesus e.nd 
His uniqueness when he calls attention to the great historic development, 
of which Jesus is the culmination and the epitome. On the grounds of his 
own historical theories, Troeltsch ought more adequately to have recognised 
the uniqueness, and in this sense the absoluteness of Jesus as an Einmaligkeit,
When one considers these historical facts that attest the unique­ 
ness of Jesus, and His absoluteness in the sense of irreproducibility, titles 
such as the second Adam, the Absolute Man, and the center of history are 
justifiable. Had Troeltsch not been so utterly preoccupied with the limitations
Cf. H. R. Mackintosh, Originality of the Christian Message, pp. 7yff.
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of Jesus, and the ways in which He was conditioned by history, he would have 
realised more thoroughly that Jesus is a supsikhistorical figure as well as 
a historical one. If Jesus is not the center of history, we have no alter­ 
native left but to believe that history has no center. The reason that we 
date all our chronology before and after Christ is our recognition that His 
advent is the most transforming event in history. Moreover, the normative 
character of Jesus is such that we are right in calling Him the Second Adam, 
and the Absolute Man, because He is the ideal and pattern of •what man should 
be. Surely the facts themselves compel us to ascribe to Jesus at least 
planetary significance. To go on to find cosmic significance in His advent is 
a step of faith. If the redemptive work of Jesus is a fulfiling of one of 
God's purposes, as we believe, then it must be of cosmic significance, not 
because it concerns man, but because all God's purposes have cosmic signifi­ 
cance •
Had Troeltsch only followed the logic of his own theories to 
their end in the recognition of the absolute, as well as the relative element 
in Jesus, he would have solved his life-problemj the quest of the absolute 
in history, as Erich Przywara remarks* Certainly it is not only a Catholic 
but a Protestant, indeed a universal Christian judgment that Przywara ex­ 
presses in this connection when he says that in Jesus we have just that 
union of the absolute and the relative, the meeting in one Person of the 
Divine Absolute elements and the relative human ones. It is really in his 
wholly relative Christology that the tragic failure of Troeltsch 1 s own life 
roots; but this failure was a personal one, not one of his method, Troeltsch
Erich Przywara, "Ernst Troeltsch, 11 Stimmen der Zeit, Heft 105, 1923, p, 79, 
Brunner, who is surely a Protestant, in his Absolutheit Jesu, p. 17, 
sees in Jesus that same meeting of the absolute and the relative of 
which Przywara speaks•
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was temperamentally incapable of recognising absolutes even when they 
were plainly before him. As Emil Spiess puts it, "to him every truth 
wore an individual face."
1 E. Spiess, Die Religionstheorie von Ernst Troeltsch. p. 51.
CHAPTER VIII
THE APPLICATION OF THE NORMS IN THE GENERAL FIELD OF THE 
RELIGIONS OF THE TNORLD — THE QUESTION OF THE FINALITY OF
CHRISTIANITY
Up to this time we have been occupied with the examination of 
the theory of norms in its application to the sphere of Christianity alone* 
It will be the task of the present chapter to go on to see how the norms 
work in the larger realm of the higher religions of the world, which will
involve a discussion of the question of the finality of Christianity, The
®+ 
historical method in itself cannot give any proff that Christianity is the
final religion, according to Troeltsch, for that is a question which only 
the future can decide. However, there are certain evidences from the 
field of history, surveyed through the method of the norms which tend to 
show a presumption towards finality in favor of some one or the other of 
the world religions*
Troeltsch1 s thinking on the question of the finality of Christianity 
divides itself into three stages, as Erioh Leidreiter, a recent writer on 
the subject, points out. The first stage is represented by early writings, 
chiefly Die Selbstflndigkeit der Religion, and Geschichte und Metaphysik, in 
which under the influence of the Hegelian dialectic of history, he quite 
confidently asserts the finality of Christianity even while protesting a- 
gainst the narrow and exclusive supernaturalism which he sees in Ritschlian 
Christianity, The bridge to the second stage, as Leidreiter rightly ob­ 
serves, is the little essay, "Christentum und Religionsgeschichte, "1897, now 
included in Gesammelte Schiften, Bd* II, The second stage in his ideas on 
the subject is that of his Absolutheit des Christenturns, first published in
Leidreiter, Troeltsoh und die Absolutheit des Christentums, pp. 1-22 »
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1901, (second edition, -which is used for the present chapter, 1912). The
transition to his final view of the subject is shown in "Die Zukunftsmfiglich-
keiten des Christentums 11 (1910), in which he takes a somewhat more radical
\l£j».n. 
standpoint fre»;the one expressed in Die Absolutheit, His final conclusionsf- —————————
on the question are to be found in the first and most pretentious of the 
lectures written for delivery in England just before his death in 1925. 
The lectures were never delivered, for Troeltsch died just a few weeks before 
the proposed visit was to take place; but the lectures were translated under 
the auspices of Baron von Eugel and other interested English scholars, and 
published under the title, Christian Thought, 1923. The Place of Christianity 
among the Religions of the World, as this lecture is called, takes a more 
radical stand in regard to the question of the finality of Christianity 
than Troeltsch had previously represented at any time; but we must believe 
that it is the final conclusion to which his historical studies had led him. 
The practical implications of the question are treated in one of his essays 
from the middle period of his thought on the finality of Christianity, "Die Mission 
in der modernen Welt", which originally appeared as an article on the impli­ 
cations of the finality of Christianity as they present themselves from the 
standpoint of Christian missions, in Die Christliche Welt, 1906.
Although there is an extensive literature in German on the subject 
of Troeltsch 1 s ideas of the question of the finality of Christianity as 
Die Absolutheit represents them, there is very little on the subject in Eng­ 
lish. Aside from a few scattered references, there is only the single book 
of R. S. Sleigh, The Sufficiency of Christianity, published in 1923. 
This phase of Troeltsch 1 s thought is excellently presented by Sleigh with 
*n understanding and sympathetic critique; but his book appeared before
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it was possible to utilise the material on Troeltsch's final views on the 
question as they appear in Christian Thought.
One common presupposition runs through all the cycles of Troeltsch's 
ideas on the question of the finality of Christianity. That is his assumption 
that one must assume that all the higher religions of the world are super­ 
natural in so far as they contain revealed truths therefore we must not be­ 
gin our investigations of other religions with the a priori idea that Christi­ 
anity stands apart from all the other religious development of mankind. He 
is also convinced, except in his final stage, that historical analysis of 
the world religions will give us an understanding of the direction in which 
all the religions are tending, and that out of the process of this analysis, 
we shall discover inherent norms in the various forms, which give the key 
to the understanding of each of the several forms, and finally will enable 
us to discern the general ideal or norm of all religion. These methodical 
presuppositions hold true even for his final radical stand that the 
various religions could not be held to be tending in the same direction.
Troeltsch believes, it must be recalled, that the historical 
norms, like the theological or religious norms, are not necessarily uni­ 
versally valid, timeless and unchangeable standards by which all the re­ 
ligions at all times can be measured. As in the various periods and in- 
dividualisations which Christianity has taken, the norms must be discovered 
for the separate times and forms, so also in the general field of the re­ 
ligions of the world, the norms arise from objects that are continually 
changing and developing. Moreover, they arise from an object which presents 
that same combination of the relative and the absolute, the temporal and the 
metaphysical that is found in all historical products. Historical combina­ 
tions are all relative and passing embodiments of the ideal, even in the
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sphere of religion; but that does not alter the fact that they embody 
values that point in the direction of an ideal aim. Christianity, ac­ 
cording to Troeltsch, is one of these great historic individualisations, 
like all the higher religions of the world} and any attempts to demon­ 
strate that it is the absolute religion cannot apply any other method, be 
that the rational one of Hegel, or the dogmatic one of the Ritschlians, 
than would be used in the treatment of the other religions of the world. 
The only fair basis is to take them and analyse them all on the historical 
method*
We shall now proceed to the examination of Troeltsch 1 s position 
on the finality of Christianity at the period represented by the Absolutheit, 
followed by some criticism of the same; and then consider his final views 
on the subject. The earliest position, represented in Die Selbstftndigkeit 
der Religion is not characteristic enough of his own thinking to call for 
extensive discussion* It is simply a modified Hegelianism in which the
Idea of religion, redemption, is discovered to be most thoroughly realised
gin Christianity, hence we accept it as the final religion, after the care­ 
ful historical comparison of the various religions.
In Die Abeolutheit, Troeltsch1 s argument proceeds on a less dis­ 
tinctively Hegelian basis, laying greater emphasis on the historical side, 
though there are still traces of Hegel's influence, such as the stress that 
he puts on the necessity of true religion's break with nature. His argu­ 
ment proceeds along genuine religio-historical lines in this essay.
The method by which Troeltsch examines the various religions of
Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, pp. 45-59•
2Troeltsch, "Die Selbstftndigkeit der Religion," Zeitsohift fur Theologie und Kirche, 1895-96, pp. 203, ff. ————————————————
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©f the world is, of course, the historical. He tries to put aside all a. 
priori canons which would make the conclusion a foregone one from the be­ 
ginning, whether these be the rational ones of Hegel or the dogmatic ones 
of orthodox theology like miracle and supernaturalism. According to 
Troeltsch, the term, Absolutheit, which comes from the modern evolutionist 
apologetic, means in its application to Christianity, that in that religion 
we have the only complete and normative truth about God, man, and the world, 
although the other religions of the world do contain certain relative and 
incomplete truth about them. In his mind the absoluteness of Christianity 
in this rational sense is the exact equivalent of the attempt to demonstEate 
the complete and peculiar truth of Christianity which the ordinary orthodox 
theology proves by the canons of supernaturalism and miracle. The intent 
of the two methods is exactly the same, and their method differs only in 
that the approach of the first is more rational and philosophic, the second 
more exclusively dogmatic. Neither the one nor the other does adequate 
justice to the historical facts in the field of comparative religion.
Troeltsch thinks that both of these types of apologetic approach 
the question quite wrongly. Instead of trying to establish what is norma­ 
tive and valid in the Christian or any other religion, they start out to show 
that Christianity is the exclusive supernatural revelation, or that it is 
the absolute fulfilment of the idea (Begriff) of religion. Thus his aim dif­ 
fers from the start from the two schools of apology; for the historical 
method of approach excludes such presuppositions and cannot provide the 
means for a proof of the finality of Christianity in either of those two 
sense. History is concerned with individual and irreproducible forms, which
Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, pp. 9-13 •
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arise out of the mobile and incalculable vitality of life itself. "What
norms it can yield do not go back to some omnipresent absolute, but arise
2 
out of these various forms themselves.
Not only is Troeltsch*s aim different, but there are further 
differences as to the approach of the investigator himself. He does not 
put aside his religion, and approach the question in an entirely objective 
spirit; Troeltsch was too true to his own thesis that no one who was not 
religious himself could understand religion. Rather the investigator uses 
his own faith to give him the means of understanding sympathetically the
religions urges and motives inherent in other religious individualisations
3 ** 
besides his own. Those critics of Troeltsch 1 s ideas, who, like Hunzi/ger,r*
recognised his entire religious sincerity, maintained that in bringing his 
faith with him to his task, Troeltsch was no different from other theologians 
in his attempt to decide among the competing claims to truth of the religions
of the world; for even with Troeltsch the decision among various norms is
4 
a matter of personal faith. The difference is a real one, however, for an
attitude of sympathy and understanding in investigation of the claims of
the other religions to truth is quite other than an investigation whose
only motive is to prove the Tightness of its own standpoint from the very start.
In religion we are in the curious position of being unable to under­ 
stand any religious phenomenon unless we are religious ourselves5 but there 
is a real difference between that attitude and dogmatically insisting




August Wilhelm HunziJger, Probleme der systeroatischen Theologie, pp. 99 ff.
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from the outset that our religion is the only true and valid revelation of 
the Divine.
From the beginning, Troeltsch believes, we must admit if we are 
to be fair, that Christianity is, and has been conditioned by historical 
conditions just as thoroughly as the other religions. We cannot point to 
any period in its history when it was absolute in the sense of historically 
unconditioned, even in the time of the primitive church. History knows no 
such thing as an absolute religion, or a universal concept of religion; and 
it is not possible on a historical basis to make such a construction of 
Christianity as to show that it ever fulfils this absolute ideal or con­ 
cept* Instead the attempt of the historical analysis is to discover the 
norms that are inherent in all the religions.
Mankind has had fewer ideas than one might expect, and thus we 
never need fear that too many norfs^will arise for the religions of the 
world. In fact not all of the religious development of mankind even enters 
into the comparison. The primitive religions, however interesting or in- 
rtructive they may be from a purely psychological point of view, do not 
embody any of the great and significant trends and values in religion, which 
are to be found only in the higher, more developed types represented by 
Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Brahmanism, and Zoroastrianism. 
These aloae enter the comparison, in which each of the higher religions 
should be examined for- its regulative principle, or Prinzip; and out of the
comparison of the regulative principles, the goal, norm or ideal of them all
2 Bttty be discovered. This goal or norm by which the validity of the various
regulative principles is to be judged is no a priori concept of religion,
Troeltsoh, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, pp. 25-35 • 
2Ibid., pp. 60-61-
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nor is it an abstract universal idea drawn from the eoir&non characteristics 
which all the types exhibit. It is a standard which evolves out of the 
process of the comparison itself, and issues from the very conflict of 
the trends that the regulative principles exhibit. The decision as to 
this norm, is, of course, a personal religious one on the part of the 
investigator; but once more Troeltsch emphasises that it is no arbitrary 
decision for the standard of one group, even the investigators own. It 
is the dominating ideal or norm which emerges with inescapable force out 
of the comparison itself, in which the secondary and non-essential elements 
fall into the background, and the truly valid and important ones force 
themselves upon the consciousness of the observer* At this time Troeltsch 
had not yet discovered the remarkable advantages of the religious a priori 
as a validator of the norms; so that here he is content to let their validity 
rest with the personal decision of the investigator.
The norm which results from the historical comparison of the 
various regulative principles of the religions affords a means of judging 
the various individualisations of religion, and although the competing 
claims to finality among them cannot be decided absolutely by it, at least 
the presumption as to the finality of the various competitors may be dis­ 
cerned. The norm is really a common ideal or goal, towards which all the 
forms are striving. This goal or ideal is embodied to a greater or less 
degree in all the individualisations. The one which embodies it most 
fully would therefore be the one in whose favor there would be the greatest 
presumption as to finality. The ideal is also the index of the truth
and the validity of the revelation that each embodies, whether that be
2 
partial or full.
Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, pp. 65-67. 
2Ibid., pp. 68-69.
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This goal, ideal or norm, which emerges from the historical com­ 
parison, Troeltsch finds in redemption, - the break with the lower world of 
nature, and the direction towards the higher world of absolute values, to­ 
wards fellowship with God, Now this goal of redemption is, according to 
him, embodied in its highest and fullest form in Christianity. In that re­ 
ligion alone the break between the lower and the higher worlds is completely 
consummated, Judaism and Islam feel the necessity for severing the two 
spheres; but because of their legalism, they do not really separate the 
higher from the lower, they place them side by side, and leave it to the 
religious subject to work out his own salvation as best he may bfc con­ 
summating the break between the two for himself. They do not supply him 
with the power which redeems him from without, but leave him to climb to 
the higher life by his own strength, or works, The Indian redemptive 
religions, in which group Troeltsch would also classify such mystical re­ 
ligions as Neoplatonism and gnosticism, do consummate the break between the 
higher and the lower worlds, but in a manner that is really a regression to 
the nature religions and polytheism, The soul is indeed united with God 
in the redemption that this group assures, but the individual is merged in the 
being of God, and his identity is lost. This type of redemption is regress­ 
ive because it loses the gains that have been made in the struggle up from 
polytheism. In the one as in the other the ideas of personality and the 
ethical characteristics of the ^ivinity count for nothing. The individual 
loses his individuality in this variety of redemption, and the world process 
loses all distinctions between good and evil, and becomes mere illusion.
Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, p. 83,
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In Buddhism particularly, redemption is consummated by the negation of 
all desire in the oblivion of Nirvana. Its redemption is just a break­ 
ing of the individual»s will instead of strengthening it through a 
positive ethical struggle.
Christianity, on the other hand, fulfils the ideal of redemp­ 
tion the most completely of all the world's living religions. It com­ 
pletes the break between the world of nature and the world of the spirit 
by building a scale of higher values above and in opposition to the 
lower ones of the world of nature. It denies the values of the lower 
sphere of nature, and at the same time is free from asceticism because 
of the positive estimate it puts upon life and the world-process, which 
according to the world view, come from God, and lead back to Him. The 
individual personality is not lost, rather it is preserved and purified 
by exaltation into fellowship with God through its self-surrender to His 
grace. Through the consequent union of will with the Divine, the human
personality becomes a sharer in the Divine ends, and a partaker in the
2 realisation of those higher values whose Source and Ground is God.
The ideal of redemption, which is realised in some degree in 
Christianity is therefore seen to be more fully and more desirably 
realised than in any of the other forms of religion. Consequently, 
since the ideal of religion and the goal of all religions are most 
fully embodied in Christianity, its revelation must be considered the 
highest and truest of all the revelations of the religions of the 
world. It is the ideal towards which all the other religions are 
groping. Yet when all this has been admitted, we have not yet proved
Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, pp. 84-86* 
2Ibid., p. 89.
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that Christianity is the absolute religion. It is a historical phenomenon, 
like the others; and although it is the highest revelation that we have 
so far, that fact does not show conclusively that it is the crown and 
culmination of religion for all time. All we can say is that among all 
the living religions, it has the highest probability of finality in its 
favour. To go beyond this probability to the belief that it is the 
final religion is a step of faiths but we can have nothing but faith to 
assure us that our religion is finality. We cannot give a theoretical 
proof that it is final. Christianity should really be regarded as the 
normative rather than the absolute religion; it will not be possible 
to assert that any religion is final until the end of history.
This assurance that christianity is the highest revelation so 
far as we now see, and that it is moving in the direction of an even greater 
realisation of the ideal of all religion is all the certainty that the
individual Christian needs. According to Troeltsch, the absolute reali-
2 
sation of religion is to be found only beyond the realm of all history.
Jesus Himself is the authority for this belief. The kingdom of God, com­ 
plete realisation of which is an eschatological consummation, is the ab­ 
solute religion for Jesus. This Absolute, which for Him centered in the 
Kingdom of God and its eschatological completion, was naive and spontane­ 
ous, born from the certainty of His great religious experience of fellow­ 
ship with God. The Christian community later transferred the absolute to 
His Person, in an effort to fortify its naive absolute, which could not 
retain its original spontaneity when it came into contact with other,




Every religion begins with this naive sense of the absoluteness 
of its own revelation, born out of the reality of its original experience* 
Now in the original Christianity of Jesus, this claim was the most naive 
and powerful* The absoluteness of this early Christian claim is truly 
universal. It makes no attempts at proof or apologetic because it is con­ 
fident of its own depth and validity. "What apologetic is added to it 
later is the work of the Christian community. Now in the very naivete of 
this early Christian claim to absoluteness and universality Troeltsch sees
a proof of its own validity. In the other religions, the absoluteness is
m
of a more restricted character. In primitive religions, it reaches only
over the clan or the territory which the local god controls* He is abso­ 
lute in his own province, but there are other gods in the neighboring 
tribes who are just as absolute in their own land. Only in the higher
forms of religions do we find any effort to extend this absoluteness over
2a larger area.
Even among the higher religions Christianity is the only one 
that erects a thoroughly naive and absolute claim to universalism. That 
is true even of the monotheistic ones. Brahmanism is the wisdom of the
H
priestly cla/s; Buddhism promises full redemption only to the monastic 
circle who are willing to devote themselves entirely to the pursuit of 
the path of enlightenment as the Buddha marked it out. Zoroastrianism 
retains other gods in the shape of the demons who constantly thwart and 
oppose the will of the good God, Ahura-Mazda, whose only helpers in his 
unceasing struggle against the demons are the members of the Persian nation.
Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, pp. 100-102* 
2Ibid., pp. 120-121'
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Thus its absolute is restricted by the demonic forces on one hand, 
and by the bounds of Persian nationalism on the other. Judaism had the 
purest claim to universalism for its absolute in the ethical monotheism of 
the prophets; but later this claim was restricted and hindered by its 
degeneration into narrow legalism and Jewish nationalism. Mohammedanism, 
which also inherited some claim to absolutism from Judaism, lost the sense 
of the fullness of this absolute through its fatalistic and arbitrary con­ 
ception of the Will of God, Who is too capricious a being to be entirely 
at one with His own ethical commands. Also it reflects too much of the 
character of Arabian tribal law and custom to hope to establish any full 
claim to universalism.
The message of Jesus contains the purest and most thorough-going 
claim to absolutism. This roots in the inwardness and depth of its own 
revelation, from which it spontaneously overflows. The Holy Will of God 
makes demands upon all men. The Kingdom of God is the all-inclusive abso­ 
lute, which appeals directly to the human soul. Its claim runs through 
all the individualisations which Christianity has assumed in the course 
of its long history. ETen the scientific analysis of the present has 
done nothing more than to reveal this very absolutism as an inner neces­ 
sity of that great religion itself, based upon the reality and depth 
of the revelation it contains.
The practical aspects of the finality of Christianity are treated
by Troeltsch in his essay on missions in the modern world, (Gesammelte
B 
Sohriften, Bd. II, pp. 779-J04). According to the view he expresses
there, any vital and powerful experience of revelation such as Christianity 
contains, must necessarily overflow into missionary activity. Moreover
Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, pp. 124-126
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quite apart from this natural expression of the greatness of its own reve­ 
lation, missions have a significance for Christianity because they are a 
means of creating a spiritual fellowship among the nations of the earth, 
which will hasten and aid in focussing the future development of all the 
religions towards the common goal to which they are tending. Missionary 
activity need not be carried on in any patronising and narrow-minded 
sense, for in the process of the creation of this fellowship, Christianity 
as well as the other faiths will be enriched through the self-purification 
which the more complete discernment of the common goal, and the inter­ 
change of ideas with the other religions will bring about.
Thus, according to Troeltsch in this middle stage of his thought 
on the question of the finality of Christianity, we cannot prove on his­ 
torical or rational grounds that Christianity is the final religionj but 
faith has nothing to fear from historical analysis and comparison with the 
other religions of the world. Such comparison reveals that all religions
•
are tending towards the common goal of redemption, and that this goal, is 
most fully and completely realised in Christianity itself. The essay, 
Die ZukunftsmBglichenkeiten des Christentums, written in 1910, and delivered 
as a lecture before the fifth International Congress for a Free Christianity 
in Berlin, in the main presents the same view, though there are some in-
t
dications that Troeltsch was moving towards a more radical position on 
the matter. He stillciaaintains that Christianity is the highest and best 
of the world religions, and sees no indication of any higher religion appear­ 
ing on the horizon. He does, however, seem to take more seriously than 
previously the idea of a syncretism of the religions of the world, in which 
the revelation of Christianity would be indeed incorporated. He even 
speculates about the possible appearance of some new revelation which
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may transcend or supersede the Christian revelation.
A far more radical view is set forth by Troeltsch in his last 
book, Christian Thought, In the lecture, "The Place of Christianity among 
the World Religions," therein contained, he retracts the view he set forth 
in Die Absolutheit des Christentums* Like his earlier positions, this 
final one also rests upon historical analysis; but he tells us in this 
lecture that his historical researches had led him to the conclusion that 
his earlier positions were untenable. It was chiefly his growing feeling 
for the historical category of individualisation which caused him to 
change his mind so completely, and convinced him that arguments he had
used in his early work could not be substantiated by historical investi-
2
gat ion*
It is impossible, according to his final view, to prove from his­ 
tory that there is a higher revelation in Christianity than in the other 
religions by pointing to an inner, spiritual depth in the redemption it 
assures; and secondly, he now sees no historical reason for regarding 
Christianity as the ideal religion, whose goal is the aim towards which 
all the other religions are tending. A clear and objective view of the 
question reveals that the other religions of the world are moving in quite 
divergent directions from Christianity, each one towards its own inherent 
ideal. Their goals are consequently not the same as that of Christianity, 
in fact some of them are the very opposite of the Christian goal. The 
various religions represent such irreconcilable trends that there is no 
reason to believe in their ultimate fusion with Christianity, or that 
their ideals would find their highest fulfilment in the Christian ideal
, "Die Zukunftsmoglichkeiten des Christentums," Gesammelte 
Schriften, Bd. II, p. 850- ——————
2Troeltsch, Christian Thought, pp. le-12 .
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of redemption.
Christianity, like all the other religions, must be examined in the 
light of the category of historical individualisation. This analysis re­ 
veals that the very term Christianity is nothing more than a theoretical 
abstraction. The vast complex that goes under that name presents no his­ 
torical uniformity whatever; it not only differs in every age, but is 
split up into a number of denominations which do not represent any his­ 
torical continuity or unity derived from the past. Christianity is, to 
use Troeltsch's own words, "a particular, independent, historical prin­ 
ciple, containing, similarly to other principles, very diverse possibilities 
and tendencies." Since these forms which Christianity has assumed in the 
past, and still continues to do in the present, are so multifarious, it 
is difficult to reconcile any of them with the idea of finality.
A further ground for Troeltsch f s change of mind is that it is his 
conviction that Christianity is inextricably bound up with western civilisa­ 
tion. Through their historical connections, the two have become so com­ 
pletely fused that all our thoughts and feelings here in the West are per­ 
meated with Christian ideals and motives, even when we are quite uncon­ 
scious of that fact, Christianity, too, has been so profoundly modified by 
its contact with the West that it has long since lost whatever oriental 
character it may have had originally. "Christianity stands or falls with 
European civilisation," is the extreme statement which Troeltsch actually 
makes.**5 Consequently the primary claim to validity of which Christianity 
can boast is only that it has made us what we are, — our social order, 
our art and science, our conceptions of freedom, and of personality, our
^Troeltsoh, Christian Thought, p. 13 • 
2Ibid., p. 24 .
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progress towards the Kingdom of God, Only through Christianity can we 
preserve the religious dynamic that we need. Some religion we must have, 
and the only one which we can endure is Christianity, which has made us, 
and which we have made*
Of course, Troeltsch affirms, the fact that Christianity has been 
the religion of such a vigorous race as our own, attests its truth and
the vitality of its spiritual power. It is, to quote his own phrase,
^ "God»s countenance as revealed to us." The validity which Christianity
has is only validity for us. Other races living under other conditions 
also possess religions which are an inseparable part of their civilisation, 
for which they can make a similar claim to validity. They can no more 
sever themselves from these religions than we can cut ourselves off from
Christianity. Their religions are quite as valid for them as Christianity
3
is for us.
Since all the religions of the world are so closely intertwined 
with the civilisations of which they are a part, the only way to compare 
the validity of the various religions is to compare the civilisations of 
which they are a part. If such a comparison were carried through, only 
God, "Who has ordained these differences, could pronounce judgment upon 
their respective truth and validity. Each religious group, accordingly, 
must follow the normative ideal inherent in itself, and seek to purify 
and enrich its own experience so far as that is possible according to 
its intrinsic standards.
The theoretical position which has just been outlined is the 
one which Troeltsch finally reached. Even in this final period, we
Troeltsch, Christian Thought, pp. 25 ff.
2Ibid., p. 26 • 
3Ibid., pp. 24-26*
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still hear the religious Troeltsch speaking in spite of the philosophical 
Troeltsch. After giving us his theoretical view, he goes on to tell us 
that practically his own attitude towards, and faith in Christianity is 
but little affected by this startling change of mind about the question 
of finality, except on the matter of foreign missions. He believes that 
missionary activity should be confined to primitive tribew,whose cul­ 
ture has already been shattered by its contact with European civilisation. 
To peoples of this type we owe it as a duty to give them a new religious 
basis upon which to build a civilisation of their own; but along with our 
attempts to pass Christianity on to them, we must constantly bear in mind 
that what we give them will take new individual is at ions of its own, in 
conformity with the conditions of their life. So far as the higher re­ 
ligions of the world are concerned, the contact with Christianity may 
prove helpful to them in their efforts to purify themselves from within, 
as well as being profitable for us; but there should be no attempt to 
proselytise among the adherents of these higher faiths.
The second practical consequence of Troeltsch 1 s change in theo­ 
retical position in regard to Christianity concerns the future of that 
religion alone. Christianity is at present faced with a new and very 
difficult situation. It needs to readjust to the changed social and econ­ 
omic conditions within its own territory. Historically it has always 
shown amazing capacity for self-purification and self-criticism. It has 
also enormous power to assume new individualisations so that there is no 
doubt that it will be able to meet the new demands that the changing con­ 
ditions of European civilisation are putting upon it. However, its present 
form will doubtless be greatly modified by this new situation. Just how
Troeltsch, Christian Thought, pp. 28 ff.
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this change will come about, we cannot prophesy with any certainty; but 
Troeltsch has faith to believe that Christianity will prove itself equal 
to its task*
As for the question of the ultimate relation of Christianity to 
the other great religions of the world, Troeltsch confesses that he finds 
it hard to give up the idea of some common goal towards which all the 
religions of the world are tending — especially since he believes firmly 
that they all emanate from the same Divine Source. At present, however, 
none of the living religions seems very near that final Divine Goal, 
which may even lie in the world beyond. It may be that the future will 
bring forth new individualisations in which the religions will be able 
to make some nearer approach of understanding towards each other than 
at present seems probable. However, as far as we can now discern the 
future possibilities, it seems likely that the revelations contained in 
the several religions will remain separate, each in its own civilisation. 
In the meantime, the truth for us is no less the truth, —• namely that 
Christianity is God's revelation to us. Just as we have learned to love 
our fellow-men as being of worth in themselves, though independent of us, 
so we mist learn to love and respect the various civilisations of mankind 
with all their differences from us, religious and other. We must seek con­ 
stantly through contact with them to purify our own motives and standards 
so that we may ever better incarnate the truth for us which is contained
in Christianity, Finally we must adjust ourselves to the idea that God's
2 
truth is not One but Many.
Troeltsch, Christian Thought, p. 31 
2Ibid., p. 35-
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The position which Troeltsch set forth in Die Absolutheit was 
the subject of a shower of criticism. The critiques of it are so many 
that one despairs of adding anything new to what has already been said 
in so many ways, from every conceivable standpoint. Outside of his col­ 
leagues in the religionsgeschichtliche Schule, Troeltsch »s standpoint met 
with little favor anywhere, except among a few isolated individuals es­ 
pecially in the Anglo-American world. However, he achieved the triumph
of gaining the approval and warm commendation of the distinguished philoso-
2 pher, Rudolf Eucken. Even before the appearance of the Absolutheit,
Troeltsch 1 s general approach to the question in Die Selbstandigkeit der 
Religion had been sharply criticised by the Ritschlians, Julius Kaftan, 
Niebergall, Traub and Reischlt Later on when the Absolutheit was published,
Hunzifer, Beth, and Meager, and the representatives of the "Positive Theology," 
Ihmels and T. Kaftan, and numerous others followed suit. It is impossible to 
go over these voluminous criticisms point by point. They divide them­ 
selves into two types. T. Kaftan represents the "positive" direction most
To be mentioned here are George Galloway, whose book, Faith and Reason, 
shows Troeltsch 1 s influence, Sleigh who in the main agrees with 
Troeltsch, and Prof. W. Adams Brown, in his Essence of Christianity, 
who while not entirely agreeing with Troeltsch 1 s conclusion?, recog- 
nises the contributions of his viewpoint. (Cf. Op. Git., pp. 273-275). 
Wendland, who would probably be classed as religo-historical theologian, 
commends the great honesty of Troeltsch1 s position on the question of 
the finality, and defends him against his Ritschlian critics. (|Cf. 
Wendland, "Philosophic und Chris tentum bei Ernst Troeltsch", Zeit- 
schrift fttr Theologie und Kirche, 1914, pp. 152 ff.)
Eucken, Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart, p. 76, "Thus 
we hail with particular joy the fact that Ernst Troeltsch, that lead­ 
ing spirit of the younger generation of German theologians, has 
brought this question (of the finality of Christianity) into the lime­ 
light, with the profundity and vigor that are characteristic of him 
in his book, Die Absolutheit des Christentums."
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effeotively. Although in his Ernst Troeltsch, eine critische Zeitstudie, 
he does bring out a number of the weaknesses in Troeltsch 1 s structure, here 
as at various other points, he does not recognise the latter's positive 
contributions with any fairness. One has the impression that the real 
standard by which he measures Troeltsch is really Lutheran orthodoxy. 
of supernaturalism as the element "which pronounces judgment upon him." 
More important are the criticisms of the Ritschlians. They also 
find fault with Troeltsch1 s refusal to admit exclusive supernaturalism in 
the Christian revelation; and accuse him of inconsistency in giving out that 
he is following the religionsgeschichtliche Methode, in the analysis of the 
other religions, and then all of a sudden turning around and declaring that
the final validation of the norms evolved through the analysis is an act
2of faith. These are the themes which Julius Kaftan set in his replies to
Troeltsch 1 s articles, "Die Selbst&ndigkeit der Religion," and "Geschichte und
Metaphysik," in the controversy carried on between them in the Zeitschrift
3 fur Theologie und Kirche, 1895-1897. Some condemnation, though surprisingly
little, is poured out upon Troeltsch 1 s Christology, — a fact to be ac­ 
counted for on the grounds that at that time Troeltsch had written nothing 
exclusively or mainly devoted to Christology, and also that he had acknow­ 
ledged his personal devotion and consecration to Jesus in warm terms in a
4 number of passages.
^Kaftan, Ernst Troeltsoh, eine critische Zeitstudie, p. 71, etc.
2 For the literature, see bibliography.
7
J. Kaftan, "Die Selbstandigkeit des Christentums," and "Erwiderung: die 
Methode; der Supranaturalismus."
Beth reviewed Troeltsch*s Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu in the 
Theologische Rundschau, 1^12, (Article entitled "Die Bindungdes Blaubens 
an die Person Jesu," pp. 16-21). In this he criticises Troeltsch for not 
stressing individual belief in Jesus more, but does not in my opinion 
point out the most vulnerable and serious defects in Troeltsch 1 s Christology'
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The fairest estimate of Troeltsch's work on the question of the 
finality of Christianity from the Ritschlian standpoint is Mezger's little 
brochure on the subject, published in 1914, under the same title as Troeltsch's 
own book, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte. The 
gist of Mezger's argument is that Troeltsch's work on the question of the 
finality of Christianity up to that time has rendered two important services; it has 
shown the impossibility of the general Hegelian type of proof for the absolute­ 
ness of Christianity; and it has demonstrated conclusively that we cannot cling 
to a type of apologetic which wishes to isolate Christianity from the con­ 
clusions of the study of comparative religion. He rightly recognises that 
Troeltsch does not deny supernaturalism in general; but agrees with the Rit- 
schlians that Troeltsch goes over from science to faith when he makes the norms 
which emerge in his historical analysis rest upon personal faith. Finally, 
he concludes that Troeltsch does not give adequate recognition to the unique­ 
ness of Jesus, when he concedes that Christianity might be superseded by some
2higher revelation. Mezger, however, is content to rest his belief in the
uniqueness and finality of the revelation of Jesus on the facts of personal 
Christian experience,
In the main the present writer is in agreement with Mezger's criti­ 
cism of this phase of Troeltsch's thinking on the finality of Christianity. 
The controversy between Troeltsch and his opponents on the matter of super- 
naturalism does not seem to the present writer the real heart of the 
question. After reading the literature on the point, one has the impression 
that more heat than light was generated in the polemic on both sides. A num-
»zger, Op. Cit., pp. 12-19. 
2Ibid., pp. 48 ff.
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ber of the opponents, as Mezger indicates, midunderKtood Troeltsch's 
position on the question entirely, and supposed that he advocated an im­ 
manent evolutionism. On the other hand, Ferdinand Kattenbusch is quite 
right when he says that the kind of supernaturalism that Troeltsch fights 
is an antiquated variety that grew up as a spatial affair under the old
Ptolemaic-Biblical cosmology, and that this type of apologetic has long
2 
since ceased to be seriously advocated in all liberal theological cercles.
The really important issue is the uniqueness of Jesus, whatever 
explanation, supernatural or otherwise, one may choose to bring forward to 
explain that quality. It has been indicated in the previous chapter that 
Troeltsch 1 s Christology does not do adequate justice to the unparalleled and 
irreproducible personality of our Lord, What critique there is to make of 
Troeltsch1 s solution of the problem of the finality of Christianity seems 
to lie in the same direction. It is from the standpoint of his own theories 
and method by which he is to be judged on this point. What he says about 
the historical conditioning of Christianity at all points in its develop­ 
ment is quite true. It is indeed no different from other religions in 
this respect. Yet on historical grounds we are compelled to assign a greater 
uniqueness to the Person of Jesus than Troeltsch in fact does. He sets 
the problem wrongly in imagining that just the history of Christinaity in 
contrast to the other religions can decide the presumption in favor of 
Christianity's claim to finality. Christianity's greatest claim to final­ 
ity lies in the unique figure of its Lord. The Ritschlians had sounder 
theological instincts than Troeltsch upon this point, — though he was right
Mezger, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte, p. 18.
2Ferdinand Kattenbusch, "Die Lage der systematisch^en Theologie," Zeitschrift 
fur Theologie und Kirche, pp. 131-132• "
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in his contention that they did not follow out the historical implica­ 
tions of the matter far enough, and se^t Jesus too much apart from all 
the rest of the religious development of mankind.
On purely historic grounds, we can reach a higher estimate of 
Jesus and through Him of Christianity's claim to finality than Troeltsch 
did» Not only as the Christ of faith is Jesus a suprahistorical figure, 
but as the Jesus of history, as Troeltsch should have seen from the inner 
logic of his own historical and normative method. No figure has so thoroughly 
stood the test of historical criticism as that of Jesus. Troeltsch, in 
the midst of a period -when historical criticism was doing its worst, put 
the judgment of history upon Jesus in too low terms. Now that we are some­ 
what removed from the thick of the smoke of criticism which surrounded 
the figure of Jesus at that time, we can see a little more clearly that 
historical analysis itself substantiates the entire uniqueness of Jesus.
If we compare Jesus with the founders of other religions, the 
only one of them who can seriously be compared with Jesus at all is Buddha. 
One needs only to read the Koran to see how inferior Mohammed is to Jesus, 
The militarism and fatalism which found their way into the gospel of the 
prophet of Islam from his personal allegiance to these ideas do not stand 
cpmparison with the lofty religious ideals that Jesus 1 spiritual conception 
for the Kingdom of God represents, Mohammed is plainly only a glorified 
Arab sheikh, not worthy to be seriously mentioned along with Jesus,
We know too little of Moses and his work to be sure just how much 
of Judaism is his creation, but even ascribing to him the most that the 
Old Testament records justify us in doing, we must still accept the judg­ 
ment of the Epistle of Hebrews that Moses was but the servant in the house,
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in comparison with Jesus, UVho is the Son over His own house, (Hebrews 
3:5,6)• Confucius is a sage rather than the founder of a religion, and 
Lao-tze a one-sided mystic, Buddha is indeed a truly inspiring religious 
figure, but his inspiring quality is marred by his negative attitude to­ 
wards life, which is a direct consequence of his atheism, Jesus conse­ 
crates life; but Buddha retreats from it. As Professor Mackintosh puts it,
it was really somewhat inconsistent of Buddha to teach men his Way when
2 the logic of his own theories would have been to go apart from all men,
Noble as Buddha 1 s personality was, he did not reveal, nor claim to reveal 
the Face of the Divine behind all life; but only the way of escape from 
life into Nirvana, non-being. Even when it is granted that at individual 
points, the ethic of Jesus and the ethic of Buddha fall together, and that 
Buddha lived out his own ethic, her personality is still marred by the pes­ 
simism of his outlook and the entire agnosticism towards the existence of 
any higher power,
"When we look across the field of history for uplifters of human­ 
ity to compare with Jesus, the field is very limited. Perhaps the only 
other figure is Socrates, He is a martyr and an uplifter of humanity; but 
there is nothing in the impression we get from his figure that deserves 
to be disignated as redemptive in its quality. Although he had his Plato 
and the rest of that group of disciples, his influence does not extend be­ 
yond the very small group of the philosophically-minded, Socrates never 
inspired a great succession of personalities from all walks of life like 
the leaders of the Christian Church to whom Troeltsoh calls our attention
The view of the figure of Buddha here presented is based mainly upon the 
little book on Buddhism by T. W. Rhys Davids, and the translations of 
the Buddhist sources of the life of Buddha by the same author,
2H. R. Mackintosh, The Originality of the Christian Message, p. 168-
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&s the historical effect of the influence of Jesus. Even the Old Testa­ 
ment Prophets are but forerunners of Jesus, and the saints derive their 
significance from the fact that they are reproducers of His spirit. From 
whatever standpoint the comparison may be made, Jesus stands out unique in 
all humanity. Beside Him all others are but as candles compared with the 
sun. There are very good historic as well as theological grounds for ac­ 
cepting the uniqueness of Jesus. One may call this supernatural on grounds 
of faith; but even on historical grounds, we must admit that Jesus is out­ 
standing and quite unparalleled in the sphere of history.
Had Troeltsch recognised the historical grounds for estimating 
Jesus more highly than he does, his contribution to the question of the 
finality of Christianity as he formulates the problem in Die Absolutheit would 
have been far greater. However, whatever doubts Troeltsch1 s earlier posi­ 
tion may raise on the question of the finality of Christianity, his final 
one is so extreme that it is a challenge which we carmot ignore. He 
reached both views on the basis of the historical method, he tells us, but 
must he believe that this radical opinion is an inherent necessity of his 
theories?
The one advance that his thinking in the final period represents 
in his clear realisation at that time that the religions of the world are 
not all tending in the same direction. The norm that he set up as the 
inherent ideal of all religions, redemption, in his earlier work, is quite 
true to the genius of all religion; but when the validity of this general 
ideal is admitted, it must be recognised that the religions of the world 
seek to realise the goal of redemption by very divergent paths. The most 
cogent bit of his earlier argument is the fact that in Christianity the
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ideal of redemption is the richest and most meaningful found in any religion. 
Is there any reason to suppose that his thinking on this subject was clearer 
in his later years? Quite the contrary seems to be the case. In those 
last days, he became obsessed with the idea of historical individualism, 
as Baron von Hugel rightly points out.
Some very grave questions must be raised about the historical 
necessity of a number of the opinions that Troeltsch expresses in Christian
Thought. One cannot help feeling very doubtful about the statement that
gChristianity stands or falls with western civilisation. If that state­ 
ment were to be accepted as true, it would mean that the two were practic­ 
ally identical. No one would deny that the destinies of the two have lain 
together for a considerable period of time, and that each has necessarily 
modified the other. But they are by no means identical. Historically, 
Christianity has shown a considerable degree of independence of western 
civilisation. The church has often been the critic of the civilisation 
of which it is one constituent factor in the past, and continues in this 
role at the present time. Troeltsch himself, in his essay G-rundpr obi erne 
der Ethik, points out very convincingly a number of points of conflict be­ 
tween the Christian ethic and the cultural ends of other aspects of our 
modern western world. As long as these conflicts exist, we cannot su- 
pose that Christianity has lost its independence of western civilisation.
Nor is it a foregone conclusion necessitated by historical evi­ 
dence that the end of Christianity would come with the fall of western civili­ 
sation. Christianity arose in the ancient civilisation of the Graeco-Roman 
world; but far from dying with that civilisation, it conquered the bar-
''F. von Hugel, Introduction to Troeltsch 1 s Christian Thought, p. jar • 
2Troeltsch, Christian Thought, p. 24-
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"barians who had conquered the old empire; and rose from the ashes of the 
ruins of the old civilisation to occupy undisputed place as the religion 
of western Europe. A religion that has been able to survive the fall of 
one civilisation may well survive the fall of another. If our present 
civilisation should end, Christianity, the most vigorous and vital element 
it contains, might well find root in some other civilisation, either in 
whatever supersedes the old one, or in some other part of the world,
This point brings us once again to the limitations of Troeltsch's 
view of Jesus. Certainly the way in which the present bearers of the 
Christian heritage present it to the modern world has some influence upon 
Christianity's hope of becoming the universal world religion. The present 
presentation of Christianity is, however, only one aspect of the problem 
of its finality and not the most important one. Troeltsch ignores Christianity's 
great claim to finality, the Person of its Founder. Just now there is con­ 
siderable practical evidence coining in from the mission fields to lead us to 
suppose that whatever limitations our presentation of Christianity to the 
world may have acquired from its connection with our western background, 
the personality of Jesus does not share these. His is a figure which appeals 
not only to the western mind; but to the eastern as well. To be sure, the 
Orient has not gone over en masse to Christianity; but there are certain 
representative men who have accepted Jesus, — men like Kagawa in Japan, 
T. Z. Koo in China, and Sadhu Sundar Singh in India. If Troeltsch's own 
category of the representative means anything, it is by leaders who typify 
the characteristics and aspirations of their own groups that we must 
judge the direction in which the temperament of the group has the capacity 
to move. These men have responded to the universal appeal of Jesus; hence
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it seems probable that Jesus can attract the peoples from which they come. 
Kagawa seems to feel that the East will come to Christ to save itself. 
In the eminently Christian letter he wrote to the Chinese Christians at 
the time of the Japanese occupation of Tsinan in January, 1932, he writes, 
HI tell you that unless Christ is glorified in the Orient, the future of 
our continent will be very dismal. Unless we believe in Christ, and deepen 
our spiritual life with Christian idealism, peace will never come."
In Jesus lies Christianity's best hope of universalism. Mission­ 
ary activity has been going on on a large scale only a little over a hun­ 
dred years, ~ a very short period for such an immense task. Europe itself 
did not become Christian in a year or evan a hundred years5 and we cannot 
expect modern missions to complete their task of spreading Christianity 
over a much vaster territory in one century. The fruits of missions are 
already sufficiently impressive to make it very doubtful whether the
fusion between Christianity and our civilisation is nearly so complete as
U
Troeltsch supposed. It is, moreover, not equivalent of- saying that the tri­ 
umph of Christianity over the East would mean the dominance of Western 
civilisation. They may take Jesus without taking western Christianity at 
all. Ghandi is certainly no friend of western civilisation; but he has 
repeatedly acknowledged his debt to Jesus.
One point which Troeltsch makes in his discussion of the question 
of the finality of Christianity in his last lectures is very significant in 
its relation to the universal appeal of Jesus. He says, ther,e that it is 
a proof of the validity and depth of Christianity that it has become the
Toyohiko Kagawa, Letter to the Chinese Christians at Tsinan, written in 
January, 1932, printed for private circulation by the Society of 
Friends in Philadelphia.
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raligion of a race like our own. Troeltsch is right; for if Christianity 
can subdue the spirit of a race whose native tendencies are in many respects 
so foreign to the teachings of Jesus as our own are, there is good reason 
to believe that He cannot fail to appeal to the peoples of the Orient. The 
Japanese are enough like ourselves to give us the right to suppose that if 
Jesus can conquer us, He is certain to attract them. There is much in His 
teaching which should appeal to the practical-minded Chinese. Of all the 
nations of the East, none seems to display such a different type of men­ 
tality from the western as India. Yet Stanley Jones, a missionary of long
experience in that country, tells us that India does not want Christianity,
2 but she does want Christ.
That is the difference. We cannot expect to find our type of 
Christianity of universal appeal; but we can expect to find that our Master 
has the power to draw all men unto Him. It may be that these other nations 
will make new individualisations of Christianity in conformity to their own 
needs and temperaments that will be quite unlike our own form, as the mis-
i
sionaries tell us. In that case, their understanding of Jesus will but 
illuminate Him in new ways so that we shall see more of His fulness when 
the line of eastern Christian saints is added to succession He has inspired
in the West,
Another statement in Troeltsch 1 s later thought on the finality 
of Christianity causes us to wonder whether he was really following the 
logic of his own theories of norms. This concerns Christianity itself. 
Is Christianity really so lacking in historical continuity that the very 
expression itself is nothing more than a "theoretical abstraction"?
Troeltsch, Christian Thought, p. 26,
2Stanley Jones, The Christ of the Indian Road, p. 18
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Are there not certain normative trends that weld these diverse forms to­ 
gether? Troeltsch himself in his earlier work was among those who gave 
an affirmative answer to this question. At that time he pointed out the 
four great normative ideas of God, man, the world, and redemption, which, 
even though variously interpreted at different times in the history of 
the Church, are passed on from generation to generation as directive 
trends around which the religious experience of each generation focusses 
itself. There is also the fifth and greatest unifying factor, Jesus Himself, 
of whose continuous normative influence Troeltsch himself in his earlier 
years knew how to tell us in warm terms. These unifying, normative aspects 
did not disappear from Christianity between the time that Troeltwch did 
his early work, and this final phase of his thought. It was Troeltsch 
who changed, not the fact. The change in his thinking was due to his 
entire preoccupation with the category of historical individuality. He 
had lost the sight of the forest for the trees.
This intense concentration upon the individual and relative as­ 
pects of all historical forms accounts also to some extent for his theory 
of polymorphous truth. That conception appears for the first time in his 
system as far back as 1907, in the lecture entitled Die Trennung von Staat 
und Kirche, but the notion does not become prominent in his system until 
about 1918, when we find several references to it in his Kaisergeburtstagsrede, 
fiber Massta1 be zur Beurteilunghistorischen Dinge. From that time on, 
Troeltsch becomes a thorough-going relativist. The example of this position 
is his statement in Christian Thought that even science and logic seem to 
exhibit strong individual differences in their fundamental rudiments and 
an innermost nature under different skies, and upon different soils.




Since even these supposedly fixed sciences vary so greatly, Troeltsch 
argues, that it should not surprise that truth in religion is many instead 
of one * Starting from Troeltsch's parallel of science and logic, one 
cannot but question whether he is stating a fact or merely giving voiee 
to a subjective aberration from fact. First of all, it must be said that 
our western civilisation is the only one which has made any important 
contribution either in science or in logic. The Oriental countries have 
created speculative philosophies, but not logic, and what progress they 
have achieved along scientific lines has been almost wholly the effect 
of western influence. However, there is nothing specifically Oriental in 
the science they do have. The Indian physicist who was recently awarded the 
Hobel prize in physics did not approach his research with some peculiarly 
Indian method unlike that of western physicists. Nor was the procedure of 
the Japanese doctor Noguchi, in his scientific labours anything essentially 
Japanese, which differentiated it from the methods of all European and 
American doctors.
Even in religion, where the element of value judgment enters 
into the apprehension of truth to a greater degree than in science, we 
cannot rest content with a theory of polymorphous truth. Werturteile root 
in Seinsurteile. If God exists, as Christianity teaches, then the Buddhistic 
atheism must be wrong. Even in these days of relativism, the law of con­ 
tradictions is not abrogated. Either God does exist, or He does not exist; 
and about existential facts there is no room for different opinions. If 
God is the loving Father that Jesus reveals, He is not the arbitrary and 
capricious Being "Whom Mohammed reveals. We cannot be content to rest our 
belief in the ultimate validity of Christianity simply with the idea that 
it is valid for us. Our convictions in the matter might well be wrong;
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for subjective feeling is not an ultimate test of validity. However, our 
faith in the finality of Christianity has a better ground, ~ the unique 
historical personality of Jesus. His revelation certainly does not agree 
at essential points with that of the other religions, but His personality 
is the greatest attestation that we can desire to the superiority of His 
apprehension of God to that of the other founders of religion. This is 
not a proof, to be sure, but it is a high historic probability.
Troeltsoh applied the historical category of individualisation 
and of irreproducibility very thoroughly at most points in his work, but 
in the very place where the greatest individuality and irreproducibility 
are to be discovered, has a curious blind spot, -- due no doubt to his 
effort to keep free of prejudging the case on a religious basis. Further­ 
more, in his consideration of Christianity in history in his own category 
of development, he should have found the counter-balance to his entire 
preoccupation with individuality. Development presupposes some continuity, 
It is not equivalent to transformationj but Troeltsch, in his final his­ 
torical examination of Christianity, unconsciously applied to the history 
of Christianity some new category of transformation, which he does not 
mention in his list. If he had followed the inner logic of his own norma­ 
tive method in history, his judgment> would have been very different from 
the one he gives us in that final book, Christian Thought. Once more it 
is Troeltsch himself who fails, not his method. The root of his failure 
lies in his low historical estimate of the place of the Person of tfesus 
as a decisive factor in the question of the finality of Christianity.
CHAPTER IX 
(Conclusion)
THE VALUE OF TROELTSCH'S CONCEPT OF NORMS IN THEOLOGY
The preceding chapters have been concerned with the presentation 
of Troeltsch 1 s theory of norms in theology, and its application in the fields 
of history in general, in Christianity in particular, and finally in the 
wider sphere of the great religions of the world. All the way through, the 
effort of the survey has "been to see in the functioning of the theory at 
individual points both its excellencies and its shortcomings. Above all, 
however, the attempt has been to find the inner logic of the theory itself 
and to appraise it in the light of its own inherent necessities. The final 
critique, however, must be an evaluation of the system of the norms as a 
method of procedure in the solution of the problem of authority. Here, 
also, the emphasis of our estimate will center upon discovering how far 
Troeltsch carried out the method according to its own logic, rather than on 
measuring the construction by the standard of some external viewpoint, our 
own or any other.
No one can read Troeltsch 1 s writings without marvelling at the 
vast scope of his learning, the enormous productive power of his mind, the 
comprehensiveness with which he grasped the conflicting trends of modern 
life, and the religious insight with which he pointed surely to the poten­ 
tialities for good or for ill in them all, from a Christian standpoint. 
Troeltsch 1 s work as a theologian, philosopher and historian covers so wide 
a field that at first sight it may seem to lack all unity. It does not 
have the unity of an ordered system, its unity is one of motive and domin­ 
ating interest. It centers about the search for normative religious truth 
in all three fields, sometimes in one, sometimes in another, or in all three 
at once; but the quest is one wherever he pursues it.
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His contribution to the solution of his problem is not one of 
content except at individual points; but his method is one which we cannot 
ignore. The problem with which he wrestled is our problem, and although 
we cannot find in him the ready-made results that more one-sided temperaments 
give us, we can find a method ready to our hand, which with careful and com­ 
plete application, will help us to find the solutions and the conclusions 
that he did not reach himself. Both Troeltsch 1 s successes and failures lay 
in the amazing vitality and complexity of his own personality. Ernst 
Troeltsch himself is a cross-section of life. Life is not capable of being 
fitted into any system; nor can Troeltsch be confined within the bounds of 
a system. He pointed out all sorts of problems, and gave off ideas about 
them as radium gives off emanations; but before he had worked the prob­ 
lems through to the end, he would change all his theories, and move on to 
something else. The only continuity in his work is therefore the growth 
of the method by which he sought to find the norms, and it is just there 
that his contribution lies. Through this complexity of his own tempera­ 
ment we must also account for the fact that his theories have a potentiality 
for far greater usefulness than they achieve in his own hands. Before he 
had reaped the fruits of any cycle of his theories, life and his own 
restless spirit had driven him on to seek other ways of discovering truth.
In the very presence of so many conflicting and divergent trends 
in his own person lies the secret of the inconsistencies and incompatibili­ 
ties of his theories. He saw what was genuinely valuable in very diverse and 
conflicting interests and values and tried to conserve them all. Sometimes 
this was a liability, but more often it was the source of the vitality and 
fertility of his approach to his problems. No one can understand or rightly 
evaluate the theories that he created without understanding Ernst Troeltsch, 
the man. The actual results that he achieves are exactly in proportion to
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what his own restless and many-sided personality allowed him to achieve.
In appraising the theory of the norms, we must judge the method, 
not by what Troeltsch himself made of it, but by its own inherent fruitful- 
ness apart from his own application of it. Troeltsch himself ended his life work 
by succumbing to the very relativism and individualism that he had sought 
all his life to avoid, but this was not the necessary or logical outcome 
of his theory of norms in history and theology. It was the relativity and 
fluidity of the man himself. The theory has great potential value in 
the solution of the problem of authority, if certain gaps are filled in, 
and some slight aberrations and over-emphases due to Troeltsch 1 s own 
temperament are corrected. After all, Troeltsch's is the most noteworthy 
attempt to wrestle with the problem of normative religious truth and its 
relation to history that we have seen since modern historical criticism 
arose*
The problem to which Troeltsch gave his life is our problem, 
too, and we cannot close our eyes to it unless we take refuge in some form 
of dogmatism, which solves the problem by ignoring it. One such easy 
solution is the road to Rome, either by the direct route of going over to 
the Roman Church or by the indirect way of the High Church povement. 
Neither of these ways faces the reality of the problem. Nor is the way 
of the Dialectic theology a real solution to the problem of faith and 
history. It is rather a. subtle and clever evasion of reality in the 
question by setting up a dualism between revelation and everything else, 
be it history, criticism, science or culture. The only way out of the 
problem of faith and history is through it, as Troeltsch rightly saw. 
His method has the great merit of being a real attack on the problem.
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MFaith cannot create factsj it can only interpret them." 
History and Christianity are inextricably bound together by the fact 
that Jesus was an historical figure. The whole problem of faith and 
history centers in Jesus. He is and must remain the surest hold and 
anchor for faith in history, without which Christianity would perish. 
Any questions which can be raised in reference to the main events of Jes
us' 
life, or the chief outlines of His teaching, must be faced honestly and 
fairly by the Church, if its Christology is not to be Docetic, sentiment
al, 
or mythical. Troeltsch set the problem of faith and history correctly 
there. He also saw clearly the further historical problem of the con­ 
nection between Christianity and history through the development that 
comes about in the succeeding centuries. That interconnection con­ 
fronts us with the need for sorting out the valid and permanent elements
 
in the extraneous additions to the Christian heritage from those which 
are mere accretions and out of line with its own genius. Troeltsch 1 s 
normative method not only states this problem but gives us a means of 
attack upon it. That alone is a valuable contribution to the problem of
 
authority, and a useful supplement to the work of a man like Harnack, wh
o 
merely calls attention to, and condemns the presence of the factors in t
he 
historical heritage of Christianity which are not included in the origin
al 
teachings of Jesus.
A further service of Troeltsch*s theory as a contribution to
Against Troeltsch 1 s contention that Christianity has developed histori­
 
cally, Karl Beth asserts that it has merely unfolded. (Beth, 
"Entfaltung und Entwicklung," Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirohe, 
1910, pp. 406-417). Of course, Christianity has unfolded, but it 
has also developed historically. It is impossible to ascribe the 
fusion of Christian doctrine with the heritage of Greek philosophy 
to "unfolding," to cite only one example .
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the problem of the authoritative versus the merely incidental and ex­ 
traneous, is that it consistently recognises the independence of religion 
in general and Christianity in particular from other factors in the cul­ 
tural aggregate of which it is a part. To be sure, in his book, Christian 
Thought, Troeltsch himself loses sight of this differentiation and iden­ 
tifies Christianity pretty thoroughly with western civilisation; but in 
all his earlier work, he showed very clearly, and conclusively that Christi­ 
anity was not only modified by the culture with which its lot was oast, 
but was also a positive and independent force which changed, modified, 
and curbed the action of these other factors in conformity with its own 
genius. That is surely the thesis of the Soziallehren, and even in Der 
Historismus, the proposed cultural synthesis was to be built around the 
highest values embodied in the life of the group, which in Troeltsch 1 s eyes 
were always the religious ones,
Troeltsch 1 s theory of norms does us the service of providing 
a means of distinguishing the historical elements which are native to the 
genius of the Christian heritage from those which are foreign to its 
spirit. This is a contribution toihe problem of authority which is still 
needed in the Christian world, — perhaps more so than ever before, when 
numerous new problems confront Christianity in its contact with the un­ 
paralleled situation in which we now find ourselves. We have great need 
to select from these new currents those trends which can be fused with 
historic Christianity and those which we must discard as entithetical to 
its ideals. Just here, however, lies one of the difficulties of Troeltsch 1 s 
statement of his method. He rests the validity of the normative elements 
thus to be distinguished upon the personal decision of the investigator, —
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a suggestion which leaves the door -wide open to subjectivism. There 
•would always be the danger that any modern attempt to distinguish the norms 
which are to direct the future will be nothing but ideas prized by the mo­ 
ment, or reflections of some vagary of the investigator himself. Even the 
great are not free from prejudices or cherished theories, and it is hard 
for even a genius to escape conditioning by the spirit of his time. Of 
course, Troeltsch frankly admits that some subjectivism is inevitable in 
the process; but his statement is somewhat faulty in that it stresses so 
greatly the importance of "this creative act of decision on the part of the 
investigator, — an idea that seems to have been very precious to him 
personally. If he had laid greater emphasis on keeping in line with the 
great figures of the past, the Prophets, the saints, and above all, Jesus 
Himself, he would have insured greater objectivity to the operation of 
his theory. He does suggest this guarantee of objectivity occasionally, 
but does not carry it out consistently enough.
Although it is a defect of Troeltsch1 s statement of the theory 
that he does not guard himself sufficiently against subjectivity, it is 
a merit of the theory as a contribution to the problem of authority that 
it provides a place for the possibility of new revelation. No authority 
that is static is adequate; for revelation, as Troeltsch finely perceived, 
is a living affair, grounded in the continuing activity of the living God 
in history. However, interestingly enough, although Troetlsch is so care­ 
ful to provide for that possibility, there is practically nothing in his 
own construction of "the normative essence of present-day Christianity to 
which one could definitely point as new revelation. This was not due to
Troeltsch, Article, MDogmatik," Section 3 in Die Religion in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, 1910 edition ,
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any lack of insight on Troeltsch 1 s own part, but to the unreligious trend 
of that age. What changes have corns about in theology recently are due to 
the impact of science for the most part, not to new revelations. We are 
not in an age when many new revelations are being vouchsafed to us; but there 
is always the possibility that in some era that is more sensitive to the 
Divine than ours, new revelation may arise. It is one claim to future 
usefulness for Troeltseh's plan that it provides for that contingency.
The crux of the question of the theory of norms as a contribution 
to the problem of authority is whether Troeltsch has really pointed the 
way to the discovery of absolutes, or whether he has just given a set of 
relative values which are ever-changing, temporary, and dependent upon 
the form in which they are embodied for their validity. It must be ad­ 
mitted that in Troeltsch 1 s later work, the latter is the case; but once 
again, this is not the inherent fault of the method, nor the necessary 
outcoma of its application. Historically we can know absolutes in only one 
way — by their timeless character. To see an absolute in the present and 
recognise it as such is really only an act of intuition, and we cannot 
be sure that we have really apprehended an absolute until enough time has 
elapsed to show us that this new value is really §UperHistorical. However, 
as we look back over the past, we can detect the absolutes as such much 
more easily; though, as Sleigh puts it, even there they do not spring out 
at us full-grown, like Minerva from Jove's head. The absolutes are always 
intermingled with relatives, therefore it takes insight to find them. 
Troeltsch, in his historical studies, became so absorbed in the relative 
dress of the absolutes that he missed their essential core. This is to be
1Sleigh, The Sufficiency of Christianity, p. 201
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attributed to his great preoccupation with the idea of the individual, and 
his strong feeling for the uniqueness of every situation. He lost the 
sense of the sugerbJLstorioal in the historical.
As far as his theological structure is concerned, Troeltsch 
weakened his theory of the norms by his inability to appreciate the abso­ 
lute values and qualities embodied in Jesus, where these meet us in the 
clearest and purest form of any single point in all history. "When Peter 
confessed at Caesarea-Philippi, "Thou are the Messiah," he, by the revela­ 
tion of the Spirit had opened his eyes to the Divine Absolutes in the his­ 
torical, human personality of Jesus of Nazareth. That all of Jesus 1 con­ 
temporaries did not recognise the Divine Absolutes in Him is understand­ 
able and forgivable; but that we should not recognise them after the lapse 
of twenty centuries has revealed their timeless, §upQrhi.storical character, 
is not so pardonable. It is surely the logical necessity of Troeltsch1 s 
theories to see the Divine in human life. That is really the presupposition 
upon which his whole construction is built; but in Jesus, where these Divine 
Absolutes confront us most unmistakeably, Troeltsch remains concentrated on 
the relative and temporally conditioned aspects of His personality* and 
misses the very absolutes he is seeking everywhere else in history.
Had Troeltsch reached a sounder historical estimate of Jesus, 
he would have found in Him a surer canon for the measure of the absolutes 
in the rest of Christian history than the personal decision of the investi­ 
gator. Having established them on the theological side, he could then have 
translated then into philosophic terms by the adoption of a realistic meta- 
physic, — perhaps the modern phenomenonology, which rightly stresses the 
abiding and compelling character of the values in themselves, and lays but 
little stress on the temporary and relative forms in which they are con-
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tained. The construction of the norms as scales of values in Troeltsch's 
system accords well with this realistic metaphysic, but does not make a 
consistent whole in combination with the Kantian idealism which was 
the basis he used for most of his life. Even in his latter days, when he 
•was moving in the direction of realism, he never wholly broke his al­ 
legiance to Kant. The fatal subjectivism of the idealistic metaphysic is 
partially responsible for Troeltsch's inability to construe his norms as 
absolute values, objectively real, and valid in themselves and independent 
of the historical accidents with which they are intermingled. A realistic 
construction of this type would have insured for his norms just the kind of 
objective validity which the theory demands.
Troeltsch f s choice of Kant as a philosophic support is unfortunate 
from a second point of view. It reinforced all the rational trends in his 
own temperament, and prevented the contingent elements whose value Troeltsch 
really saw from receiving the recognition which his theory as a whole de­ 
mands. Troeltsch*s critics are about equally divided as to whether he was 
a rationalist or a mystic* There are those, who, like Wobbermin, picture
him as a thorough-going rationalist. Others, like Wendland, who appreciate
2 
the deeply religious bent of his nature, think of him as a mystic. The
truth is that both reason and religious intuition were very strong in 
Troeltsch, and produced a marked tension in his personality which reflects 
itself in his work. Sometimes one won; sometimes the otherj but in the 
periods when Troeltsch is most Kantian, he is invariably most rationalistic. 
At thes.s times he nearly loses sight of the contingent elements in his view 
of the historical reality from which his norms arise. That this was Kant's
Wobbermin, Die religionspsycholggische Methode in der Religionswissen- 
sohaft und Theologie, p. 366*
2J. Wendland, "Philosophic und Christentum bei Ernst Troeltsch," Zeitschrift 
fur Theologie und Kirohe, 1914, p. 130.
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influence rather than Troeltsch himself, is shown by the fact that even 
in his most rational essay, Psychologic und Erkenntnitheorie in der 
Religionswissenschaft, we find him declaring that the heart of all re­ 
ligion is the perception of the presence of God in the soul, — a thor­ 
oughly mystical idea. The mystic in Troeltsch also comes to the fore 
in the great admiration which he displays for the sects in his Soziallehren. 
The theory of the norms is an effort to conserve both the rational and 
the §uperrational aspects of religious reality. In the historical ag­ 
gregate, both rational and contingent elements are present, and both can 
furnish normative values; but when Troeltsch actually comes to tell us 
where the norms are, he generally turns rationalist, and discovers them 
only in the rational aspects, particularly at the periods when he is most 
Kantian. Since the major portion of his theological contribution falls 
within the period from 1902 to 1914, we must attribute some of Troeltsch 1 s 
neglect of the contingent elements to Kantianism. Even in this most Kantian 
phase^ of his thinking, however, "there are instancBSrj-o the contrary, such as his dis­ 
covery of the norms for religion in general in the idea of redemption, — 
a purely contingent aspect of reality. Another instance of the emergence 
of the contingent is the importance he places upon the non- 
rational experience of the immediacy of God in the soul. However, the 
two outstanding failures of his construction of the normative essence of 
Christianity, his Christology and his incomplete doctrine of redemption 
are both the errors of a rationalist. Had he been truer to his theory 
of the importance of the contingent elements, his presentation of the 
normative essence of Christianity would have been more acceptable. As
^Troeltsch, Op. Cit., pp. 35-36.
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Professor Otto in his Daa Heilige unforgettably reminds us, religion is 
only partially capable of rationalisation, and the rational elements 
are pften not the deepest.
"Whenever Troeltsch gets away from Kant, he makes fewer mistakes 
on the rational side, and had he found a system of metaphysic which al­ 
lowed more play to the contingent, which his theory really recognises as vital, 
he would have been able to reap more of its benefits in his own application 
of his normative approach.
Aside from the philosophic structure on which the theory is 
built, there are certain omissions and gaps in Troeltsch 1 s own statement 
of his method, which need to be filled in if the theory is to attain its 
full usefulness in the solution of the problem of authority. Without 
departing from the spirit of the theory, perhaps we may be allowed to sup­ 
plement the theory at these points by what additions it seems logically to 
require. In the first place, Troeltsch nowhere distinguishes clearly be­ 
tween those norms whose permanent and valid character is assured, and 
those trends which are hypothetically, but hot certainly, normative in 
character. There should be a gradation among the norms, especially those 
for the essence of Christianity. This gradation is implicit in the dis­ 
tinction which he makes between the historical norms, and those of pre­ 
sent experience; but he does not make any statement about the gradation 
of the norms in his discussion of the method by which these are derived. 
It is the opinion of the present writer that four different grades of 
norms emerge from Troeltsch 1 s analysis of Christianity.
Jesus Himself is the supreme norm for Christianity for all 
time. His normative position is assured by the uniqueness of Kis own per­ 
sonality, the authority of His Person and message as a revelation of God, 
and by the experience of the Church throughout the ages. His unparalleled
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influence is attested by the succession of the saints whom He has in­ 
spired, as Troeltsch so well points out. The judgment of history is 
that His personality is Puperrn.istorical, timeless, and contains abso­ 
lute qualities and values which are indispensable to Christians in all 
ages. By Him we measure our individual religious experience, and in 
Him we find the example and inspiration for all our attempts to find 
and do the Will of God in our individual lives and in society. He is 
therefore the central and permanent norm for the Christianity of all 
periods.
Perhaps it would seem from the foregoing that Troeltsch was 
in error to admit any other norms into Christianity besides Jesus, and 
that the Ritschlians were right in making Him the sole center of authority 
in the uhurch. Such is not the case, however, though Troeltsch has 
left a certain gap in his theory because he does not tell us more of the 
reasons why he admits other figures to a normative position. He does 
give us some considerations which make it impossible to see in Jesus 
the sole' norm for his system; but he does not define carefully enough 
just how and for what the other personalities are normative. Without 
departing too much from the spirit of Troeltsch 1 s work, it would seem 
that some of these reasons may be supplied as a supplement to the theory.
Troeltsch tells us that we do not know all the details of 
Jesus' life and teachings; therefore we cannot hope to make Him the sole 
authority. Furthermore, we can appreciate Him fully only as the great 
figures of the Church illuminate and throw into high relief the quali­ 
ties which they catch from Him, and embody in their own lives. Both 
of these are cogent reasons which we can neither deny or ignore.
''Of. Die Bedeutung Jesu fur den Glauben, and the Section on Christology 
—i[n~tnir Glaubens\ehre *
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There are several other ways in which the authority of these other figures 
can supplement the authority of Jesus. This brings us to the second 
grade of norms, those discernible in the great leaders of the Church who have 
undeniable authoritative significance, but whose authority is on a distinctly 
lower plane than that of Jesus.
We cannot make Jesus the norm for our experience of Him as 
Redeemer. He is the Revealer of God; we can discern that fact clearly 
whatever obscurities or critical difficulties may confront us in the 
gospel records. However, since His self-consciousness as Messiah is 
one of the most unclear of all the problems in the gospels, we cannot be 
sure in what senses He would wish us to regard Him as Redeemer, through 
Whose life and death we are able to receive and accept the grace of God. 
We do not know exactly what interpretation Jesus placed on these events 
Himself. Jesus is the object of our experience of redemption, not the 
subject of it. We alone are the subjects of an experience of redemption, 
which Jesus never had, so far as we know, for He did not need it. It 
is from the other personalities of the Church, Paul, the author of the 
Epistle to the Hebrews, the writer of the Fourth Gospel, Augustine, 
Luther, and the other heroes of the faith that we must seek the norms 
for our experience of redemption through Christ. Certainly any theory 
of authority that did not provide norms for the Christian experience of 
redemption would be very thin indeed.
We need the guidance of the classic expressions of the ex­ 
perience that great souls have had in Jesus to lead us to the fullness 
of a well-rounded appreciation of His greatness and His meaning for our 
lives. In all our Christological thinking, these other leaders must 
provide the normative formulations for us. There is some truth in
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the observation that we cannot entirely share the religion of Jesus, but 
must content ourselves, at least until we are redeemed by Him, with the 
religion about Him, For these elements which are integral to Christian 
experience, we need the normative guidances of the master Christians in 
all ages. These considerations alone would make it impossible to see in 
Jesus the sole center of authority.
No one of the great figures of the Church is absolutely norma­ 
tive as an individual, but as a group their authority is indispensable. 
Some thoroughly devoted Christians prefer the Johannine Christology to 
The Pauline, others find greater richness in that of the Epistle to the 
Hebrews, There are those who see a congenial interpretation of 
the meaning of Christ in Calvin*s teaching; others in Luther. Some 
find the charm of Jesus embodied more beautifully in St. Francis of 
Assisi than in St. Augustine. Christology is a growing affair. New 
saints may arise who will add to the fulness of our appreciation of 
Jesus by giving us new Christologies, or combining the old in new ways. 
The normative position of the interpreters of Jesus is permanent as a 
group, but there, must be freedom to select from their contributions as 
individuals.
The third group of norms which should be distinguished are 
those whose authority depends not so much upon the universal and absolute 
Xaluee which they embody, as upon their applicability to similar situation?, 
where the historical combination of factors is such that they are authori­ 
tative and useful in the solution of corresponding problems. This class 
of norms would include normative solutions of both a doctrinal and a 
practical character. It is impossible to find in Jesus an answer to all 
questions that may arise in the life of the Christian body. To
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cite one example, Paul gives us more light on missionary methods and 
aims than Jesus does; for Paul had a broader experience in that field. 
The Church has had a long history, in which it has had to meet a great 
variety of situations and solve a great many problems. On the doc­ 
trinal side, the creeds are the attempt of the Church to reach a norma­ 
tive position. But not only is this a matter of doctrines. In prac­ 
tical questions, too, we need whatever normative solutions the experi­ 
ence of the Church in similar historical situations can give us, in 
so far as it is a true application of the Spirit of Jesus, and is capable 
of translation into terms that will be understandable and helpful to 
our own age. A practical illustration may serve to clarify this point. 
Our age is one in which it seems that civilisation itself is tottering. 
Perhaps there are Christian canons for it in the teaching of St. Augustine, 
who also lived in an age of decay. There are other epochs, like the 
age of the Reformation, to which Troeltsch so often pointed, which are 
so rich in religious creativity that they can furnish normative guidance 
to almost any succeeding generation. The values embodied in such an age, 
and those from any other period which are transferable to other situations 
constitute this third class of norms of occasional applicability. 
The absolute character of thes® three classes of norms is 
historically assured. The fourth class is that of tentative or hypo­ 
thetical norms. There are many problems which confront Christianity at 
the present time that are quite unparalleled in its history. Jesus did 
not tell us explicitly what to do about war, the economic order, inter­ 
nationalism, or any of the other burning social questions upon which the 
modern Church cannot turn its back. The history of the Church can give
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us little that is normative towards the solution of these vital issues. 
Even in the realm of doctrine, we are confronted by the unprecedented 
heresy of having within the ranks of the church itself those who deny 
the existence of God. It is for an age like ours that this fourth 
class of norms must be discerned, — those trends which so far as the 
best religious insight of our time can see lie in line with the Christian 
ideal of the past. We do not have history behind us to show just where 
these values are, or what they are; but we must try to apprehend these 
new norms along the lines that Troeltsch suggested. We must look for 
new revelation in the light of the old. We must seek the norms for a 
new synthesis of Christianity which shall embody its ideal and the 
Spirit of its Master better than in the past. That is the contribution 
of Troeltsch 1 s theory of the new norms. For their validation we have 
nothing but the guidance of the Spirit. Yet if we believe in the Spirit 
that shall lead into all truth, we can believe that we shall discover His 
truth for us, and for the future which we are creating. In the words of 
the little poem that Troeltsch was very fond of quoting:
"Was Gott sei wird in Ewigkeit 
"Kein Mensch ergrtinden. 
"Doch will Ktreu«* sich jeder Zeit, 
"Hit uns verbttnden." 1
By way of summary, it may be in order to indicate once more 
what the norms in Troeltsch 1 s system are, and where they are to be dis­ 
covered. They are absolute values, or directive trends which point in 
the direction of an absolute value or ideal, — for example, redemption 
is the norm for all religion. In the particular case of the history of
by Conrad Ferdinand Meyer, quoted by Troeltsch in Die wissenschaft- 
liche Lage und ihre Anforderungen an die Theologie, p. 58.
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Christianity, these norms are usually incarnated in great personalities, 
or in especially creative, classic eras of the history of the Church, 
like the Reformation. Any epoch contains norms which are authoritative 
for itself, and some of these may prove to be applicable to other periods. 
The norms may also be inherent in some particular individualisation of 
the Christian ideal, such as the type represented by the mystical sects, 
which Troeltsch admired greatly, or some peculiar variation of one form, 
like New Protestantism. These norms may prove applicable to other forms, 
and thus pass into the stream of the historical heritage, or they may be 
absolute and valid, even if they are not absorbed into the Christian 
heritage. In history the two most important sources of the theological 
norms, so far as the present writer understands the implication of 
Troeltsch 1 s theory, are the great religious figures, and the classic 
epochs of church history. In addition, there are present-day norms 
discernible from the analysis of the religious consciousness of the 
Christian community. These ideal values of both sorts, the vehicles 
of revelation, constitute the seat of authority in religion for Troeltsch.
In conclusion a few words must be said of the desirability of 
Troeltsch 1 s normative method as a solution to the problem of authority 
in Christianity. It is no infallible authority that he offers us; but 
we have come to a time when we must cease to 16ok for infallible and 
inerrant authorities in the older sense. The Catholic Church still 
claims infallibility and inerrancy, but at the price of avoiding the 
issues instead of facing them, and for Protestants at least, its claims
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received a blow in the time of the Reformation from which they never re­ 
covered. In like manner, we can no longer regard the Scriptures as an 
absolute authority in the older sense. The figure of Jesus, as Troeltsch 
quite adequately establishes, cannot be viewed as the authority for 
everything in Christianity, nor provide a stereotyped solution for every 
conceivable problem which can arise in the life of the Church. If in­ 
dividual religious experience is made the sole seat of authority, we 
fall a prey to the worst dangers of individualism and subjectivism in 
which every man becomes a law unto himself,
Troeltsch*s method is a fortunate combination of the best in 
all the solutions which have heretofore been offered to the problem. 
It is in fact such a valuable proposal that one wonders why it has been 
generally ignored even by those who have written on his system. The only 
one of Troeltach's critics who even mentions it is Earth, who disagrees 
with it. The ultimate seat of authority in Troeltsch 1 s solution is in 
revelation itself. An authority -which is to achieve fullest usefulness 
must contain objective, fixed elements, but it must also be flexible enough 
to provide room for development and change. It must be both static and 
dynamic. Troeltsch 1 s proposal provides for this combination. In the 
historic norms we have the sure and approved heritage of God's revelation 
to men in the past, through the Old Testament development, the culmination 
of that growth in the apprehension of God<?s nature and truth in Jesus 
Himself, and the continuing effect of His inspiration and the revealing
1K. Barth, Dogmatik, p. 387.
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work of the Spirit in the great succession of the saints down to our 
own time. Finally there is the provision for the apprehension of new 
revelation in our own day and generation, which the 'Christian theologian, 
by the witness of the Holy Spirit in his own heart, discerns, and gives 
to the Church for its present and future guidance.
Troeltsch has solved another problem which is a very difficult 
one in the present state of the question of authority. We can no longer 
naively suppose that revelation is before us in all parts of the Scripture, 
as our fathers did. Biblical criticism has destroyed that belief once 
for all. Nor can we imagine that any and every intuition which comes to 
our minds is a real revelation of God, as many of the mystics have done. 
Revelation, like the absolute values, does not meet us in pure and iso­ 
lated form either in the Scriptures, or at the present time. It is inter­ 
mingled with extraneous and foreign elements,th.at are as often as not 
quite opposed to the Spirit and nature of the Living God, Whom Jesus 
reveals. We must therefore select the true and .valid content of 
revelation out of all this long development, and out of our present 
religious experience.
Troeltsch gives us guidance in making this selection. With 
a sure religious sense he points to the living bearers of revelation, 
who have seen the truth most fully, and whose vital message is normative 
for us today, as for all the periods of the history of the Church. By 
these great figures of the past we measure our own religious experience, 
and know whether it be of God, or the imagination of our own minds. 
For the new revelation in our time, we must trubt to the consecrated 
work of modern leaders. The Church has usually been wise enough to
accept guidance from, its greatest and best sons and daughters. God does 
not leave Himself without a witness in any generation, and in our own day, 
we can still trust to the religious insight of a Wilhelm Herrmann or a 
Studdert-Kennedy for normative Christian guidance on the new and peculiar 
problems that vex us. If this is dependence upon experts, at least they 
are trustworthy experts, who are closer to the Spirit of their Lord than 
the Church at large can hope to be.
Karl Barth criticises Troeltsch's proposed solution to the prob­ 
lem of authority as a return to the authority of the Church, — a Catholic 
position disguised in the Protestant form of the philosophy of history. 
In spite of this objection, Barth 1 s own position is not nearly so far re­ 
moved from that of Troeltsch as he supposes. He, too, puts the seat of
authority in revelation, in the Word, witnessed by the Prophets and the
2Apostles; though he is more careful than Troeltsch is to state that the
latter are on a distinctly lower plane of authority. Barth, too, admits
the figures of Calvin and the other Reformers to a position of authority,
3 
as "witnesses" as he expressly states. Doubtless, his selection of
authorities would differ from Troeltsch's, (for example by the omission of 
the detested Schleiermacher), but practically Barth acts upon Troeltsch 1 s 
theory. Indeed, the Church as a whole has worked upon it, — consciously 
in Catholicism, unconsciously in Protestantism, — for most of its history. 
Why should we not admit the theory as our present solution to the problem 
of authority, and strengthen our position by availing ourselves of the
Barth, Dogmatik, p. 387. 
2Cf . Barth, Op, Git., pp. 341 ff. 
3Ibid., p. 40-
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large modicum of authority that is still left us even when we do not possess 
a single authority that is infallible and inerrant taken by itself?
Science eind religion differ from each other in many ways, both in 
method and in aim; but they do have one thing in common: the search for norma­ 
tive truth. In both fields, some normative truth is handed down from the 
past; but some must be sought and won in the present. History distinguishes 
the absolute and valid for us in the heritage which has come down to us; for 
the test of time reveals the gold from the dross in the combination of the 
absolutes and the relatives. Troeltsoh's theory points the way to a high 
degree of certainty for us in our appropriation of the absolute and valid 
authority that the past can give us. For the present-day norms, we cannot 
.expect absolute certainty, nor does Troeltsch promise it to us. His con­ 
ception of present religious truth is that it is a growing body of approxi­ 
mations to reality, — a conception of truth not unlike that of the scientists, 
and sponsored in the religious field by St. Paul, who said, "Not that I have 
already attained," (Phil. 3:12), and, "Now we see as in a mirror darkly," 
(l Cor. 13:12)• For the present, we can have no certainty that we have 
rightly apprehended whatever new truth God is revealing to us except so 
far as it is in line with the revelation of the past, and the inner assurance 
of the witness of the Spirit that we have rightly discerned it.
We are in a time when we peculiarly need to seek guidance on our 
problems, and "purify ourselves for the task before us through a new vision 
of God," as Troeltsch in his Dante oration admonishes us. We must seek the 
Absolutes in the relative in our own day, the Divine in the human. The method 
of Troeltsch can give us help in this search. In our quest of the Absolutes
Troeltsch, 'Per Berg der Lauterung, p* 17«
we must not, like Troeltsch himself, lose faith in our search, but must 
earnestly continue the struggle to see and to embody the Absolute ideal 
of Christianity more fully and perfectly in the new synthesis we are 
striving to make. Troeltsch failed to find the goal he sought, but often 
those who fail themselves point the way for others to succeed.
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